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ABSTRACT 
European Foreign Policy Co-operation : Interpreting The 
Institutional Debates From Fouchet To The Single European Act 
K E V I N M I L L E R 
This thesis focuses upon three distinct episodes in the development of European 
foreign policy co-operation : 1. The Fouchet Negotiations of 1961-62; 2. The 
Luxembourg Report of 1970; 3. The Single European Act of 1986. 
In the context of these episodes a number of consistent themes are apparent. 
Firstly, the inclusion and participation of the UK is seen to be of crucial importance 
to the legitimacy and credibility of foreign policy co-operation. Secondly, the 
gradual but perceptible decline of French influence among its European partners. 
Thirdly, the importance of the role of the Western European Union in the 
development of foreign policy co-operation. 
This thesis develops the view that evolution of European foreign policy co-operation 
should not be viewed in the context of a struggle between Supranational and 
Intergovernmental visions of European integration. It concludes that there is 
among member states a broad underlying consensus with respect to the fundamental 
character of a European foreign and defence identity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The creation of a 'European' foreign and defence identity has been and remains 
a constant underlying theme of post-war European integration. The realisation 
of this identity is generally regarded as the final and most difficult hurdle in 
construction of a fully fledged European Union. As a consequence all attempts 
to place foreign policy co-operation among the Member States of the EU on a 
formal footing have been scrutinised within the context of the 'European Union' 
debate. Al l projects, regardless of their intent or the particular context of their 
initiation are thus examined and judged, not upon their individual merits and the 
specific issues they seek to address, but upon the degree to which they approach 
a particular end model of that notoriously ambiguous goal of an 'ever closer 
union'. 
Whilst this study is no exception to this general rule, the evidence that has 
been examined tends to suggest that, since the implementation of the Treaty of 
Rome, this debate leads us unnecessarily down a blind alley. There exists 
among the governments and policy elites of the Member States a surprising 
underlying consensus with respect to the fundamental character of a 'European' 
foreign and defence identity. It has become clear in the course of this research 
that the debates and disputes exercising the participants in the development of 
foreign policy co-operation have revolved around questions of detail, necessity 
and relative power, rather than antithetical visions of 'European Union'. 
In tracing the evolution of foreign policy co-operation among the Member 
States this thesis can be divided into three distinct, but ultimately linked episodes 
which may be characterised as the conception, birth and the coming of age of 
foreign policy co-operation. In the context of these episodes: the Fouchet 
negotiations of 1960-62; the Luxembourg Report of 1970 and the Single 
European Act of 1986, a number of consistent themes have emerged. Firstly, 
the inclusion and participation of the UK is seen to be of crucial importance in 
offering legitimacy and credibility to the success of any project in the sphere of 
foreign policy/security co-operation. Secondly, throughout the period 
researched one can observe a gradual, but nonetheless perceptible decline in the 
political pre-eminence of French influence among the Member States. Thirdly, 
a further factor to emerge is the importance of the role played by the hitherto 
largely ignored WEU as a vehicle in integration process. 
The approach adopted in this study has been one of detailed textual analysis of 
the various draft treaties, and the issues aroused in the negotiation of the various 
drafts. In addition concentration on textual sources has been supplemented by 
personal interviews with two prominent participants in the negotiations leading 
to the institutionalisation of EPC in the Single European Act. The chronological 
parameters of the thesis are essentially 1960 to 1986, thus the implications of the 
negotiation and implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
found in the 1992 Treaty of Political Union have not been considered. 
However, whilst post-1989 geo-political conditions have led to a reassesment of 
the role of Europe in the post cold-war world, the decisions taken in the 
Maastricht Treaty vis-a-vis foreign and security policy are essentially consistent 
with the patterns identified in this thesis. 
CHAPTER ONE 
T H E F O U C H E T NEGOTL^TIONS : 1961-63 
The establishment of the Fouchet Committee had its origins in attempts 
by President de Gaulle to institutionalise political co-operation between the 
Member States of the EEC at the highest level. The desirability of organised 
political co-operation was initially expressed by de Gaulle during an official visit 
to Rome on 2 June 1959 ^, at which time he proposed the establishment of a 
system of regular meetings between Foreign Affairs Ministers, who would be 
supported by a small permanent Secretariat. This proposal was made on a 
bilateral basis to the Italian Government, who accepted the principle of regular 
consultation at the level of Foreign Ministers, on condition that all six Member 
States of the Community be invited to participate. 
Concrete expression was given to the proposal following a meeting of the 
E.E.C Council of Ministers in Strasbourg on 23 November 1959. The Ministers 
announced their intention to meet every three months for the purposes of 
'consultation on matters of international policy'^. It should be noted that 
although the principle of regular consultation was accepted, the Foreign 
Ministers decided to reject the idea of a permanent Secretariat, and also made it a 
clear stipulation of their terms of reference that the deliberations of the Ministers 
should not prejudice consultations in NATO or WEU . 
Encouraged by this initial success de Gaulle determined to take the idea 
of regular consultation further, to the level of the Heads of Government. In 
pursuit of this aim he initiated a series of bilateral meetings with the Heads of 
State or Government of the six ( paying particular attention to his developing 
relationship with Chancellor Adenauer of the FRG ) in an effort to convince his 
counterparts of the value of 'organised co-operation'. In addition to these 
personal contacts with his constitutional equals, the General embarked upon a 
series of staged press conferences, and television and radio broadcasts in which 
he expounded his ideas on the political future of Western Europe. 
"To ensure regular co-operation between the States of Western 
Europe is what France considers desirable, possible and practical 
in the political, economic and cultural domains, and in that of 
defence. This requires organised regular consultation between 
responsible governments, and then the work of specialised organs 
in each of the common domains which are subordinated to 
government." ^ 
As a consequence of this persistent and frenetic period of activity de 
Gaulle was able to muster support for a summit meeting between the Heads of 
State or Government of the Member States, to take place in Paris on 10-11 
February 1961. r 
Unable to reach agreement on the agenda set by de Gaulle, the Summit 
resolved its difficulties in time-honoured fashion by establishing a committee to 
study the issues raised by the Summit meeting. The 'study committee' 
established by the Heads of State or Government was composed of personally 
chosen national diplomats and was placed under the Chairmanship of the then 
French Ambassador to Denmark, Christian Fouchet. Thus the Fouchet 
Committee was born. Its remit: to submit proposals for the establishment of 
regularised meetings of the Heads of State or Government and of the Foreign 
Ministers. Internally the Committee established two sub-committees; one to 
study the problems of 'cultural co-operation', the other to study the problems of 
'political co-operation'. 
After some delay due to difficulties encountered in the Committee, 
allegedly over the inclusion of defence in the Committee's agenda, the Fouchet 
Committee's first Draft Report was presented to the Heads of State or 
Government at the re-arranged Bonn Summit of July 1961. Its content formed 
the basis of discussion at the Summit and the subsequent decision to instruct the 
Fouchet Committee to ... 
"... submit proposals on the means by which a statutory form can 
be given as soon as possible to the union of their peoples." 
In the months that followed, four draft Treaty texts were submitted to the 
Fouchet Committee. Of these two were of French origin, the third a text 
produced and submitted by the other five Member States, and lastly, a final 
'Joint Text' adopted by the Committee as a whole. Negotiations on the draft 
Treaties effectively broke down in failure in mid-April 1962. Subsequently there 
were a number of unsuccessful attempts by the Committee's new Chairman, 
Ambassador Cattani, to bring the Member States back to the negotiating table. 
In examining the Fouchet negotiations, the first and most obvious 
question that arises is, why did the Fouchet negotiations fail to reach a successful 
conclusion ? According to Emilio Battista, the answer to this question was to be 
found outside the deliberations and documents of the Fouchet Committee. 
"These papers show how close the opposing arguments were 
brought together and how easy it would have been to reach 
agreement. It must therefore be concluded that the obstacles lay 
not in the texts analysed but in the political climate created by 
other negotiations." 
The 'other negotiations' identified by Battista as the source of the Fouchet 
Committee's failure, were those concerning the first British application for 
E.E.C membership; negotiations which were later ended by the veto of de Gaulle 
in January 1963. Whilst the issue of British entry to the Community did indeed 
intrude upon the judgements and decisions of the participants in the Fouchet 
Committee, it would be both inaccurate and misleading to suggest that the sole 
source of the Fouchet Committee's failure to reach agreement can be attributed 
to the soured atmosphere of the U.K's entry negotiations. 
Equally it would be misleading to imply that little or nothing of the 
difficulties leading to the breakdown of negotiations can be gleaned from a 
detailed study of the various Fouchet texts and negotiations. While agreeing 
with Battista's conclusions to the extent that there were a great many areas of 
agreement and compatibility with respect to the overall institutional form of the 
projected Political Union, close observation of the draft Treaty texts and the 
accompanying negotiations do reveal a small number of very significant 
divergences between the Member States. In my view these contributed to the 
ultimate failure of the Fouchet negotiations, and continued to be a source of 
contention up to and beyond the signing of the Single European Act. Thus in 
order to explain the failure of the Fouchet negotiations it is necessary to examine 
both the content of the draft Treaty texts, and political climate and environment 
in which the negotiations took place. 
Most standard texts dealing with the history and development of post-war 
European integration ^ tend to present the Fouchet episode as part of an on-going 
struggle between the supranationalist/federalist and the 
intergovernmental/Gaullist visions of a United Europe. Explanations for the 
failure of Fouchet invariably centre on the refusal of the French, and in 
particular de Gaulle, to give ground on the insistence that a Political Europe 
could only be realised on the basis of a 'Europe des Patries'. Whilst on the other 
side of the negotiating table, one is presented with the scene of the smaller 
States, with the Netherlands in the lead, successfully defending the 
supranationalist vision of Europe against the French juggernaut. 
Superficially this picture of the negotiations has an appealing simplicity 
and fits very neatly into the stereotypical caricatures of Member States attitudes 
and behaviour, with some foundation in fact, that have emerged in the course of 
post-war European integration. 
To take de Gaulle as an example. It is a matter of record that de Gaulle held 
particularly strong views on such issues as the institutions of the European 
Communities, the question of British entry to the Communities, and on the 
French position in NATO . It is also a matter of record that on each of these 
issues, the strength of de Gaulle's views were matched by his actions. The 1965 
Luxembourg Crisis, two vetoes on British entry to the Community, and the 
withdrawal of French forces and bases from the integrated command structure of 
NATO are testament to this. These support the view that de Gaulle was asserting 
French leadership of Western Europe. Thus the failure of Fouchet can apparently 
be explained in terms of GauUist intransigence, consistent with the pattern of 
behaviour exhibited by de Gaulle throughout his relations with the Communities 
and the Atlantic Alliance. 
This thesis is by no means an attempt to vindicate, or to present a 
revisionist view of de Gaulle. One can accept the view that de Gaulle in his 
European/NATO policy was seeking a leadership role for France among the 
Western European States. But to explain the failure of the Fouchet negotiations 
on the basis of some titanic struggle between two distinct and opposing views of 
the future of European integration amounts to an oversimplification which tends 
to blur and distort the motivations, actions and objectives of the major 
participants. 
Although this will be discussed in greater detail below, it can be 
suggested that this oversimplification is an understandable consequence of the 
period in which the negotiations took place. One can observe an overwhelming 
tendency to describe and explain all 'European' projects in the language and 
terminology of the contending theories of European integration, a tendency 
which escaped the confines of academic debate and found its way into the 
mainstream of the political debate. This adds to the difficulty of analysing the 
Fouchet texts and negotiations. While it is in some measure possible to describe 
and explain aspects of the Fouchet episode with reference to the 
'supranationalist-intergovernmentalist' debate, a detailed examination will reveal 
that the issues at stake were more complex, and arguably of a different nature. 
The two major protagonists throughout the negotiations emerged at an 
early stage. Indeed the establishment of the Fouchet Committee was a 
consequence of early disagreements between France, as the sponsor of the 
original proposals, and the Netherlands, which from the outset of this episode 
was less than enthusiastic about de Gaulle's proposals to institutionalise political 
co-operation among the Six at the level of Heads of Government. At the Paris 
Summit of February 1961 and in the face of apparently heavy pressure, from 
among others, de Gaulle's new found ally, the German Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, refused to accept the text of 
a previously formulated 'final communique' outlining the scope of de Gaulle's 
proposals. As a consequence of this refusal on the part of Luns, the eventual 
'final communique' of the Paris Summit was significantly altered, and the issue 
of political co-operation among the Six, turned over to a 'study committee', the 
Fouchet Committee. 
"It was decided to instruct a committee of representatives to 
submit to the next session concrete proposals for the meetings of 
Heads of State or Government and of Foreign Ministers as well as 
for any other meeting that might appear desirable. This 
committee will also study other problems of European co-
operation, particularly relating to the development of the 
Communities. It w^ as decided to hold the second meeting in Bonn 
on 19 May 1961." ^ 
Given subsequent events it might be reasonable to suggest that in having 
the issues of the Paris Summit turned over to a 'study committee', the Dutch 
delegation were hopeful that they had consigned the proposals to oblivion. 
However, the fact that these particular proposals had the earnest backing of de 
Gaulle meant that the project was not about to die a quiet and undistinguished 
death. 
Thus in an attempt to dilute any proposals to the point of ineffectiveness 
the Dutch embarked upon a strategy of obstruction and delay, the immediate and 
direct consequence of which was the re-scheduling of the Bonn Summit from 
May to July. According to Bodenheimer ^ the postponement was due to Dutch 
insistence that any communique or report from the committee should avoid 
mentioning the possibility of setting up new institutions. While Silj suggests 
that the Dutch proved to be obstructive over a wide range of issues, most notably 
the inclusion of defence in the deliberations of the Heads of Government of the 
Six. 
In spite of the obstacles placed in their way by the Dutch delegation, the 
Committee was able to submit, albeit slightly late, a draft report to the Bonn 
Summit. The draft report was a fourteen point document making 
recommendations on such issues as the frequency of summit meetings between 
the Heads of State or Government, and the range and scope of their discussions. 
Overall the report appears to suggest a willingness among the committee 
members to find common ground for future discussion; a spirit of compromise 
suggesting a belief that deeper political commitments were a realistic possibility. 
It would however be incorrect to suggest that this spirit of compromise was 
unanimously shared on all issues. Indeed even at this early stage in the Fouchet 
episode it is possible to detect the undercurrents which would eventually lead to 
the breakdown of negotiations. 
The Dutch delegation, not being entirely successful in their strategy of 
delay and dilution insisted that their reservations to certain aspects of the report's 
recommendations be clearly stated. These reservations, which amount to an 
opposition to Seven of the report's Fourteen points (one of which is the Dutch 
reservation clause) are effectively a crystallization of what may be identified as 
the 'official ' , that is to say, the public face of the Dutch Government's policy 
throughout the negotiations. 
"The Dutch delegation...fears that the system of European 
institutions might be compromised by the creation of a political 
superstructure of an intergovernmental character. The Dutch 
delegation was also of the opinion that all questions of world 
policy which in principle come under the jurisdicfion of NATO 
should be excluded from the consultations of the Heads of State or 
Government. Moreover, the Dutch delegation felt that the United 
Kingdom's participation was desirable as it would ensure not only 
that the various shades of European opinion were reflected but 
also that Europe was represented in a more balanced manner that 
corresponded more closely to political realities. "^^ 
Thus, briefly stated, the three themes of Dutch policy throughout the 
negotiations can be idenfified as supranationalism, British participation, and the 
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primacy of NATO . It should be noted with respect to the Dutch advocacy of 
British participation that the U.K Government had not at this point made its 
formal application to join the Communities. 
Notwithstanding the Dutch reservations, the draft report formed the basis 
of discussion at the Bonn Summit and of the subsequent Bonn Declaration of 18 
July 1961 containing the instruction to the Fouchet Committee, to "... submit to 
them proposals on the means by which a statutory form can be given as soon as 
possible to the union of their peoples.'^^ 
In many respects the Bonn Declaration is a remarkable document, a 
triumph of ambiguity and compromise. Indeed reflecting the previously noted 
tendency to describe and explain all European projects in terms of a 
supranationalist-intergovernmentalist debate the Bonn Declaration is regarded by 
Silj as . . . 
"... the most skilful and acrobatic compromise ever reached in all 
these years between the Gaullist views on Europe and the 
'European' approach." 
The issues of defence, the constitutional character of any future Political 
Union, the position of the existing European institutions, and the widening of 
membership are enveloped in a smoke-screen of language open to vastly differing 
interpretations. The overall impression conveyed is of an enormous effort to find 
a form of words acceptable to all Member States. This was remarkable feat in 
view of the Dutch opposition to seven of the draft report's fourteen points, and 
the equally strident views of de Gaulle. As the The Times, noted the declaration 
was 'sufficiently (not to say obscurely worded) to overcome the reservation 
which any of the member countries notably the Netherlands might entertain'. 
Indeed reflecting the tendency to assess all developments in the language of the 
intergovernmentalist-supranationalist debate. The Times went on to characterise 
the Bonn Declaration as a 'middle way ... a compromise between the Gaullist 
Europe des patries and the Supranational concept of the Coal and Steel 
Community and the stillborn EDC'.^^ 
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Indeed as a consequence of the search for a middle way the Bonn 
Declaration is little more than a statement of aspiration rather than of action and 
intent. Its only concrete decisions were the instruction to the Fouchet 
Committee, and confirmation of an agreement for the Heads of Government and 
Foreign Ministers to continue to meet at regular intervals. This said, the Bonn 
declaration does strike a very positive and optimistic tone reflecting, with the 
exception of the strongly stated Dutch opposition, the spirit of compromise 
evident in the committee's draft report. The prospects of a successful outcome to 
the deliberations of the Fouchet Committee were thus seen to be reasonably high. 
Drafting the Fouchet Plan 
In total there were four 'draft Treaty' texts submitted to the Fouchet 
Committee. The first draft was submitted by the French delegation on 2-11- 61. 
This first draft wil l be examined in close detail and in the order in which the 
various articles appear rather than in a ranking order of relative importance, so 
as to give an appreciation of the overall structure envisaged by its formulators. 
It will thus serve as the reference point with which to observe changes and 
similarities in the most important aspects of subsequent texts. The first draft 
consists of a Preamble, five Titles and eighteen Articles. 
Continuing the linguistic acrobatics of the Bonn Declaration the Preamble 
is a wide-ranging and ambiguous passage open to a variety of interpretations. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect is found in a reference to the proposed Union 
as a 'Union of their Peoples' a phrase which is carried through to Tide One 
under the heading 'Union of the European Peoples'. Initially it would appear to 
be a major concession in favour of the supranationalist lobby. However, the 
wind is swiftly taken out of supranationalist sails in Article 1 of the Treaty 
proper, which establishes the Union as a 'Union of States'. "By the present 
Treaty, a union of States, hereafter called 'the Union' is established."^^ This is 
followed by further interplay between the 'peoples' and the 'States'. "The Union 
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is based on respect for the individuality of the peoples and of the Member 
States. " 1 ^ 
In sum the formulation of this Article is a clever linguistic compromise 
which, while recognising the absolute nature of de Gaulle's views on the primacy 
of the nation state, holds out a hand to those with claims to supranationalist 
aspirations, whose support at this stage was vital. It is a creative piece of 
concept juggling between the Europe of the States and the Europe without 
frontiers. A 'peoples Europe' yes, but a Europe in which the supremacy of the 
State is firmly established and unchallenged. 
Article Two deals with the Aims of the Union. Of the four objectives 
outlined, the most relevant to this thesis are those of a 'common foreign policy' 
and a 'common defence policy'. 
"It shall be the aim of the Union: - to bring about the adoption of 
a common foreign policy in matters that are of common interest to 
the Member States; ... - to strengthen in co-operation with other 
free nations, the security of Member States against any aggression 
by adopting a common defence policy." 
The most notable aspect of these aims is their qualified and ambiguous 
nature. The aspiration of a common foreign policy is qualified by the clause 'in 
matters that are of common interest to the Member States', thus implying that 
there are foreign policy interests which would lie outside the jurisdiction of the 
Union. Whilst the objective of a common defence policy is even more vague, 
referring as it does to defence, 'in co-operation with other free nations'. This 
lack of clarity reflects French unwillingness to make clear and specific 
commitments of subordination to the Atlantic Alliance, an unwillingness evident 
throughout the negotiations. Alongside the equally insistent demand by the 
Dutch to subordinate any defence policy to the Alliance this issue was to become 
arguably the most crucial of the negotiations. Article Four lists the institutions 
of the Union in order of precedence. They are. The Council, The European 
Parliament and The European Political Commission. The significance of this 
order will become apparent via an examination of their tasks and jurisdictions. 
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The formation of the Council dealt with in Articles 5 and 6 represents the 
institutionalisation and upgrading of the process set in motion by the Foreign 
Ministers of the Six in the November 1959 'Strasbourg Communique', later 
it provided the model for the establishment of the European Council and of 
course the inspiration for the development of EPC. The Council was to be made 
up of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States and their 
respective Foreign Ministers. The Council was to meet every four months at the 
level of Heads of State or Government, whilst the Foreign Ministers were to 
meet at least once in the intervening periods between meetings of the Heads of 
State or Government. 
Where the Strasbourg Communique had placed clear limits on the sphere 
of their discussions, "... consultations will be conducted without prejudice to 
consultations in NATO and WEU,"^^ the French text follows the 
recommendations of the draft report submitted to the Bonn Summit and places no 
boundaries on the range of subjects to be included in the discussions of the 
Council. 
"... no limit should be placed on the subjects discussed at 
meetings of Heads of State or Government. Consultations will 
embrace not only international policy in general but also political 
problems connected with the existence of and development of the 
communities and questions relating to new spheres of co-
operation, for example cultural affairs ."^ 
This all-embracing remit coupled with the ambiguity of intention and 
scope observed in the projected aims of common policies in defence and foreign 
affairs does tend to siiggest a certain unwillingness to address difficult issues 
head-on, leaving them to be fought out behind closed doors of Council meetings. 
This impression is further compounded by the voting procedure of the Council 
which appears to have contained within it an elaborate escape clause. Article 6 
states that the Council 'shall adopt decisions for achieving the aims of the Union 
unanimously', but also goes on to allow that decisions can be made in the 
absence or abstention of 'one or two' members. Decisions taken in which one or 
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two members are either absent or who have abstained would be binding only on 
those members who have taken part in the vote; with the proviso that such 
decisions may later be endorsed and implemented by the absent or abstaining 
member at any time, and from this point of endorsement the decisions made will 
be binding on that Member State. 
Taking into account the ambiguity on the issues of foreign and defence 
policy this voting procedure brings with it the possibility of an inconsistent 
foreign and defence policy. This 'escape clause' may just as easily be viewed as 
a device to facilitate movement and prevent the deadlock of negotiations so often 
a negative feature of voting systems based on the principle of unanimity. 
Consideration of these possibilities does not appear to have played much of a role 
in the negotiations. Of much greater concern was the possibility contained 
within the Articles dealing with the Council, and previously endorsed in the draft 
report, of the Council involving itself with issues falling within the jurisdiction 
of the Community institutions, and thereby threatening the legitimacy and 
authority of these institutions. 
With regard to the role of the European Parliament in a future Political 
Union, the Bonn Declaration expressed the wish to 'associate public opinion 
more closely with the efforts already undertaken' by inviting the European 
Parliament to extend the range of its debates to include issues on the agenda of 
the Fouchet Committee. This invitation had in fact been pre-empted by the 
European Parliament's Political Committee which, in response to the Paris 
Summit of February 1961 had prepared a report outlining the European 
Parliament's views on the issues raised by the Paris Summit. The findings of 
this report were embodied in a resolution adopted by the Parliament on 28 
June 1961 ^ 1 . 
Although the Bonn Declaration did decide to make a study of the 
Parliament's resolution •^ •^  the degree to which the Parliament's resolution and 
subsequent reports made an impact on the text of the Fouchet plans is open to 
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question. While not directly addressing the concerns and ambitions of the 
European Parliament in terms of providing for direct elections or of providing 
specific guarantees of respect for the institutions of the Communities, it does 
provide for the extension of the European Parliament's debating mandate to 
include 'matters concerning the aims of the Union.'^-^ which given the stated 
aims of the Union, would by implication include the discussion of defence and 
security issues. In addition the draft provides that the Parliament would have the 
right to address written and oral questions to the Council and to submit its 
recommendations to the Council, combined with commitment of the Council to 
inform the Parliament of its actions within six months. The draft also commits 
the Council to the submission of an annual report to the Parliament. 
Clearly it is easy to suggest that the European Parliament gained nothing 
of substance in this first draft. However i f one considers the highly restricted 
nature of the European Assembly at this time, one could take the view that its 
very inclusion in the institutional structure of the Union was a significant 
breakthrough for the Parliament. Indeed its inclusion represents the 
acknowledgement of a link between membership of the European Communities 
and the Political Union. Thus in a common institution the first draft Treaty 
ensures that the first Fouchet draft, symbolically at least, remains within the 
established tradition of the post-war integration movement. 
In the creation of the European Political Commission, which was to be 
staffed by 'senior officials of the Foreign Affairs departments of each Member 
State', one can identify the political secretariat proposed by de Gaulle in 1959. 
Article 9 deals with the basic staffing and structure of the Political Commission, 
the most significant aspect of which was its permanent location, Paris. Whilst 
the location of the Political Commission was to become a highly contentious 
issue, the question of location was in many respects a symptom of a wider and 
more fundamental dispute rather than its cause. The underlying cause was to be 
found in the role rather than the location of the Political Commission. 
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"The European Political Commission shall assist the Council. It 
shall prepare its deliberations and carry out its functions. I t shall 
perform the duties that the Council decides to entrust to it."'^ 
The provision that the European Political Commission carry out whatever 
duties the Council decides to entrust to it, combined with the absence of 
limitations on the range of issues within the purview of the Council, was to raise 
fears and accusations that what was being created in the Political Commission 
was the means by which the rights and jurisdictions of the as yet unmerged 
Commissions of the European Communities would be undermined and eventually 
replaced by an institution possessing no Supranational characteristics. This view 
was further compounded in Article 14, which entrusts to the Political 
Commission the task of implementing the budget of the Union. 
Article 16 provides for a review of the Treaty after a period of three years 
in order to examine progress made and to consider measures for strengthening 
the Union. 
"The main objectives of such a review shall be the introduction of 
a unified foreign policy and the gradual establishment of an 
organisation centralising within the Union, the European 
^^mmunities referred to in the Preamble to the present Treaty." 
Bringing the existing Community Treaties under the umbrella of the 
Union would appear to be a significant step towards the creation of an all-
embracing 'European Union'. However when the review Article's commitment 
to establish a centralising organisation with which to bring this about is 
considered alongside the aspects of Articles 6, 10 and 14, there would appear to 
be cause for concern among those anxious to protect the rights and privileges of 
the Community institutions. 
It is however, notable that despite the heated rhetoric expended over this 
issue, couched in terms of the intergovernmentalist-supranationalist debate, the 
subsequent draft Treaties endorsed by the 'Five' made no attempt to limit the 
range of the Council's jurisdiction other than to acknowledge that the objectives 
of the Union would not 'derogate from the competences of the European 
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Communities.' This acknowledgement had previously been endorsed by the 
French in their acceptance of the findings of the 'draft report' presented to the 
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Bonn Summit. ^ ' In so far as the remainder 'review' article is concerned the 
only notable aspect is that while reference is made to the objective of the 
'introduction of a unified foreign policy' there is no mention whatsoever of 
further development in the sphere of defence policy. 
'Article 17' sets out the conditions under which new members were to be 
granted entry to the Union. States must be members of the Council of Europe 
who accept the aims and obligations of the Union, and who have previously 
acceded to the European Communities. Acceptance of new members was to 
based on a formula similar to that outlined for Treaty amendments. 
Membership of the existing Communities in this version of the draft Treaties 
considered by the Fouchet Committee, takes on the role of a threshold, a test-bed 
of the applicant State's commitment to 'Europe'. 
The Second French draft (Fouchet Two) 
On 18 January 1962 the French delegation submitted to the Committee a 
second draft Treaty. The other five delegations took the view that this second 
French draft constituted a backward step in relation to the first draft and 
immediately rejected it as a basis for negotiation. 
In relation to the first draft the aims of the Union in this draft appear in a 
much reduced and less ambitious form. Gone are the aims of common policy in 
foreign affairs and defence or even an oblique reference to the Atlantic Alliance. 
There is in fact no reference to the aim of a common policy in any area, rather 
the draft refers to 'reconciling and co-ordinating' the 'common interest'. 
"It shall be the aim of the Union to reconcile, co-ordinate and 
unify the policy of Member States in spheres of common merest 
: foreign policy, economics, cultural affairs and defence." ^ 
Although expressing the aim of unifying the policy of Member States, the 
formula adopted by the second draft is clearly qualitatively different from that 
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found in the first draft. To 'reconcile and co-ordinate' policy does not carry the 
weight of an explicit commitment to the aim of a common policy with its 
attendant implications of a legally binding commitment to pursue a single and 
agreed policy in a uniform and consistent fashion. Rather the aim of 'reconciling 
and co-ordinating' policy is suggestive of an agreement to pursue a number of 
non-binding general principles, which would of course be open to differences in 
both interpretation and implementation. 
Whilst the absence of a clear-cut commitment to 'common policy' in the 
aims of the Union may be regarded as a dilution in comparison to the objectives 
outlined in the first draft, this dilution is countered by something of a bombshell 
in the inclusion of 'economics' among the aims of the Union. The inclusion of 
economics among the aims of the Union even in the absence of a clearly defined 
commitment to common policy adds further fuel to the suggestion that the 
French had among their objectives the undermining and eventual take-over of the 
powers and functions of the Community institutions by a body under the 
complete control of the Member States, that is to say an institution possessing no 
supranational powers. 
The second French draft adds to the institutional framework a further tier, 
the 'Committees of Ministers'. The inclusion of this tier represents both a 
separation and a development 
"A Committee of Foreign Ministers and a Committee of Ministers 
of Education shall be set up. These Committees shall meet not 
less than four times a year and shall report to the Council." 
In creating a Committee of Foreign Ministers the draft also confines 
membership of the Council to the Heads of State or Government, unlike the first 
draft which included the Foreign Ministers in the composition of the Council. 
While, in creating the Committee of Education Ministers begins the process of 
creating specialised agencies to cover every aspect within the jurisdiction of the 
Union, a development which is catered for in Article 8, 'The Council may decide 
to set up other Committee's of Ministers. '^^ 
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Given the inclusion of economics among the aims of the Union, the 
implications of this Article for the European Commission did not go unnoticed. 
The 'review' article in this second draft is shorter and more equivocal 
than its counterpart in the first draft. No mention is made of the issues of 
foreign policy nor of bringing the existing Communities within the Union 
structure, both of which are specifically referred to in the corresponding article 
of the first draft. 
"Three years after the Treaty comes into force it shall be subjected 
to a review in order to consider suitable measures either for 
strengthening the Union in general in the light of progress made 
or, in particular for simplifying, rationalisinLand co-ordinating 
the ways in which Member States co-operate." ^ 
Whilst there is little substantive evidence with regard to the precise 
motivations surrounding the submission of the second French draft, there would 
appear to be a consensus among commentators that its submission was the 
consequence of the direct intervention of President de Gaulle.-^-^ It is speculated 
that de Gaulle had become concerned that in the process of discussions on the 
first French draft, too many concessions were being made to the views of the 
other participants in the Fouchet Committee. In short de Gaulle was thought to 
be of the view that control of the Committee's agenda was slipping from the grip 
of the French. The consequences of this were regarded as incompatible with 
French interests, particularly in respect of the relationship with the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
Thus the second French draft can be regarded as an attempt to adjust the 
Committee's terms of reference. The aim of which was to produce an outcome 
more in line with French interests. That is to say, either the withdrawal by the 
other Member States of their more ambitious proposals and acceptance of what 
was now the hardened French position, or, the failure of the negotiations. 
Indeed it has been suggested that the breakdown of the negotiations was regarded 
by de Gaulle as a more palatable solution than acceptance of the proposals then 
being floated in the Committee. 
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Regardless of the actual trigger for the submission of the second draft, 
from this point onwards one can observe a clear and definite shift in the French 
attitude towards the negotiations. Where previously one could characterise the 
French position as one of great enthusiasm and dynamism, this very quickly 
changed to a position of obstruction, delay and negativity. 
Draft Treatv of the 'Five' (Fouchet Three) 
Following the submission and immediate rejection of the second French 
draft Treaty by the other five Member States, the 'Five' prepared and submitted 
to the Committee a further draft Treaty. This draft is significantly longer and 
more detailed than the second French draft. A further general point to note is 
the prolific use of square brackets as a means of identifying areas in which the 
'Five' had failed to reach full agreement. This is significant in view of the 
generally held view that the Fouchet negotiations foundered on and were 
characterised by disputes between the French delegation and the other five 
Member States. 
The most notable aspect of Article 1 is what appears to be an attempt to 
intertwine the idea of a 'Union of States' and a 'Union of Peoples'. Perhaps 
taking note of the European Parliament's insistence that the spirit of Bonn 
Declaration be maintained, the draft of the 'Five' attempts to bind the two 
concepts that formed the linguistic acrobatic team of the Bonn Declaration. "By 
the present Treaty, a Union of States and of European Peoples, hereafter called 
the European Union is established."^^ It is notable however that the 'Union of 
States' precedes the 'Union of European Peoples'. The key as ever lies in 
interpretation, ambiguity reigns supreme 
With Article 2 comes the first of the differences of view among the 
formulators of this particular draft. The objective of a common foreign policy 
attracts no dissenting square brackets, whereas the objective of a common 
defence policy results in a rash of square brackets indicating that this was an area 
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of major disagreement among the 'Five'. The point of contention in the 
'adoption of a common defence policy' being the persistent difficulty of the role 
and status of the Atlantic Alliance in relation to the emergence of a 'European' 
defence identity. In this respect there are two bracketed references to the 
position of the Atlantic Alliance vis-a-vis the Political Union.. 
"the adoption of a common defence policy - [within the 
framework of the Atlantic Alliance]^-,[as a contribution towards 
strengthening the Atlantic Alliance]" 
It is notable that this particular difficulty over the relationship with the 
Atlantic Alliance emerged within the context of the draft of the 'Five' and did 
not directly involve the well documented French objections to the NATO 
command structure. Though it maybe speculated that the second, more 
ambiguous, form of words was aimed specifically at resolving the French 
difficulty and was therefore a means of allowing the French to accept the 
mention of the Atlantic Alliance within the confines of a Treaty document, 
thereby removing a major obstacle to further movement. 
Articles 4 to 10b dealing with the 'Institutions of the Union', make a 
number of changes in relation to the institutional structure proposed in the first 
draft. The most notable change is the relegation of the Political Commission, 
proposed by both the first and second French drafts, from the formal institutional 
structure of the Union to the role of supporting body. Indeed its continued 
existence would appear to hang in the balance. The reference to the Political 
Commission in Article 4 is enclosed in the ubiquitous square brackets indicating 
this as a further area of disagreement between the 'Five'. 'The Council and 
Committee's of Ministers shall be assisted [by a Political Commission] by a 
Secretary-General.' 
Further doubt is cast on the creation of a Political Commission in 'Article 
8' which outlines the staffing and duties of a Political Commission sees fi t to 
enclose the greater part of this Article, including the title of the proposed body, 
in square brackets. 
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"The [Political Commission] shall consist of senior officials 
appointed by each Member State. [It shall prepare the 
deliberations of the Council and ensure that its decisions are 
carried out]. It sh^ll perform the duties which the Council decides 
to entrust to it ." 
While the creation of a Political Commission appears to be in some 
doubt, the setting up of the position of Secretary-General of the Union would 
appear to have gained general acceptance among the 'Five',^^ the detail of 
which is covered in Article 9. Article 9 also provides the Secretary- General 
with the assistance of a 'secretariat', and stresses the independent status of the 
Secretary-General in the manner of European Commissioners. 
"The Council shall appoint for a period of a Secretary-General 
who shall be independent of the Governments of the Member 
States of the European Union, His term of office shall be 
renewable. He shall be assisted in the performance of his duties 
by a staff appointed by him in accordance with a procedure to be 
laid down, on his proposal, by the Council. " ^ 
It would therefore appear that the apparent difference of view in Article 4 
concerns whether or not the Political Commission should have an existence 
independent of the Secretary-General or be subsumed within the general 
functions of the Secretary-General. However what does seem clear is that a 
much reduced status and role was envisaged for the Political Commission by the 
formulators of this particular draft in comparison to that proposed in both drafts 
submitted by the French delegation. 
In reducing the role and status of the Political Commission and 
recommending the creation of an 'independent' Secretary-General, the 'Five' 
would appear to have taken note of the recommendations found in the report of 
the European Parliament. This report, produced in response to the submission of 
the first French draft, expressed the view that a 'college of permanent 
representatives' ie. a Political Commission, should not be set up as a separate 
institution of the Union, but rather it should be the creature of the Council. 
In addition the Parliament expressed the view that the Council should have at its 
disposal a Secretary-General, who, with the assistance of a Secretariat would 
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carry out the instructions of the Council. The Parliament stressed however that 
although independent of the Member States the jurisdiction and functions of the 
Secretary-General should be strictly defined. The intention must be to ring-fence 
the powers and jurisdictions of the Community institutions. However in spite of 
taking on-board a number of the Parliament's recommendations with respect to 
the Political Commission and a Secretary-General, the draft of the 'Five' makes 
no attempt to define the role and functions of the Secretary- General other than to 
state that the functions of the office were to be deemed 'incompatible with the 
exercise of any other off ice'.^^ 
Of further note in respect of the institutional structure is the inclusion 
within the Union's institutional framework of the 'Committees of Ministers'. In 
the inclusion of the Committees of Ministers the 'Five' adopted and extended 
the institutional innovation proposed in the rejected second French draft. 
Whereas the French draft proposed the setting up of a Committee of Foreign 
Ministers and of Education Ministers the draft of the 'Five' adds to this a 
'Committee of Ministers for Defence and for the Armed Forces'. 
A further tentative addition to the institutional structure is proposed in the 
bracketed addition of the 'Court of Justice'. No further details of this proposal 
were given other than the inclusion of an Article 10b which noted that this issue 
remained the subject of a pending study by Ambassador Ophuls the German 
delegate to the Fouchet Committee. 
Article 10 deals with the role of the European Parliament within the 
framework of the Union. Its role in this Treaty draft differs only in minor detail 
from that proposed by the two previous French drafts. In terms of increased 
power the aspirations of the European Parliament have again been ignored. 
Article 16 is an extensive and detailed article dealing with the issue of 
Treaty review. Indicating the existence of differences between the 'Five' this 
article is split into two alternative versions, divided by the presence of square 
brackets. 
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The main difference between the two versions of the review article is 
found in the clarity with which the objectives of the review are expressed. The 
bracketed version is the clearer and less ambiguous of the two. The bracketed 
version also differs to the extent that it expressly states among its objectives, the 
creation of an 'Independent Executive' and the extension of the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities to cover the institutions of the 
Union. It can be assumed that the bracketed status of this version expresses the 
minority position. 
In contrast the unbracketed version of the review article while referring to 
the same issues is rather ambiguous and non-committal preferring not to make 
definite commitments to particular aims, rather to 'review' and 'gradually 
introduce' measures. However, when compared to the single non-committal 
paragraph of the second French draft, both versions of the review article in the 
draft of the 'Five' are extensive and far reaching, though it is notable that no 
mention is made of furthering the objectives of a common foreign policy or of a 
common defence policy, while the objective of a common foreign policy is 
explicit in the review article of the first French draft. 
In sum the draft submitted by the 'Five' differs from the second French 
draft primarily in the force and clarity of its projected objectives, retaining the 
aim of 'Common Policies' as opposed to the more tentative and limiting 
'Common Positions' oudined in the second French draft. This however is 
undermined by the presence of square brackets in a number of the most crucial 
areas, thus indicating substantial disagreement among the 'Five'. In terms of the 
institutional structure envisaged, there is, in spite of the downgrading of the 
Political Commission, little substantive difference or dispute between this draft 
and those submitted by the French on the basic institutional form of the Political 
Union. Al l project a fundamentally intergovernmental structure, with no 
supranational characteristics. 
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Joint Draft Treaty and Report 
Following the submission of the draft Treaty of the 'Five', negotiations took 
place in pursuit of a Treaty text acceptable to all six Member States. Almost 
inevitably the draft of the 'Five' was as unacceptable to the French as the second 
French draft had been to the 'Five'. As a consequence the Committee were 
unable to reach full agreement and decided to adopt a Treaty draft in which there 
were a number of alternative versions of some of the more sensitive and 
intractable issues. Use was also made of the square bracket. 
The reality of the 'joint draft' is that it can be divided into two quite 
distinct versions, a French version which differs little from their second 
submission, and a version endorsed by the 'Five' which again differs litde from 
that submitted in January 1962. As a consequence of the difficulties encountered 
in the negotiations and the unusual situation of a significant number of alternative 
versions of the draft Treaty's articles and the use of bracketed text within the 
same document, the Committee decided to compile and adopt an 'introductory 
and explanatory report' outlining the reasons offered by the Member States for 
variations in the text. 
The first use of square brackets in this final draft are found in the 
Preamble. In this instance within a passage of joint text, that is to say, text 
agreed by all six Member States. The bracketing concerns the opening of the 
Union to new members. 
"[desirous of welcoming] [ready to welcome] to their ranks other 
countries of Europe that are prepared to accept in every sphere the 
same responsibilities and the same obligations [and conscious of 
thus forming the nucleus of a union, membership of which will be 
open to other pe^es of Europe that are as yet unable to take such 
a decision]; . . ." '^^ 
The initial response to the bracketing in this text would be to assume that 
it was a reflection of one of the core disputes of the negotiations; the question of 
British participation, the so-called 'Prealable Anglais.'^"^ However, it would 
appear that the use of the bracketing in this instance rests on the style of language 
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employed rather than the sentiment. The Six had previously agreed during the 
December 1961 negotiations to establish a clear mechanism linking membership 
of the Communities with membership of the Union. In effect, accession to the 
Communities was to be both a pre-condition and an obligation to join the Union. 
This agreement is confirmed in the joint text, which though appearing as joint 
text is regarded as 'Article 17' of the French text and 'Article 21' of the text 
agreed by the 'Five'. 'The Union shall be open for membership to States that 
have acceded to the European Communities referred to in the Preamble to this 
Treaty.'45 
Bracketing of a similar nature appears in Article 1 of the joint draft which 
establishes the Union as a 'Union of States', while a bracketed addition extends 
this to a 'union of States [and of European peoples].'^^ The accompanying 
explanatory report identifies the objection to the inclusion of the reference to the 
'European peoples' as a French objection. According to the report, the French 
took the view that it was premature to talk about a 'Union of Peoples' at such an 
early stage. It would in the French view be more appropriate to employ such 
language when progress towards such a reality had been made. This position is 
consistent with de Gaulle's oft quoted views on the primacy of the nation-state 
and was voiced clearly throughout this period, and should therefore have come as 
no surprise. In objecting to the phrase 'union of European peoples' in both the 
Preamble and in Article 1 the French text can be seen to have avoided the 
ambiguity and linguistic acrobatics of the first draft. The 'Five' on the other 
hand took the view, according to the report, that the review clause in the Treaty 
takes such a 'reality' into account, particularly in its provision for direct elections 
to the European Parliament. It should however be noted that close observation 
of the text demonstrates quite clearly that the 'Five' in reality retain a strong 
attachment to the primacy of the State, tending to suggest that the various 
allusions of a commitment to a supranational Europe have a strong rhetorical 
edge. 
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Article 2 outlining the objectives of the Union has alternative versions of 
text. The French version remains that of their second submission. It is brief, 
non-committal in respect of the aim of common policy and retains the 
contentious reference to economics. 
In so far as the reference to economics among the objectives of the Union 
is concerned, the French justification in the explanatory report for its inclusion 
amounts to little more than an anodyne re-statement of the French view of the 
primacy of the Heads of State or Government which ignores the issue of respect 
for the powers and jurisdictions of the institutions of the existing Communities. 
"The French delegation feels that in view of the fact that the 
Council, as supreme organ of the Union, is composed of persons 
who bear the highest degree of responsibility in their respective 
countries, it must be able to deal with all problems affecting their 
countries interests in any sphere." 
Again one must accept that the French position on this issue is consistent 
with their position throughout the negotiations. Though it can be suggested that 
this is a prime example of the lack of flexibility and intransigence exhibited by 
the French delegation following the submission of their second draft. Given that 
the French delegation had previously endorsed the conclusions of the 
Committee's Draft Report,^^ to the effect that the jurisdictions of the 
Community institutions would be respected except in exceptional circumstances, 
it would have taken little for the French to have made a similar commitment had 
they wished to adopt a more conciliatory approach to the negotiations. In this 
light the French position on this issue can be regarded as an attempt to block 
further progress as the agenda slipped from their grasp. 
The 'Five's' version of Article 2 again remains for the most part that 
submitted in their previous draft, including the use of the ubiquitous square 
brackets indicating areas of dispute among the 'Five'. The French version of the 
institutional framework of the Union remains that which was proposed by their 
second draft. The 'Five' on the other hand favour offer a slightly altered 
institutional framework from that proposed in their previous draft. Where 
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previously they had proposed the setting up of a Council and Committees of 
Ministers as separate institutions, this draft combines the Council and 
Committees of Ministers as a single institution. The European Parliament retains 
its position and also included as a fully fledged institution of the Union is the 
previously bracketed Court of Justice. 
With regard to the Political Commission, the 'Five' appear to have 
resolved the difficulties encountered in their previous draft. The text agreed by 
the 'Five' makes provision in paragraph 2 of 'Article 5' for both a Political 
Commission and a Secretary-General, both of which are charged with the same 
basic task: 'The Council and the Committees of Ministers shall be assisted by a 
Political Commission and a Secretary-General.' 
In so far as the composition of both bodies and their specific roles are 
concerned, the text remains that of the January draft, but removes the bracketing 
which accompanied the January draft. Thus the possibility of the functions of 
the Political Commission being subsumed into those of the Secretary-General 
was removed. In addition the assumed threat to the use of the title of 'Political 
Commission' is removed, though the report does note continuing Dutch concern 
over use of this title in a reservation which also reflects the tendency to conduct 
all debates in the terminology of the supranationalist-intergovernmentalist debate. 
"... the Dutch delegation fears that the term 'Commission' may be 
confused with the name of the Community bodies in the existing 
Communities, where^the institution envisaged for the Union is 
intergovernmental." ' '^ 
Superficially the creation of the office of Secretary-General would appear 
to be a straightforward case of the French, who make no provision for the office 
of Secretary-General, at odds with the 'Five'. This however was not the case. 
Whilst the text of the five in the final Joint draft appears in an 'unbracketed' 
form, the explanatory report reveals three differing strands of opinion. The 
justification offered by the French for their opposition was to argue that the 
creation of the office of Secretary- General would at this stage limit the capacity 
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and flexibility of the Member States to act in pursuit of a stronger Union; the 
Political Commission it was argued would be sufficient to carry out the tasks 
envisaged by the Treaty draft. 
The report goes on to identify ERG, Italy and Belgium as the strongest 
advocates of the office of Secretary-General, offering the distinct impression that 
these three States saw the role of Secretary-General to be that of a Federator. 'A 
carefully chosen Secretary-General could provide a powerful impetus to the 
unification of Europe.'^^ In contrast the Dutch and the Luxembourg delegations 
felt unable to commit themselves to support the creation of this office, though no 
justification for their lack of support is offered by the explanatory report. 
Articles 10 & 11 of the French text and Articles 12 & 13 of the 'Five's' 
text ( which despite their different numbering appear as joint text) deal with the 
position of the European Parliament. The main point to note here is the 
weakening of the Parliament's position relative to that in all previous drafts, 
including the much derided second French draft. This weakening tends to 
further support the view that the despite the rhetorical utterances acknowledging 
the importance of the Parliament, its presence within the institutional structure 
was regarded as primarily symbolic, a ritual genuflection to the principle of 
democracy. The explanatory report adds weight to this view by virtue of its 
silence on the question of the future role and powers of the Parliament. 
The inclusion of the 'Court of Justice' of the European Communities 
within the Institutional framework favoured by the 'Five' is significant in a 
number of respects. Firstly, its inclusion alongside the European Parliament in 
the first stage of the Union leaves only the as yet unmerged Commissions of the 
European Communities outside the formal institutional structure of the Union. 
Secondly, unlike the European Parliament whose inclusion in the institutional 
framework of the Union cannot be said to have carried with it the granting of 
significant legislative powers, the Court of Justice via its inclusion in the text of 
the 'Five' gains a significant increase in its jurisdiction. 
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"The Courts of Justice of the European Communities shall be 
competent to decide on any dispute between Member States 
connected with the interpretation or application of this Treaty. 
Member States undertake not to subject such disputes to any other 
form of settlement." 
Connected to the inclusion of two Community institutions within the 
framework and activities of the Union, the explanatory report notes the German 
delegation's view that it would be desirable to invite the Commissions of the 
European Communities to attend meetings of the Council on issues which fell 
within the competences of the Commissions. However while noting the German 
suggestion, the report goes on to reject this proposal as a potentially dangerous 
development. To invite the Commissions to meetings of the Council it was 
argued would run the risk of undermining the oft-stated commitment to respect 
the competences of the existing Community institutions. The French for their 
part adopted the usual line that no limits should be placed on the competence of 
the Council, and added that it was unnecessary to lay down the procedure to be 
followed by the Council. 
The articles dealing with the general review of the Treaty, are the subject 
of separate texts (Article 16 in the French text. Article 20 in the text of the 
'Five'). The French version is that submitted in their second draft. The version 
endorsed by 'Five' amounts to a compromise position made up of the alternative 
versions found in their January draft. 
The main differences among the 'Five' on this issue had largely been 
differences of clarity and the provision of an 'Independent Executive'. The 
version adopted by the 'Five' in this final draft adopts the clear form and style of 
the bracketed version but omits the more contentious elements of the review, in 
particular the provision to create an Independent Executive, thus indicating a 
withdrawal from the federalist brink that such an institution suggested. The 
removal of this clause can perhaps be regarded as a recognition that the original 
inclusion of this provision was a case of enthusiasm overcoming the political 
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reality that such a proposal had no chance of obtaining the support of the French, 
not to mention the more reluctant among the 'Five' 
In connection with the review article, the explanatory report notes the 
reservation of the Benelux delegations. This reservation has the appearance of a 
threat, to the effect that i f the Treaty review does not take place within the time 
period and terms stated ie. at the time of the thirds stage of implementation of 
the Treaty of Rome, they reserve the right to denounce the Treaty. The 
reasoning behind this 'threat' centres, according to the report, on the absence of 
an agreed formula and the provision of compulsory stages for the further 
advancement of the Union. In short they were advocating an implementation 
plan based on the model adopted by the E.E.C . 
The final provisions of the draft are in the main joint text and deal with 
such issues as voting procedure for the admission of new members, language of 
the Treaty and ratification procedure etc. The differences that do exist are of a 
minor and technical nature. 
End of Negotiations 
During March and early April 1962, negotiations took place aimed at 
resolving the very evident differences between the Member States with respect to 
the detail of any Treaty of Political Union. During this period the Committee's 
chairman was chosen by de Gaulle to oversee the French withdrawal from 
Algeria, a role for which he was disparagingly dubbed, 'de Gaulle's Gauleiter' 
by the O.A.S. Chairmanship of the Committee was taken on by the Italian 
Ambassador, Cattani. Thus for a period the Committee adopted the title of the 
Cattani Committee. Cattani, it would appear made, strenuous efforts to 
reconcile the various areas of disagreement. In the main his efforts were directed 
towards textual acrobatics in the main areas of disagreement; the status of the 
Atlantic Alliance and the competences of the existing Community institutions. 
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To this end Cattani presented a number of amended draft articles to be inserted in 
the March 15 joint draft. 
Overall the Italian amendments can be viewed as an attempt to bring the 
French into the fold. The tactic employed by Cattani appears to be one of giving 
the French what they required in terms of phrasing combined with the removal 
or re-positioning of contentious issues. 
In the case of the Atlantic Alliance, the Cattani amendments remove all 
references to the Alliance in the Treaty proper, but adds a new paragraph to the 
Preamble which refers to the Atlantic Alliance in a form of words which echoes 
the Bonn Declaration. 
"Conscious that security must be preserved by common action in 
^ field of defence, helping to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance." 
The removal of the reference to the Atlantic Alliance from the main body 
of the Treaty and specifically the objectives of the Treaty, goes some way to 
resolving the French difficulty in this area. It takes no account of the dispute 
between the 'Five' over the nature of the Union's commitment to the Atlantic 
Alliance, a particular problem when one takes into account the Dutch position on 
this issue which was equally as strident as that held by the French. 
The revised Article 2 outlining the aims of the Union, represents an 
almost complete acceptance of the French viewpoint, as expressed in the second 
French draft. Gone are the objectives of 'common policy' to be replaced by the 
French formula of 'common interest'. In fact the revised Article 2 submitted by 
Cattani uses the exact wording of the French text, with the exception of the 
contentious reference to economics found in the French version. 
Although avoiding an explicit reference to economics among its specific 
objectives, the second paragraph of this amended article manages to bring 
economic issues within the sphere of the Union's competences, by virtue of a 
torturously convoluted form of words which seeks to qualify and justify a tacit 
acceptance of the Union's involvement. 
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"To further the work accomplished in the economic field in 
pursuance of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, Member States of 
the UniQtL may from time to time arrange for an exchange of 
views." 
This again appears to be an acceptance of the French view that there 
could be no issue beyond the competence of the Council. Though reference back 
to the study committee's 'draft report' to the Bonn Summit, would confirm that 
in proposing this amendment, Cattani remains consistent with the findings of the 
Committee in this area. The Committee recommended that intervention by the 
Heads of State would be desirable in cases where deadlock threatened progress. 
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It should be recalled however that this particular provision in the 
Committee's draft report was one of the seven points objected to by the Dutch in 
their lengthy reservation clause. 
Even when one takes into account the revised Article 3 submitted by 
Cattani which seeks to further qualify the Union's involvement in Community 
activities, the Cattani amendments clearly bring the Treaty closer to the 
French viewpoint at the expense of the Dutch position on the issues of the 
Atlantic Alliance and respect for the functions and powers of the existing 
Community institutions. 
The Cattani amendments were presented to a meeting of Foreign 
Ministers in Paris on 17 April 1962. The meeting broke up having failed to 
reach agreement. It also failed to offer the Cattani Committee a fresh mandate 
or to issue a communique confirming the breakdown of negotiations. In the 
following days however, by means of press conferences and newspaper articles 
the various participants offered their reasons, excuses and apportioned blame in 
varying degrees for the failure of the negotiations. 
Cattani apparently did not accept that the negotiations were beyond 
retrieval and continued his attempts to bring about a reconciliation and a revival 
of talks throughout the summer of 1962. As a consequence of Cattani's 
continuing efforts the Italian Government submitted a further series of 
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amendments to the draft Treaty. There is little to be gained by ploughing 
through these amendments other than to comment that the overall impression is 
one of further movement towards the French version of the draft Treaty, and 
consequendy a dilution of the text supported by the 'Five'. These proposals 
were rejected, and despite a number of attempts, Cattani finally had to admit 
defeat. 
Perhaps one reason for the failure of Cattani's efforts can be identified in 
the opening of bilateral talks between France and FRG during the autumn of 
1962. The result of which was the signing on 29 January 1963 of the Franco-
German Treaty. This was a bilateral treaty of co-operation echoing the original 
offer made to the Italian Government by de Gaulle in 1959, and in content not 
unlike the second French submission to the Fouchet Committee, stressing 'co-
operation and co-ordination' rather than 'common policy'. 
Earlier in the same month (14-1 63) de Gaulle effectively vetoed the 
British application to the Communities, thus signing the death warrant of the 
Prealable Anglais and any hope of the revival of negotiations for a Political 
Union in the near future. 
The Netherlands. Britain and the Adantic Alliance 
Having noted the early reluctance of the Netherlands to support the 
proposals initiated by de Gaulle the negotiating position of the Netherlands 
retained its obstructive and negative edge throughout the Fouchet negotiations. 
The negotiating stance of the Dutch delegation rested upon three themes, 
supranationalism, British involvement, and the status of the Atiantic Alliance. 
Within the context of these three themes, supranationalism and British 
involvement, can be said to have been employed by the Dutch as their principle 
negotiating weapons, while the issue of the Atlantic Alliance can be regarded as 
the non-negotiable element of their position. Indeed it will be argued that the 
whole thrust of Dutch negotiating strategy was designed to ensure that their 
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position on the role and status of the Atlantic Alliance remained untouched. In 
short, the Dutch position throughout the Fouchet negotiations was motivated by 
the desire to at best prevent the negotiations from reaching a successful 
conclusion, or at worst to mitigate as far as possible the effects of an agreement 
on their position vis-a-vis the status of the Atlantic Alliance. 
The eventual failure of the Fouchet negotiations would suggest that the 
Dutch were entirely successful in their strategy. However, although an 
undoubtedly crucial element in the breakdown of the negotiations, it would be 
incorrect to attribute the failure of Fouchet to the success of the Dutch 
negotiating strategy alone. To suggest this would be to ignore the role of the 
French in the breakdown, and to attribute to the Dutch an artificially inflated 
influence among the 'Six'. Indeed in spite of sometimes superficial appearances 
to the contrary, the Dutch position on a number of issues left them isolated and 
at odds with their traditional allies within the Community. 
The prominence given to the issues of supranationality and of British 
participation as elements of the Dutch negotiating strategy rests on the decision to 
combine these two issues as an 'either-or' choice as the price for Dutch co-
operation. Attention in this respect focuses on the clear contradiction found in 
the vigorous and vocal attachment to the principle of supranationality, expressed 
in support for the protection of the powers and functions of the existing 
Community institutions, combined with an equally vigorous support for British 
entry to the Communities and/or participation in the Fouchet negotiations. The 
contradiction here was the oft-stated British aversion to the principle of 
supranationalism. 
This combination of objectives developed by the end of the Fouchet 
negotiations in April 1962 to form the 'Prealable Anglais', the Dutch pre-
condition for the acceptance of any Treaty of Political Union, in effect an 
encapsulation of the 'official' Dutch negotiating position. 
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"The Netherlands is in favour of a united Europe that is as 
extensive as possible and therefore bigger than the six countries of 
the European Economic Community. This Europe should be 
based on supranational and integrationist principles identical with 
those of the ECSC Treaty. The French plan on the other hand, is 
founded on the old concept of a treaty between States, the alliance 
of an 'Europe des Patries'. We think that this should be rejected 
but are ready to make comiessions if the United Kingdom is 
brought in on the subject." 
In this form the Prealable Anglais may be summed up as a preference for 
a Union based on supranational principles, combined with a reluctant willingness 
to accept some form of intergovernmental arrangement on the condition of a 
guarantee of British participation and entry. Thus the negotiating position of the 
Dutch is distilled to the formula, 'Supranationality or British entry', thereby 
creating the clear impression of an element of flexibility in the Dutch approach. 
Closer examination of the negotiations suggests that this flexibility in the Dutch 
position was illusory, the Prealable Anglais is not what it at first appears to be. 
This is perhaps most clearly illustrated in the explanatory report which 
accompanied the final 'joint' Fouchet draft. In this report the Dutch delegation 
entered a reservation which fundamentally altered the character of the Prealable 
Anglais. 
"The Dutch delegation has made it clear that, so far as it is 
concerned the signing of this Treaty is closely linked with the 
accession of the United Kingdom.""-' 
Gone is the conciliatory tone which intimated a willingness to drop the 
insistence on British entry if ground was given to the principle of 
supranationality on one hand, or on the other hand if supranationality was out of 
the question, a willingness to settle for U.K entry as a consolation. Rather the 
Dutch negotiation formula of 'supranationalism or British entry' is transformed 
to a Hobson's choice of 'British entry or no institutions' be they 
intergovernmental or supranational. As Bodenheimer has indicated, the 
Dutch gave the impression that they wanted both supranational institutions and 
U.K entry, but would in the spirit of compromise and flexibility accept one or 
the other, while in fact insisting on only one: British entry. 
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This apparent willingness to jettison a supranational solution for the sake 
of British entry to the Community raises serious questions about the depth of 
Dutch commitment to the principle of supranationality, a principle often 
presented by the Dutch as a fundamental doctrine of faith. Indeed it was in this 
vein, as a point of principle, that Foreign Minister Luns justified his opposition 
to the first French draft in the Tweede Kamer, a draft which was generally 
regarded by the other delegations as providing a reasonable basis for negotiation. 
"Objections of principle have been laid by the Dutch stress 
has been laid on the absence of those supranational aspects which 
provide guarantees for the interests of small countries."" 
In making this statement Luns publicly endorses the widely held view that 
supranationality provides a buffer which protects smaller Member States against 
the weight of the larger Members. The presence of a supranational institution 
possessing clear and well defined jurisdictions, charged with promoting the 
interests of the whole Community, in principle places constraints on the actions 
of all Member States. Thus the smaller Member States are able to deal on a 
more equal footing with their larger partners. The intermediary common 
supranational agency liberates negotiations and decisions from the 'power-play' 
that is said to be characteristic of purely 'intergovernmental' organisations. 
Thus the question to be addressed here is: was the public adherence of the 
Dutch to the principle of supranationalism matched by their practice ? Dealing 
first with the Fouchet negotiations. It is not unreasonable to suppose that given 
their ever-so-public declaration of attachment to the principle of 
supranationalism, the Dutch would use the opportunity presented by the 
negotiations to submit proposals of a supranational character. This opportunity 
was spurned by the Dutch who throughout the whole period of the negotiations 
failed to submit any substantive proposals to the Committee, let alone proposals 
of a supranational nature. Rather, the Dutch pursued a strategy of negation and 
delay, which contrary to the impression promoted by the Dutch, was not 
exclusively directed against the French proposals. Indeed the great majority of 
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the 'square brackets' punctuating the draft Treaties submitted by the 'Five' were 
evidence of Dutch opposition to the views of the other four Member States. An 
example is found the context of the aims and objectives of the Union. 
The 'Four' ( FRG, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg) took the view that 
the aims of the Union should not be restrictive. The Union it was envisaged 
should possess a 'negative competence', filling the gaps of the existing Treaties. 
Thus any area of activity not already under the jurisdiction of the existing 
Treaties could legitimately become the object of the Union's attention. This 
being the case it was reasoned that the aims to be outlined in the Treaty were to 
have the status of examples or preliminary goals to which the Union could direct 
its initial attention. Thus the stated aims were to be viewed purely as a platform 
for wider unspecified, perhaps supranational aims. 
The Dutch objected strongly to this approach arguing that the aims of the 
Union should be strictly enumerated, identifying the areas in which the objective 
was to be either 'common policy', 'harmonisation' or 'close co- operation'. 
Whilst it may be suggested that in the insistence that the objectives of the Union 
should be strictly enumerated, the Dutch were hoping to confer on the Union a 
positive competence which would establish the Union with a clear identity. It 
would seem however, that far from seeking to promote a strong identity for the 
Union the Dutch were rather more anxious to preserve and protect the rights and 
jurisdictions of the Member States vis-a-vis the Union. 
"The Dutch delegation, ... , feels that the enumeration of 
objectives should be restrictive in order to establish beyond any 
doubt that the Member States retain ar^ powers that have not been 
specifically conferred on the Union.""° 
Further evidence of Dutch reluctance to give concrete expression to the 
public advocacy of supranationalism is found in their refusal to support the 
proposal to establish the position of Secretary-General of the Union. This 
proposal backed by FRG, Italy and Belgium is arguably the only proposal within 
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the Treaty drafts possessing any supranational characteristics to be included in 
the first stage of the Union. 
"The Council shall appoint ... a Secretary-General who shall be 
independent of the Governments of the Member States of the 
European Union. ""'^ 
In establishing the office of Secretary-General whose powers would, 
superficially at least, resemble those of the President of the European 
Commission, it would appear that the three advocates of its creation, ( FRG, 
Italy and Belgium ) were seeking to create a catalyst for future integration, a 
'federator'. 
"The three other delegations ... attach great importance to the 
appointment of a Secretary-General, who would be independent of 
the Governments and whose office would be independent of the 
Governments and whose office would constitute a community 
feature that could develop at later stages of the Union. A 
carefully chosen Secretary-General ^ u l d provide a powerful 
impetus to the unification of Europe." ^ 
The Dutch it seems, were reluctant to commit themselves to the support 
of this proposal, a decision which would appear to be at odds with their public 
position on the principle of supranationality. Though it should be noted that 
while refusing to endorse the proposal to create the office of Secretary-General 
the Dutch also refused to support the alternative French proposal to entrust the 
functions of a secretariat to the Political Commission of the Political Union. 
Indeed the issue of a secretariat, its uses, and its potential threat to the rights and 
jurisdictions of the existing Community institutions, in particular the Commission 
of the European Communities, was one of the main areas of dispute throughout 
the negotiations and was to remain a contentious issue for years to come. Thus 
in considering the issue of the Dutch commitment to the principle of 
supranationality, one could reasonably suggest that the very obvious 
contradictions apparent in their negotiating position throughout the Fouchet 
negotiations were primarily rooted in a particular constellation of circumstances 
which required in the judgement of the Dutch, the abandonment of deeply held 
convictions in favour of a more pragmatic approach. 
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However, consideration of the development of post-war European 
integration demonstrates a remarkable degree of consistency in the Dutch 
approach to the principle of supranationality. The first attempt to create a 
'supranational' community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
had at its heart the High Authority. Of all post-war 'European' institutions the 
High Authority was the most clearly supranational. Possessing, within its 
sphere, wide-ranging powers to control the production and distribution of coal 
and steel in the six Member States; including the power to levy its own taxation, 
thereby establishing a degree of financial autonomy unknown to all previous, and 
as it has turned out, all subsequent 'European' ventures. 
In the original Schuman Plan there were no provisions for a Council of 
Ministers as it was hoped to avoid the deadlock that had caused many 
'Europeans' to abandon the Council of Europe as the vehicle to bring about a 
united Europe. However the institutional structure of the ECSC finally agreed 
by the six original Member States did include a Council of Ministers, thus 
institutionalising the power of Member Governments and providing a means of 
checking the High Authority's capacity to act. 
Contrary to the commonly held view, a view publicly endorsed by the 
Dutch, that supranational institutions provide small members with protection 
from the weight of their larger partners, the creation of the ECSC's Council of 
Ministers owes its existence to the fears of the Benelux States, led by the Dutch. 
The Netherlands was concerned about the accountability of the High Authority 
and fearful that the supranational powers of the High Authority would in time 
lead to the economic absorption of Benelux by France and Germany in the name 
of efficiency, and economies of scale. As a consequence of these fears, which 
may arguably be regarded as groundless were nontheless deeply felt, the Benelux 
States demanded the setting up of a Council of Ministers in order to ensure that 
ultimate control of the Community lay in the hands of the Member Governments. 
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This same aversion to the principle of supranationality can be observed in 
Dutch reactions to the EDC proposals for a European army put forward by Rene 
Pleven in the October of 1950. Pleven called for 'The immediate creation of a 
unified European army under the authority of a European Minister of 
Defence.''^2 
The Pleven Plan was effectively an attempt to resolve the problem of 
German re-armament by supranational means. Military manpower in this 
European army was to be controlled by a supranational commission modelled on 
the ECSC High Authority. In addition the plan made provision for the setting up 
of a European Political Community. 
The bare fact that the Dutch were the first to ratify the EDC Treaty tends 
to obscure a fundamental opposition to virtually every aspect of the proposals. 
This opposition was manifest in their refusal to even participate in the initial 
stages of the negotiations, preferring observer status alongside the British and 
Scandinavians. Their eventual full participation and ratification was a 
consequence of intense U.S pressure 
It seems clear that the fears of absorption expressed in relation to the 
ECSC were a prominent factor in their opposition to the EDC. As Van der 
Harst indicates, in the Foreign Ministry of The Netherlands it was feared that... 
"... integration of armies implicitly means integration of foreign 
policies. Such a process would eliminate the possibility of 
independent policy-making in the Netherlands, because it was 
unavoidable that within a supranational State the big powers would 
dominate the small powers." 
The brief examples of Dutch aversion to the 'practice' of 
supranationality, would appear to represent an opposition based upon fear and 
vulnerability, a stand-point which tends to fly in the face of their public 
adherence to the convention that supranationality protects the weak. In direct 
contrast to this opposition based on vulnerability, the Dutch have also fought 
strenuous battles against the extension of supranationality in an area where the 
Dutch have occupied a position of considerable strength, that of transport policy. 
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In spite of considerable efforts on the part of the European Commission, the 
Dutch, throughout the 1960's, steadfastly refused to surrender their national 
veto, thus preventing any movement towards the creation of a Common 
Transport Policy. 
In this particular case the Dutch position would appear to concur with the 
prevailing view that supranationality places limits on the capacity of the more 
powerful actors to exercise their influence, thereby allowing the weaker actors to 
deal with these actors on a more equal basis. They do not however appear to 
accept the desirability of such limitations in an area in which they themselves 
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were able to exercise great influence and control . 
Although this brief overview of the practical Dutch response to issues of 
supranationality, as opposed to their rhetoric, by no means represents a complete 
picture, it does tend to suggest that their commitment to the principle of 
supranationality is somewhat lacking in credibility. The examples cited here 
cover a variety of issues and stretch over a relatively long period, both prior and 
subsequent to the Fouchet period, thus suggesting a strong degree of consistency 
in the Dutch approach, rather than dramatic and temporary reversals of policy in 
the light of a change of Government or Cabinet personnel. Indeed the reverse 
would be true. The Netherlands in the period from the end of World War Two 
up to the early 1970's may be regarded as the model of continuity and stability. 
Nowhere was this stability and continuity more evident than in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Joseph Luns held the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs 
without break between 1952 and 1971, a nineteen year period during which 
Foreign Minister Luns enjoyed a virtually unassailable position and was thus able 
to pursue, without interference, a consistent line in the major areas of foreign 
policy. 
Given the underlying stability and continuity of government in the 
Netherlands, particularly in the Foreign Ministry, the question remains: why the 
discrepancy between the rhetoric of unqualified support for the principle of 
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supranationality and a demonstrable reluctance to match this support in practice ? 
On one level it can be said to be a tactical response rooted in a well-developed 
Dutch survival instinct. 
The Netherlands as a small State with little capacity to coerce other 
States to accept the Dutch view of things, have tended in their relations with 
other States to place great emphasis on high moral principles rather than on the 
naked exercise of power 
Hence the Dutch, have played a significant role in the development of 
international law, the work of Hugo Grotius being the most notable example. 
Dutch support and attachment to the development of international law has its 
origins in necessity. As a small nation with a massive maritime trading empire it 
was essential that their capacity to trade remained unhindered. Thus in the 
absence of significant war-waging capacity the promotion of international law, 
stressing the sovereign equality of States and respect for the laws of the sea were 
regarded as vital to the continued prosperity of The Netherlands. 
In time these attachments of necessity have taken on the status of 'guiding 
principles' resulting in a tendency for the Dutch to adopt a highly moralistic, 
holier-than-thou attitude in their relations with other States. Thus it has become 
almost second nature for Dutch politicians to justify their actions on grounds of 
principle. It is in this light that Luns statement to the Tweed Kamer must be 
judged. Luns made his statement of 'principle' in relation to the first French 
draft, a draft generally regarded as a reasonable basis for negotiation, and upon 
which, according to a variety of sources considerable progress had been made 
in bridging the issues dividing the delegations since the draft's submission in 
November 1961. 
Thus given the progress made and the optimistic noises emanating from 
the various delegations, the negativity and opposition that had characterised the 
Dutch position even prior to the start of the negotiations proper was beginning to 
look rather isolated and increasingly untenable. The extent of Dutch isolation at 
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this point in the negotiations has however been obscured by virtue of the 
submission of the second French draft in the week following Foreign Minister 
Luns statement to the Tweede Kamer. 
To many observers, this second French draft confirmed lingering fears of 
a Gaul list-dominated Europe, which would undermine both the powers and 
functions of the existing Community institutions and also the unity of the Adantic 
Alliance. Dutch opposition viewed from the perspective of the revised second 
French draft, which was submitted just five days after Luns speech was thus seen 
to be fully justified, thereby retrieving, for a short period at least, Dutch standing 
among the 'Four', uniting them in opposition to Gaullist ambitions. It would 
therefore appear that in his alleged intervention de Gaulle became the unwitting 
ally of the Dutch, strengthening immeasurably the 'objections of principle' which 
five days prior had been based on little more than a reflex aversion to any 
proposals backed by de Gaulle. 
The overriding impression thus far tends to suggest very strongly that 
Dutch attachment to the principle of supranational integration was lacking in 
credibility. Indeed Luns in his speech to the Tweede Kamer actually admitted 
that supranationalism was not an option in the sphere of political integration. 
"Admittedly the Netherlands did not suggest implementing 
political integration in the field of common foreign policy or 
education and culture on a supranational basis. Nor was there any 
illusion about the possibility of such a solution or whether the time 
was ripe for that.""^ 
It would however be a mistake to dismiss the Dutch support for 
supranationalism as nothing more than rhetoric. The Dutch have been and are 
supporters of supranational integration of sorts. At its most genuine Dutch 
advocacy and support for supranational integration was support for strictly 
defined 'functional agencies' performing largely technical functions within 
stricdy limited spheres of economic and social policy. The Dutch did not accept 
the logic of, or indeed the desirability of the neo-functionalist argument that 
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integration in the area of 'low politics' would lead automatically to integration in 
the area of 'high polities'. 
In the light of the foregoing analysis, the apparent willingness of The 
Netherlands to sacrifice the extension of supranationality in favour of British 
entry would appear to be less of a sacrifice than the rhetoric of Dutch politicians 
would tend to suggest. The 'Prealable Anglais' in this respect amounted not to a 
negotiating flexibility containing reasonable alternatives, but rather to an 
inflexible insistence that British entry to the European Communities was the price 
for a Dutch signature on any Treaty of European Union. 
However, in examining this aspect of the Dutch position, it will be 
suggested that what would appear to be a negotiating tactic, designed as a means 
of facilitating British entry to the Communities, was actually established and 
based on the assumption that the British application to the Communities would 
result in failure. In making this assertion this is in no sense an attempt to suggest 
that the Dutch were not in favour of the principle of British entry to the 
Communities, there is simply far too much evidence to the contrary to sustain 
such an argument. The Dutch for example were by far the most ardent 
supporters within the 'Six' for the British 'Free Trade Area' proposals of 1956; 
proposals viewed in some quarters as a cynical attempt to 'empty' the as yet 
unratified Treaty of Rome of its content. Indeed Dutch support for the British 
proposals is consistent with the 'Anglophile' orientation of the Dutch identified 
by Spinelli. 
" I f politics and dominating interests have pushed the Dutch into 
the Community, their more spontaneous sympathies remain not 
toward their southern jpeighbours but towards those of the north, 
above all the British. "^ -^  
Dutch support for the British proposals was also consistent with their free 
trade sympathies and initial worries that the Treaty of Rome would establish a 
'closed continental club'.^** Indeed the fear of being locked into a potentially 
autarchic structure and the formation by the British of EFTA, the Europe of the 
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'Seven', prompted the Luns Plan of 1959. Luns proposed that the 'Six' and the 
'Seven' should extend then- internal tariff cuts to each other and to all GATT 
signatories. Luns also proposed that the 'common external tariff of the 'Six' 
should be reduced by 20%. These proposals were rejected by the other Treaty of 
Rome signatories on the grounds that they went too far in weakening the central 
discipline of the Community. 
As an attempt to extend low tariff barriers over as wide an area as 
possible the 'Luns Plan' was consistent with Dutch free trade principles. But of 
more relevance to this discussion is the apparently close relationship between the 
U.K and the Netherlands in the formulation of this plan revealed in a footnote to 
Miriam Camps account of the episode. 
"It is worth noting that Mr Luns visited London for discussions 
with British Ministers on 2Qth November 1959, a few days before 
he put forward his plan." 
The Dutch of all the Member States were clearly among those well 
disposed to the principle of British entry to the Community. Thus had the U.K 
application to the Community been successful, such an outcome would have met 
with broad Dutch approval. However, the argument proposed here is that 
although the Dutch may well have favoured the principle of British entry to the 
Community, they were also fully aware of the difficulties facing the British 
application, and had therefore made the judgement that the entry negotiations 
were likely to end in failure. 
The broad sweep of Community history would point to the actions of de 
Gaulle in vetoing the British application as sufficient explanation for the failure 
of this application. Unquestioning acceptance of this view tends to obscure 
genuine and arguably intractable obstacles to the successful conclusion of the 
British application. Notwithstanding de Gaulle's well documented lack of 
enthusiasm for British entry, many of the obstacles to British entry were created 
by the British themselves. Quite simply the British entered the negotiations with 
their hands firmly tied, having made a number of very public prior 
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commitments, which both limited their capacity to negotiate and fuelled doubts 
about the sincerity of their application. These prior commitments were made to 
three major groups: EFTA; the Commonwealth, and to British agriculture. 
Prior to the formal application to the Community Britain met with its 
EFTA partners to gain formal approval for its decision to seek membership of 
the Community and also to quell rumours that the Britain was prepared to renege 
on its commitments to EFTA in pursuit of EEC membership. The result of these 
meetings was the London Agreement. 
Without delving into the fine detail of this agreement it would appear that 
it committed the U.K Government to seeking the approval of its EFTA partners 
before signing any agreement with the Communities. It also came very close, as 
Camps points out to ' stating that the United Kingdom would not join the Six 
unless and until the Six agreed on a single market of the thirteen.'^^ 
As the British application did not reach the stage of seriously discussing 
the commitments to EFTA, it is difficult to judge with any degree of accuracy 
just how binding the London Agreement was regarded by the British, though one 
can suggest that such commitments to six close allies were not undertaken 
lightly. Regardless of such speculation, it is hard to escape to impression that 
the British application has the appearance of a bloc application, an attempt to 
resurrect the 1956 Free Trade Area proposals. Thus irrespective of intentions, 
the 'London Agreement' undoubtedly fuelled lingering suspicions among 
Member States about the sincerity of the U.K's decision to seek Community 
membership, given that the Free Trade Area proposals were regarded in many 
quarters as an attempt to prevent the birth of the E.E.C. 
In announcing their decision to open formal negotiations with the 
Community it was clearly stressed by the British Government that no agreement 
would be signed unless 'satisfactory arrangements' could be made to safeguard 
Commonwealth interests, found in the system of trade arrangements known as 
Commonwealth Preference. 
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Although not committing itself to a precise definition of the phrase 
'satisfactory arrangements', it seems clear from the record of the negotiations 
that the commitment to the satisfaction of Commonwealth concerns was genuine 
and regarded as an essential pre-condition to a successful outcome. This 
commitment was expressed by Britain's chief negotiator, Edward Heath in his 
opening speech to the negotiations. 
" I am sure that you will understand that Britain could not join the 
E.E.C under conditions in which this trade connection was cut 
with grave ioss and even ruin for some of the Commonwealth 
Countries."^' 
The understanding hoped for by Heath was in short supply. Both sides 
entered the negotiations adopting largely inflexible positions. The problem in 
this respect was two-sided. The 'Six'(and the Commission) failed to recognise, 
or did not wish to recognise the depth of Britain's Commonwealth connection, 
while the British for their part were hamstrung both by their prior commitment 
and by the constant and occasionally very public misgivings of partners, whom 
one may assume were not displeased at the negative effect they were having on 
the negotiations. 
Wliilst it should be recognised that some progress was made on 
Commonwealth issues before de Gaulle's veto of January 1963, many of the 
most contentious issues relating to the Commonwealth had yet to be addressed. 
But given the less than euphoric tone and atmosphere of the early stages, the 
prospects for the successful resolution of these outstanding issues were not good. 
Although the observations thus far do seem to indicate that the prospects 
of a successful outcome to the U.K's entry negotiations were bleak, they are 
observations which do not in themselves provide concrete confirmation of the 
view that the Dutch insistence on the Prealable Anglais was based upon the 
assumption that the U.K application would end in failure. However i f the issue 
of British agriculture is examined a little closer, there is firmer evidence to 
support this view. 
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The 'problem' of agriculture related to systems of agricultural price 
support. The Community's Common Agricultural Policy and the British system 
of deficiency payments differed fundamentally in structure, operation and 
outcome. In addition the highly influential representatives of the British 
agricultural industry the NFU unanimously opposed British entry to the 
Communities at this time. This opposition was based upon theii" interpretation of 
the consequences of the CAP for British farmers. 
Conscious of both the opposition of the NFU and the fundamental 
differences in the system of agricultural support, Heath adopted a dual approach 
to the problem. Firstly Heath proposed that given the fundamental differences in 
the systems it was reasonable to allow the British an extended period of between 
10 and 12 years in which to adjust to the CAP. Secondly, although the Member 
States had agreed upon the general principles by which the CAP would operate 
they had at the time of the British application yet to reach agreement of the detail 
of the policy. This being so the British took the opportunity to suggest that in 
the light of the fundamental differences between the two systems of farming 
support, and the unpalatable consequences of immediate implementation of the 
CAP on the British economy in the form envisaged, they should be allowed to 
play a full role in the formulation of the fine detail of the CAP. 
The British were to be sorely disappointed in both of these requests. On 
the question of full and immediate implementation they met with an absolute 
rejection from the Member States, a rejection repeated on a number of occasions 
throughout the negotiations. 
"The Six backed by the Commission insisted that the British 
should make the changeover from their system of guaranteed 
prices and deficiency payments to the common agricultural policy 
on the day of entry into the Common Market. ... at the 10-11 
December meeting, the Six insisted again that the British accept 
the principle of an immedmte change-over to the Community 
agricultural support system. "^^ 
The projected economic and political consequences of accepting this 
condition were regarded as unsustainable and unacceptable and included an 
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immediate and significant rise in food costs leading, it was argued to rapid 
inflation, thus eroding the competitive position of British industry and bringing 
hardship to low-income consumers. In addition as the largest importer of 
food from non-community countries the U.K's balance of payments would be 
adversely affected. It was also indicated that some agricultural products 
protected by the British support system would lose this protection under the 
terms of the CAP. In the face of these consequences it would surely have been 
impossible for the British to proceed with their application for Community 
membership. 
Crucially, in the context of the argument advanced here, the absolute 
refusal of the Member States to consider an extended adjustment period or 
British participation in the formulation of CAP, was held together by an 
untypically strong Franco-Dutch alliance. 
"... the Six were not prepared to discuss any aspect of the 
negotiation (with the U.K) which was affected by the Common 
Agricultural Policy until they had reached fairly detailed 
agreements among themselves on the main features of the 
agricultural policy ... the French, with considerable support from 
the Dutch had made it clear that they would not agree to the 
passage to the second transition period on 1 January 1962 unless 
substantial agreement had been reached on the details of the 
agricultural policy. 
It would thus appear that while the Dutch may well have favoured the 
principle of British entry to the Communities they were not prepared to pay any 
price for such an outcome. One can speculate that i f the Dutch were as 
enthusiastic about the prospect of British entry to the Community as 
Bodenheimer has suggested they would have sought at the very least to 
demonstrate an accommodating attitude to the very obvious British difficulties on 
this issue. 
However, on this and on virtually every other aspect of the U.K entry 
negotiations, the Dutch stood shoulder-to-shoulder with their Community 
partners in presenting to the British a united front; the Community spoke with a 
single voice. The Dutch, as were other Member States, may have been 
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supportive of the principle of U.K entry but not at the cost of compromising the 
central policy aims of the Community. 
Thus although the Dutch were happy to make British entry the 'sine qua 
non' of their negotiating strategy in the Fouchet negotiations, they were 
singularly reluctant to constructively assist the British in their efforts to negotiate 
acceptable conditions of entry. 
Further evidence for the view that the Dutch were less than sure about the 
U.K's willingness and capacity to accept the central disciplines of the 
Community at this time, is offered by former Dutch Foreign Minister J.W Beyen 
in a 1965 article, which, although a retrospective review of the episode, reflected 
the broadly held views of the Dutch Foreign Ministry . 
"The dramatic way in which General de Gaulle slammed the door 
in the face of Great Britain has distorted historical perspective. ... 
Economic Nationalism with its overtones of insular social 
conception in all classes was - and still is - very strong in Great 
Britain. Apart from its traditional bond with the Commonwealth 
and next to the historical reluctance against joining the Continent, 
this Nationalism renders the thought of having to accept the 
subordination of national economic and social policy decisions 
taken by a foreign country (even if Great Britain be a powerful 
member of that body) a very unpalatable one. The chances that 
Great Britain in a few years will desire to join the Communities 
are real. But one should not be too keen on welcoming the British 
before they fare actually and wholeheartedly willing to accept the 
'bondage'. "^ "^  
However, one thing seems clear, the odds were firmly stacked against the 
prospect of British entry. There is little doubt that the Dutch would have been 
fully aware of the difficulties facing the British application, indeed the evidence 
presented above would suggest that they played a significant role, alongside the 
French, in compounding the difficulties faced by the British. Thus given that it 
has been clearly established that the Prealable Anglais was not the a flexible 
negotiating strategy which included the options of supranational ism or British 
entry, but rather was the more limited British entry or no institutions, the 
question to be addressed is very simply: why the Prealable Anglais ? 
I f the logic of this argument is accepted and followed through, the only 
conclusion that can reasonably be drawn is that the aim of the Dutch in pressing 
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the Prealable Anglais so strongly was to destroy any possibility of a successful 
outcome to the Fouchet negotiations; an aim in which they were completely 
successful . Though as previously noted the failure of Fouchet cannot be 
attributed to the reluctance and resistance of the Dutch alone. 
The question that follows from an acceptance of this objective on the part 
of the Dutch is : why destroy the Fouchet negotiations? The answer to this is 
found in the third element in the Dutch negotiation strategy, the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
The resistance of the Netherlands to aspects of the institutional structure 
proposed in the various Fouchet drafts, in particular the proposal for a Paris-
based Political Secretariat, was prompted by a general concern that this would 
result in the emergence of a Franco-German 'Directoire' which would undermine 
not only the powers and functions of the existing Community institutions but also 
those of the smaller Member States, in particular the Netherlands. In this respect 
the argument for U.K entry as a counterbalance to this prospect does have a 
degree of force. However, while it can be accepted these were real and genuine 
fears on the part of the Dutch, the underlying cause, and guiding principle of 
Dutch resistance to Fouchet is to be found in their attachment to the Atlantic 
Alliance and in particular to the primacy of the U.S. A within the Alliance. 
Historically the Dutch as a maritime trading nation with little coercive 
capacity have tended to pursue a neutralist line in their international relations, 
promoting the development of international law as a means of resolving disputes 
between States. Dutch neutrality was pursued and maintained until invasion by 
Germany in 1940. Having capitulated within five days, the Government-in-exile 
in London abandoned its long-standing tradition of neutrality, a stance that had 
survived even the severe pressure of the First World War. In recognising the 
failure of neutrality the Dutch Foreign Minister Van Kleffens, in 1942, voiced 
the acceptance of the need to develop some form of regional grouping in order to 
guarantee the future security of the Netherlands. 
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" I f we can establish such an institution on a lasting basis, then as 
far as I can see, Holland will have to participate. In that case our 
security would J)e better served by collaboration than by non-
participation."^-' 
Thus in the aftermath of the second world war the Dutch duly became 
signatories of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Whilst this wholehearted embrace of binding military alliances would appear to 
be a radical departure from a long-standing position of neutrality, it can be 
suggested that this decision was by no means as radical as appearances would 
suggest. Indeed as Voorhoeve has argued the Dutch tradition of neutrality 
could perhaps better be described as ' neutralist-abstentionism', a combination of 
non-alignment in peace and neutrality in war. Further it is argued that the Dutch 
were able to maintain this convenient position, not by virtue of the strict 
observation of the tenets of international law by other States, but rather as a 
consequence of the close Dutch relationship with Great Britain. This amounted 
to a de facto alliance guaranteeing the security of the Netherlands, both in Dutch 
colonies and on the European Continent where Britain held a vital balancing role. 
Thus it can be suggested that the Dutch were able to pursue 'neutralist-
abstentionism' under the wing of Pax Britannica. The absence of formal Treaties 
with Britain can largely be accounted for by the dictates of the European Balance 
of Power. The great strategic importance of the Netherlands at the mouth of the 
Rhine meant that the formalising of ties of alliance with the Netherlands risked 
the opposition and intervention of the other major powers in the European 
system, an unnecessary risk to stability when it was clear to all that any threat to 
the security of the Netherlands would result in British intervention in support of 
the Netherlands. 
The failure in 1940 of the policy which had served so well in its primary 
function of ensuring the territorial and political integrity of the Netherlands, thus 
led to an abandonment of a formal position of neutrality and non-alignment in 
favour of clearly defined Treaty commitments. In entering into these 
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commitments, in particular to the North Atlantic Alliance, it can be argued that 
the Dutch in this decision had not so much abandoned a long-standing moral 
principle, as simply re-directed the strategy by which to achieve the unchanged 
policy goal of the maintenance of Dutch security. Thus in their quest for 
security the Dutch had simply replaced the de facto protection of the Pax 
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Britannica with that of the de jure protection of the Pax Americana. ^ 
Reflecting the views of Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary-General that 
the raison d etre of NATO was 'to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and 
the Germans down' the Dutch strongly believed that achieving the first and 
last of these objectives depended crucially upon an unambiguous U.S 
commitment to the defence of Western Europe, a commitment made credible via 
the deterrent capacity of the U.S strategic nuclear arsenal. Thus 'keeping the 
Americans in' can be said to have been the guiding principle of Dutch security 
policy. The maintenance of this commitment required that the U.S.A held and 
retained a clear and unchallenged position of leadership within the Alliance, thus 
necessitating the complete subordination of all Alliance signatories to the U.S.A 
in defence and security matters. Indeed the zealous promotion of U.S primacy 
within the Alliance led the Dutch to actively oppose the development of 
independent nuclear deterrents by the U.K and French Governments. Such 
developments they argued would create a heightened and mistaken sense of 
security leading to the disintegration of the Alliance which would no longer be 
regarded as necessary for security. Thus, Dutch promotion of American 
leadership within the Alliance was based not on 'sentimentality' but rather upon a 
hard-headed assessment of the needs of Dutch security. 
It is in this context that the Dutch resistance to Fouchet must be viewed. 
The Dutch regarded the Fouchet proposals, in particular those advocating the 
creation of a common foreign and defence policy as a threat to the Alliance and 
more specifically the primacy of the U.S.A within the Alliance. In the Dutch 
view the development of a cohesive 'European' defence grouping, particularly 
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one in which de Gaulle would undoubtedly play the leading role, would 
undermine the Alliance and present a threat to the U.S position of leadership, 
which could ultimately lead to the disengagement of the U.S.A from Western 
Europe. In the Dutch interpretation such a development was regarded as 
disastrous. Europe without the presence of the U.S guarantee would be unable to 
provide a credible deterrent to the threat of the Soviet Union. Indeed 
notwithstanding the lack of credibility found in creation of a purely European 
defence identity, the Dutch much preferred the relatively benign hegemony of the 
U.S.A to the inherendy de-stabilising prospect of a three-way struggle for 
leadership in Western Europe, between France, UK and ERG, that would ensue 
in the event of an American disengagement. 
Whilst it can in hindsight be argued that the USA did not seriously 
consider the withdrawal of its commitment to Western Europe, one must be 
aware of the wider political context from which the Dutch drew their conclusions 
about the possibility and consequences of such a development. This period of 
the early 1960s was arguably the most difficult and tense period of the Cold 
War. The downing of the U2 spy plane, the failure of the Four Power Summits, 
the erection of the Berlin Wall, and following very closely on the heels of the 
breakdown of Fouchet, the Cuban Missile crisis, are convincing testament to the 
intensity of the Cold War in this period. Indeed not only were the tensions 
between East and West a source of grave concern, this was also a period of great 
uncertainty within the Alliance. This uncertainty was largely the consequence of 
the arrival of the Kennedy Administration in 1961. The change of style and 
global emphasis in foreign policy issues apparent at the outset of the Kennedy 
Administration led to fears that the U.S was less inclined towards the European 
theatre than previous U.S Administrations.99 In some quarters this change of 
style was interpreted as a change of substance, thus giving growing currency to 
the view that i f pushed the Americans were fully prepared to disengage from the 
European Continent. 
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Further fuelling this view of growing U.S ambivalence to the European 
dimension was the somewhat mixed American reaction to the erection of the 
1 on 
Berlin Wall in August 1961. ^ It was a reaction which appeared to suggest a 
willingness to reach some form of compromise with the Soviet Union, and was 
thus interpreted as an indication of the lack of U.S commitment to European 
security. 
From the perspective of the Dutch the possibility of U.S disengagement, 
however remote in reality, was exacerbated by the parallel emergence of a strong 
Franco-German relationship. In contrast to the less than forceful condemnation 
observed in the U.S and British reactions to the erection of the Berlin Wall, de 
Gaulle offered, to the somewhat vulnerable and isolated Chancellor Adenauer his 
strongest support, thus cementing the relationship which had been established as 
a consequence of their meetings at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises in 1958. 
Uncertainty over U.S policy, compounded by what Hanrieder describes as 
'personality conflicts' resulting from a 'generational gap, differing life 
experiences and style' between Adenauer and Kennedy, drew the West 
Germans closer to the French orbit. 
Given this particular constellation of circumstances the Fouchet proposals 
so far as Dutch policy-makers were concerned represented a particularly 
unwelcome risk to the essential interests of the Netherlands. Fouchet was fatally 
flawed by virtue of its association with de Gaulle. 
Irrespective of any formula of spoken or written guarantees regarding the 
primacy of the Atlantic Alliance, the Dutch were of the view that the long-term 
aims of French defence policy ran contrary to the requirements of Dutch 
security, that is to say the subordination of all Alliance signatories to the U.S.A. 
De Gaulle had spoken on many occasions of his intention to carve out a 
leadership role for France both in Western Europe and on the global stage. 
Having suffered the rejection of his 1958 proposals to Eisenhower and 
Macmillan to create within NATO a tripartite 'Directorate' of the USA, UK and 
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France ^ , de Gaulle had served notice of French dissatisfaction with the 
'Anglo-Saxon' domination of the Alliance and of the French intention to 
withdraw from the integrated command structure of NATO. Thus the underlying 
motive of de Gaulle's initiative was seen to be a means by which the French 
could undermine the U.S position in NATO as a precursor to the emergence of a 
purely 'European' defence identity under the direction of France. Indeed in 
addressing the Tweede Kamer in January 1962 on the issue of the Dutch position 
in the Fouchet negotiations, Luns was at pains to stress that any French 
guarantees regarding the position of the Atlantic Alliance should be treated with 
the maximum degree of scepticism. 
"The Dutch objections are based on our conceptions of the 
position of NATO and on the belief that a common doctrine is 
necessary for pursuing a common defence policy. There is no 
need for me to tell you how different France's view of defence 
policy is from ours and also that of several other European 
governments. I cannot understand therefore why Mr.van der Goes 
van Naters and Mr.Schuijt were so pleased to find in the new 
French statement that this joint defence policy should lead to a 
strengthening of NATO . Do these representatives really believe 
that the addition of these words implies that France has adopted a 
position in favour of a military policy which will tend to 
strengthen military integration in NATO ^1^ . . . , I believe you will 
not, I hope, ... cherish such an illusion." ^^ -^  
Given this interpretation of de Gaulle's ambitions, the Fouchet proposals 
had to be resisted by the Netherlands. However whilst the Dutch Government 
had attempted to strangle de Gaulle's initiative at conception, as a relatively 
small power, and at this stage rather isolated in their blanket opposition, they 
simply did not possess the political muscle to achieve this, nor indeed to resist 
the pressure placed upon them to participate in the negotiations. As a 
consequence the Dutch had to mitigate their relative weakness via the use of 
obstructionist tactics within the confines of the Fouchet Committee's 
deliberations. Indeed as noted above the creation of the Committee itself can be 
attributed to the intransigence of the Dutch. 
Accepting that the Dutch did not possess the political weight to kill-off 
the Fouchet proposals at a stroke nor to resist the pressure to participate in the 
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negotiations tends to raise questions with respect to central role attributed here to 
the Dutch in the breakdown of the negotiations. Even given the last minute 
support of the Belgians one could argue quite forcibly that had the other Member 
States wished to reach a successful conclusion to the Fouchet negotiations it is 
doubtful that the Netherlands would have been able to do little more than modify 
the content of the proposals. In this context the Dutch attempted to mitigate the 
possibility of a successful outcome by insisting on the inclusion of bracketed 
reference to the effect that any common defence policy agreed by the Political 
Union would be subordinated to the Atlantic Alliance. 'The objectives of the 
Union shall be ... the adoption of a common defence policy [within the 
framework of the Atlantic Alliance]'^^"^ In contrast the other four delegations 
preferred a less binding formula of support for the Alliance.' [as a contribution 
towards strengthening the Atlantic Alliance]. 
Thus, notwithstanding the judgement that the U.K application would end 
in failure, the Dutch efforts to bring the British into the negotiations can in some 
respects be regarded as an acknowledgement on the part of the Dutch that in the 
final analysis they may have been forced to accept some form of Treaty 
arrangement. In the event of this worst-case scenario, it would be preferable to 
dilute the Franco-German axis with the equally Atlanticist presence of the 
British. The Dutch it would appear were seeking to cover all possible outcomes. 
However, while the Dutch must be regarded as absolutely crucial to the 
failure of the Fouchet negotiations, it should be also be recognised that they were 
not in a position to destroy the proposals in isolation. In bringing about this 
'satisfactory' conclusion they were in unwitting alliance with the initiators of the 
proposals, France. 
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Fouchet: Theory and interpretation 
As previously noted there was, and indeed is, a propensity among 
politicians, commentators and academics alike to characterise and explain all 
European projects and developments as part of an on-going struggle between two 
competing and conflicting visions of a 'United Europe' a tendency 
encapsulated by Tugendhat 
"Federalism and intergovernmental ism, supranationalism and co-
operation between different nationalities : two concepts of Europe 
... have been \adng with each other since the earlier days of the 
Community." 
At a general level, whether characterised as a conflict between 
supranationalism and intergovernmental ism, federalism versus confederalism or 
as a choice between an 'integrationist' Europe or a Gaullist 'Europe des Patries', 
it is a legitimate and continuing debate rooted in the origins of post-war 
European integration. In the context of the institutional and policy framework 
established by the Treaties of Paris and Rome, the ambiguous mix of 
supranational and intergovernmental elements contained within the Community 
Treaties ensure that these provide a forum for this bipolar dialogue. Thus as a 
consequence of both general and specific factors the language of the competing 
and contested visions of Europe is established as the common currency of 
European debate. 
In this respect the rhetoric and peripheral declarations surrounding the 
Fouchet negotiations are firmly located within the established tradition of the 
intergovernmental-supranational struggle. However i f one wishes to examine 
and explain the motivations for the promotion of the Fouchet proposals and 
account for their eventual failure in the context of a theoretical framework, 
recourse to the paradigms underpinning the supranational-intergovernmental 
dialogue requires examination. This is particularly so in the case of those 
theories most closely associated with the development of the Communities, 
functionalism and neo-functionalism. 
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Based upon assumptions of economic and technical determinism, and the nature 
and scope of political activity, functionalism was often regarded as the theoretical 
model for the creation of the ECSC . Developed largely during the inter-war 
years as a response to the carnage of the first world war, functionalism sits 
broadly within the sphere of what E.H. Carr described as the 'Utopian' or 
idealist approach to international relations. In the functionalist view the 
persistence of inter-state conflict was a systemic problem brought about by the 
very existence of Nation States. Recourse to the balance of power as a means of 
preventing future conflict between States did not prevent war but actually made it 
inevitable. In response the functionalist prescription was to propose the creation 
of-a system based upon those things which, according to Mitrany, bring people 
together, a system based upon common interest and co-operation rather than 
those things that divide; a 'working peace system'. 
"The task that is facing us now is how to build up the reality of 
common interest ... not a peace that would keep the nations apart, 
but a peace that would bring them actively together; not the old 
static strategic view of peace but a social view of it ..._ we must 
put our faith not in a protected peace but in a working peace; it 
would be nothing more nor less than the idea and aspiration of 
social security taken at its widest range." 
The 'working peace system' was to be achieved via cross border co-
operative ventures in areas identified as belonging to the 'functional' level of 
state activity. These included economics, science, technology, communications 
and in particular, reflecting the influence of Fabian socialism on Mitrany, the 
provision of welfare. These 'technical' areas of state activity were in the 
functionalist analysis, non-political and uncontroversial, whereas those areas of 
state activity such as foreign policy, defence, diplomacy etc belonged to the 
realm of politics, and, as the symbols of national power and independence were 
jealously guarded. In contrast those areas identified as 'non-political' were 
prime candidates for the functionalist approach. States on the basis of economies 
of scale, would recognise the benefits of cross-border co-operative ventures and 
would thus willingly surrender their jurisdiction in these areas. Based not upon 
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traditional 'security' alliances but on what Mitrany identified as the 'cardinal 
virtue of technical self- determination' the organisational and administrative 
structure of the 'functional' bodies would be determined by the function to be 
performed. 
At the level of the individual, it was argued that functional co-operation 
would, in time, overcome traditional enmities and distrust via the practice of 
'living and working together'. While at the level of the State, the network 
of overlapping 'functional' organisations would gradually undermine the bases of 
the strength of Nation States, both in terms of the changing loyalties of citizens 
and also as a consequence of increasing reliance upon the functional 
organisations for the effective operation of the State. The gradual assumption of 
technical and economic functions on the part of transnational 'functional' 
organisations would render impotent the capacity of States to act as independent 
entities on the world stage. 
"Man can be weaned away from his loyalty to the Nation State by 
the experience of fruitful co-operation; ... international 
organisation arranged according to the requirements of the task 
could increase welfare rewards to individuals beyond the level 
obtainable within the state. ... From small beginnings ... the 
functional approach could eventually enmesh national goverjunents 
in a dense network of interlocking co-operative ventures." 
Functionalism for a variety of reasons was closely associated with early 
developments in the process of post-war European integration and was 
widely regarded as the theoretical model and inspiration for the first post-war 
experiment in 'sectoral' integration', the ECSC. Although Mitrany's 
functionalist credo may well have, in part, provided Monnet with the inspiration 
for the creation of the ECSC, empirical studies of the ECSC's structure and 
operation showed functionalism to be of extremely limited value as a descriptive 
and explanatory tool. Very simply the reality of the ECSC in practice bore little 
relationship to functionalist paradigm. Perhaps the most glaring inconsistency 
between the functionalist schema and the reality of the ECSC was the assumption 
of an economic and technical determinism operating within a political void. In 
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its aims and its operation the ECSC existed within an intensely political 
environment. As Puchala points out 'there are simply no non-political issues in 
relations between nations'. Thus a more appropriate, empirically grounded, 
model was sought. 
It arrived in the form of neo-functionalism, a theory largely developed as 
a direct consequence of research into the operation of the nascent Communities. 
Deriving from the pluralist school of U.S political science, neo-functionalism 
was to become the dominant and influential theory of integration. It came to be 
regarded as the unofficial ideology of the Brussels elite who adopted its language 
and its prescriptions with great enthusiasm in their efforts to promote and further 
the integration process. However, while neo-functionalism was seen to be a 
response to the inadequacies of functional ism, by the latter half of the 1960s neo-
functionalism was itself seen to be of limited value as an explanatory tool. 
Indeed the pioneer and leading theorist of the neo-functionalist school, E.Haas, 
with an admirable degree of intellectual honesty concluded that neo-functionalism 
was obsolete. 116 
While sharing a number of functionalist assumptions, in particular that of 
economic and technological determinants as the underlying motor of progress and 
change, the neo-functionalist thesis differs markedly in its view of the role and 
function of politics in the integration process. Whereas functionalism regards 
and identifies certain areas of State activity as immune from political 
controversy, neo-functionalism proceeds from the assumption that all areas of 
State activity, without exception, have the potential to take on a politically 
sensitive status. Thus the neo-functionalist argues that sectoral integration is 
shaped not by function but rather as a consequence of political bargaining and 
conflict in which the self interest of the relevant actors is the decisive factor 
117. 
Central to the neo-functionalist thesis is the concept of 'spill-over' or 
'forward linkage'. Accepting the basic notion of economic and technologically 
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driven change, neo-functionalism takes the position that it is the pressure from 
the relevant societal elites in their efforts to secure the fruits of economic and 
technical progress that provides the impetus for integration. As economic and 
technical pressures increase, the various elites, recognising the success of the 
initial experiments in sectoral integration, will press for the expansion of the 
supranational principle to encompass related areas, thus increasing the powers 
and competences of the supranational entity. This is the process of spillover. It 
is therefore argued that i f societal elites could be persuaded that their interests 
would be best served in the context of an institutional framework which 
overarches and takes precedence over pre-existing national units, they would 
willingly shift their loyalties to this supranational body. The institutional 
structures thus created are thereby seen to be the consequence of self interest 
rather than the 'cardinal virtue of technical self-determination'. 
Of crucial importance to the neo-functionalist debate is the question of 
where spillover ends. Although never wholly explicit in the writings of the 
various theorists of neo - func t i ona l i sm , i t was widely assumed that the 
terminal point of the spillover process would be the emergence of a supranational 
State, which in form closely corresponded to a federal model. Indeed during the 
first years of the Treaty of Rome's operation neo-functionalism appeared to be 
unerringly accurate in its analysis of the integrative process. The 'logic' of 
spillover thus provided an attractive and persuasive account of the integration 
process. As a consequence the neo-functionalist thesis was adopted wholesale by 
many federalists who saw in neo-functionalism the ideal vehicle with which to 
promote their ambitions for the Communities. The association of neo-
functionalism with the federalist cause in the early 1960s became almost 
inextricable; the success or failure of European integration came to be judged by 
the degree to which the European Communities approached a federal outcome. 
However the point to be made here is that while neo-functionalism was at 
the zenith of its influence in the early 1960s, it is of little value as an explanatory 
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tool with which to explain the Fouchet episode. Indeed there were no serious 
attempts to examine the Fouchet negotiations from a neo-functionlist perspective, 
though as noted, the language of the neo-functionalist debate was pervasive 
throughout this period. At one level, as an attempt to comprehend the 
integration process neo-functionalism was fundamentally devalued and tainted by 
its close association with the normative goals of the federalist movement. While 
at another level reflecting its roots in theories of economic and technical 
determinism the untested assumption that integration at the level of low politics 
would automatically spillover into the sphere of high politics was later struck a 
mortal blow by de Gaulle in one of the most well documented incidents of post-
war European integration, the 1965 Luxembourg Crisis and its resolution in the 
Luxembourg Compromise of 1966.^^^ Deterministic assumptions about 
integration at the economic and technical level leading inevitably to integration in 
the sphere of high politics were shown with graphic clarity to be fatally flawed. 
As Haas in his reappraisal of neo-functionalism noted 'The history of the 
European unity movement suggests that the relationship between politics and 
economics remains somewhat e l u s i v e ' . T h u s subjecting Fouchet to neo-
functionalist analysis will not lead us far down the path of understanding. Indeed 
the same can be said of the use of Federal and Confederal models as explanatory 
tools. 
Whilst the Dutch negotiators attempted to present their opposition to the 
proposals in the context of this struggle, and while de Gaulle presented his case 
in the language of the Europe des patries, casting aspersions on federalist 
dreamers, an examination of the various Fouchet drafts and the accompanying 
reports demonstrates quite clearly that the fundamental constitutional nature of 
the proposed Political Union was not the source of dispute. The issues which 
divided the Member States in the context of the proposals were issues of detail, 
not disputes over the basic constitutional form of the structure to be created. In 
short the participants in the Fouchet negotiations, including the Netherlands, 
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were under no illusions that this was a federalist project. Nor, other than in 
peripheral rhetoric, was there any suggestion that a federal outcome was 
desirable. 
I f anything it would be reasonably accurate to suggest that in terms of 
constitutional models, the Fouchet plans most closely accord with a State-
centered confederal model 121. However while this may provide a satisfactory 
picture of the constitutional model sought by the Fouchet Committee's 
participants it does not explain their motivations nor does it account for the 
breakdown of the negotiations. Thus there is little to be gained in employing 
normatively charged federalist and confederalist paradigms. A far more 
appropriate model with which to understand and interpret the Fouchet episode 
can be found in recourse to aspects of the traditional Realist school of 
international relations. ^^2 
Viewed from the realist perspective, international organisations and 
regional groupings are seen primarily as instruments of State policy. In the 
creation of a regional political and/or defence grouping the status and power of 
the larger participants vis-a-vis their smaller partners are increased while the 
combined strength of the grouping leads to an increased leverage at a global 
level. The corollary is that the State or States which are able to exert a 
leadership role within the regional grouping are more able to shape the external 
policy direction of the grouping. Thus in effect the leverage of the leading State 
or States is doubly increased. The smallei- less powerful partners, although 
clearly subordinate, are also seen to benefit in terms of the increased security 
guarantees realised through their association with the larger more powerful 
member States. In addition, just as the stronger States experience an increase in 
the global leverage the smaller States by virtue of their membership of the 
grouping are (to use a boxing metaphor) able to punch well above their weight in 
their relations with other States. 
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In the initiation of the Fouchet proposals it would stretch the imagination 
to its limits to suggest that de Gaulle was seeking to further the cause of the 
European federalists. Few, i f any, would cast serious doubt on the view that the 
Fouchet proposals were seen by de Gaulle as a means of promoting French 
national interest and power; a bid for the political leadership of Western Europe. 
Indeed it is in the perceived consequences of this bid for a leadership role that we 
find a partial explanation for the failure of the Fouchet negotiations. For the 
Dutch the Fouchet proposals presented the Netherlands with the potential re-
emergence of a security dilemma. 
In the realist perspective the search to achieve and maintain national 
security holds a central position. Based upon Hobbesian assumptions of anarchy, 
the ultimate and primary aim of the Nation State in international relations is seen 
to be the preservation of its territorial and political integrity. In its starkest form 
it is argued that the very pursuit of security on the part of the State creates the 
perception of insecurity in neighbouring States, which, observing the efforts of 
one State to guarantee its security, interprets such developments - increased 
weapons production and troop manoeuvrers etc - as a direct threat to their own 
security, which in turn requires similar counter-measures. This aggressive 
pursuit of security, issuing in arms-racing and so very often inter-state conflict 
19 
has been characterised by Jervis as the 'spiral of international insecurity'. 3 
Each sovereign state is thus faced with a security dilemma. Resolution of this 
dilemma in absolute terms can only be achieved when a State is able to achieve a 
position of hegemony. However, the realities of global politics intrude at this 
point. Although legally equal sovereign entities, the differences in the potential 
and actual power of States vary greatly, thus the capacity of States to achieve a 
position of security must vary accordingly. Very simply, few States are capable 
of resolving their security dilemma in isolation. In most cases they must pursue 
a strategy of alliance other with States sharing similar security problems. Thus 
the anarchy of international relations is tempered by the emergence of balances 
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of power in which alliances of States off-set the perceived strengths and 
ambitions of the other. 
Historically the Dutch had pursued a superficially different track in their 
efforts to resolve their security dilemma, that of neutrality. However as noted 
above, this strategy of neutrality was pursued under the de facto protection of a 
British security guarantee. In the aftermath of the Second World War, shedding 
the failed policy of neutrality the Netherlands sought to resolve their security 
dilemma via membership of regional defence pacts, most importantly the Atlantic 
19 
Alliance. 4 In committing the Netherlands to the Atlantic Alliance the Dutch 
resolved their security dilemma in the virtual abdication of their national defence 
function to the will of the unchallenged leader of the Atlantic Alliance, the 
U.S.A and the nuclear guarantee thus provided. In its total acceptance and 
support of U.S hegemony in the Alliance, the Netherlands represent a prime 
example of the role of smaller powers within regional groupings. Acceptance of 
the leadership role reinforces the power of the dominant partner while allowing, 
within limits, the smaller members to pursue their other non-security goals in the 
safe knowledge that security, as far as it can be, is guaranteed. 
To the Dutch the Fouchet proposals represented a threat to the primacy of 
the U.S.A within the Alliance while failing to provide an adequate and credible 
replacement. French leadership aspirations in Western Europe coupled with the 
well documented antipathy of de Gaulle to the 'Anglo-Saxon', in particular U.S. 
domination of the Alliance, rang alarm bells in The Hague. A successful 
conclusion to the Fouchet negotiations would create a cohesive and potentially 
disruptive bloc within the Adantic Alliance at a time when U.S attitudes to 
Western Europe were seemingly in a period of re-examination, and the threat of 
the Soviet Union appeared to be at its height. American withdrawal from Europe 
thus emerged as a possibility. 
France as the potential leader of an emergent 'European' security bloc did 
not and could not offer the Netherlands the guarantees of security against the 
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Soviet threat provided by the USA and its nuclear umbrella. In addition the 
prospect of a US-free Western Europe with an increasingly strong ERG held out 
the unpleasant prospect of a tripartite struggle for leadership between France, the 
UK and FRG. Thus for the Dutch their strenuous resistance to virtually every 
aspect of the Fouchet proposals, though wrapped in the rhetoric of the integration 
debate was fundamentally based upon ensuring the primacy of the U.S. in 
defence and security matters remained intact and unchallenged. The maintenance 
of Dutch security depended on it. 
Explanations for the shift in the French negotiating position from one of 
positive and active participation to that of negativity and obstruction have largely 
been addressed above. Accounting for this attitudinal shift within the context of 
the realist perspective we are returned to the realist view of international 
organisations and regional groupings as instruments of State policy. It is widely 
accepted that the primary purpose of de Gaulle in initiating the Fouchet proposals 
was to create a vehicle with which carve out a leadership role for France in 
Western Europe. The realisation that their potential partners saw in the Fouchet 
proposals a means of enhancing and promoting their own interests meant that 
France would not go unchallenged in its aims, elicited from the French a rapid 
retreat into untenable and un-negotiable positions, a strategy aimed at either 
bringing the other participants into line or ending the negotiations. 
Thus in conclusion, the initiation of the Fouchet proposals by de Gaulle 
can be attributed to an attempt by the French to place France at the head of a 
potentially powerful West European political and defence grouping, thereby 
circumventing the influence of the U.S.A and to a lesser extent the U.K. The 
primary causes of the failure are to be found in the combination of two factors 
:1) Dutch security fears; 2) the loss of French control over the direction of the 
Fouchet Committee's deliberations with the realisation that French influence over 
their Community partners was less strong than had been anticipated. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BIRTH OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION : 
1969-71 
Central to this thesis is the contention that the act of conception which in 
time brought the European Co-operation mechanism into the organic structure of 
the Community Treaties can be traced to the Fouchet Plans of 1961-62. Whilst 
one may legitimately question the strength of this claim of a parental link with 
Fouchet, there can be no dispute with respect to the place and time of the 
mechanisms birth. The 1970 Luxembourg Report, quietly and without 
ceremony ushered into life what many federalists would regard as the 
illegitimate child of European integration. 
In outlining the origins, motivations and influences leading to the formulation of 
the 1970 Luxembourg Report there is, even among those commentators 
acknowledging the legacy of Fouchet, an overwhelming tendency to identify 
French initiative and influence as the major factor in bringing about the co-
operation mechanism established by the Luxembourg Report. 
"... EPC, established undeniably due to French initiative, appears to be 
an important representation of French ideas on the ends and means of the 
construction of Europe, as reflected in traditional Gaullist thinking, 
^ompidou's mind and the political realities of France in the late 1960's." 
While one cannot reject the absolute necessity of French agreement and support 
in the creation of the Political Co-operation mechanism, there is a strong case to 
suggest that the influence of the French Government in the setting up of EPC 
has been somewhat overstated, thus necessitating a degree of re-assessment. In 
making such a claim one must first look beyond the actual content of the 
Luxembourg Report, to the political context and circumstances which gave rise 
to the establishment of the Davignon Committee. In this respect most 
commentaries ^ identify the decision of the 1969 Hague Summit to instruct the 
82 
Foreign Ministers to 'study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of 
political unification',^ as the appropriate point of reference. This instruction to 
the Foreign Ministers did indeed lead to the formulation of the Luxembourg 
Report. However it will be suggested here that in identifying the pressures, 
influences and motivations leading to the formulation of the Report, a more 
appropriate starting point is found in what became known as the 'WEU crisis' of 
1969. 
The WEU Crisis 
The 'WEU crisis' of 1969 took place against the familiar background music of 
British involvement in Europe. Its origins lie in de Gaulle's 1967 Veto to 
Britain's second application for membership of the European Communities. 
Whilst the first British application in 1961 faced an uphill-struggle and would, 
regardless of de Gaulle's presence, have been unlikely to have reached a 
successful conclusion, the same cannot be said for the 1967 British application 
under the Wilson Government. This application was largely free of the 
constraints which had so encumbered that of the Macmillan Government. The 
commitments undertaken by Macmillan, to E.F.T.A, the Commonwealth and to 
British Agriculture, and which incidently had been endorsed by Wilson's 
predecessor Hugh Gaitskill, had been largely abandoned. Although there were a 
number of questions to be resolved, the binding character assumed by the same 
issues in the first application was absent. Perhaps of greatest significance was 
the British acceptance of the Common Agricultural Policy, for France the 
central pillar of the Community, and upon which the negotiations in 1961-62 
had foundered. 
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In addition to this sea-change in British policy, Wilson, re-elected in 1966, 
enjoyed the luxury of a 97 seat Parliamentary majority and was therefore in a 
position to undertake risky ventures. Given these conditions and, with the 
exception of France, the overwhelming support for the British application 
among Member States , a support reinforced by Wilson's diplomatic efforts 
around the Capitals of the Community States, the prospects of a successful 
outcome appeared good. The only significant hurdle to be negotiated was the 
reaction of de Gaulle 
In this respect, despite de Gaulle's initial, almost ritual incantation on the 
unsuitability of Britain as a Community member following the formal 
submission of the British application (11-5-67), the French President, at the 
Summit marking the 10th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome (29-30 May 1967), 
accepted that the British application should be studied in detail. This apparently 
conciliatory step was however to prove something of a false dawn. 
The next few months saw from French government circles a series of negative 
pronouncements on the British application casting doubts on the depth of 
Britain's 'European' conversion, culminating in a press conference by de Gaulle 
on 27-11-67. 
"What France cannot do is to enter now, with the British and their 
associates, into negotiations that would lead to destroying the European 
construction to which she belongs." 
The following month at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, the French 
delegation refused to discuss the British application further. 
"...no agreement had been reached on the procedure to be pursued, but 
the applications for membership ... remain on the agenda of the 
Council." ^ 
Thus, although remaining on the agenda of the Council, the British application 
was effectively a dead-letter, de Gaulle had for the second time exercised his 
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veto on British entry. In the face of de Gaulle's unilateral decision, a decision 
which ran directly contrary to the wishes of the Governments of the 'Five', their 
reaction was understandably hostile, and resulted in a crisis of relations between 
the five and France in which the future of the Community was called into 
question. 
The 'Five' embarked on a campaign of pressure to force France into opening 
negotiations with Britain and the other applicant States. This pressure, while 
difficult to describe as concerted, took various forms, from the refusal to co-
operate with French initiatives in the context of the Communities, to the 
conclusion of a number of bi-lateral and multilateral co-operation projects with 
Britain, in areas which could, arguably, have been undertaken in a Community 
context. Examples include the collaboration between the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain on the 'Gas centrifuge method of 
uranium enrichment', and the joint development of a 'multi-role combat aircraft' 
(later known as the Tornado) between. Great Britain, F.R.G, Italy and the 
Netherlands. 
As a consequence relations between France and its Community partners were 
increasingly strained. This was further exacerbated by the other pressing 
difficulty facing the Community, the completion of the Treaty of Rome, and in 
particular the ful l implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
In the context of this thesis, the most significant response to de Gaulle's veto 
were the proposals of the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. At a 
meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in October 1968, Harmel put forward 
a number of 'ideas for reviving political co-operation between the Member 
States'. 
"We ... propose(d) that the seven WEU States try an experiment in 
political consultation, which would be renewable and open to 
improvement each year. ... The States would be required to undertake 
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politically, in few fields selected each year, not to adopt national 
positions without compulsorily seeking the views of their partners. We 
do not mean the reciprocal exchange of information, but an undertaking 
by each State to fix its political position on certain predetermined 
subjects, not in the light of national interests alone but after hearing the 
views of its partners. ...without any compulsory consultations there will 
never be any harmonisation of foreign policies, which ... is essential i f 
Europe is ultimately to express itself with a single strong and unwavering 
voice."" 
The forum for these compulsory consultations was to be the WEU framework. 
In justifying the use of the WEU as a vehicle for his initiative, Harmel, 
outlining his proposals to the Belgian Senate, identified 'two fundamental 
reasons'. 
"The first is that for the time being the only Treaty we have which lays 
down our commitments in the political field and for which a Council of 
Ministers has been set up in the modified Brussels Treaty,... The second 
reason for our action must be clearly explained to the Senate, for we 
believe that i f this cautious and experimental seven-power revival is 
successful, it would dispel doubts felt in some quarters. It would in fact 
show whether Britain, which has applied for membership of the Common 
Market, has also carried out the political conversion expected of it and 
also wheflier together we can define the conditions for a truly European 
policy." ' 
Harmel's proposals were welcomed by the WEU's Member States with the 
notable exception of France, which again employing the tactics of the 1967 
veto, did not explicitly reject the proposals, but rather opposed their immediate 
implementation, while accepting their presence on the agenda for future 
discussion. Thus, unable to reach agreement in the October WEU Council, the 
baton was taken up by the Italian Government which agreed to 'prepare 
adequately' proposals for the next Council meeting in Luxembourg in February 
1969. These proposals were duly presented to the WEU Council on 6th 
February 1969. 
The Italian proposals are presented in the familiar form and style of the various 
draft treaties and reports examined throughout this thesis. The Italian proposals 
are composed of an explanatory preamble, seven specific proposals and an 
appendix. The preamble contains nothing of note and need not be examined 
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here. However, the actual proposals and the attached appendix are worthy of 
closer examination, in particular proposals 'A ' , ' C and ' D ' . 
"The Italian Government proposes that,..., the Council should decide to 
step up co-operation provided for by the modified Treaty of Brussels. 
A. Consultation on foreign policy questions between seven countries, 
which at present take place during the quarterly Council sessions, will be 
obligatory for certain issues. By way of example, the Italian Delegation 
suggests the appended list (Appendix 1). This list could be revised 
annually. This consultation will take place before the adoption of 
national positions so as to enable, i f possible, joint positions to be 
adopted or harmonised stands taken by mutual agreement."" 
Appendix 1 contains seven specific 'foreign policy' issues, which according to 
the Italian proposal should be the subject of obligatory consultation. These 
issues are : " 1 . Political organisation of Western Europe for the purpose of 
integration. 2. Europe's relations with the United States. 3. Europe's links 
with the Soviet Union and European Communist States. 4. Europe's 
responsibility with regard to extra-European crises. 5. European aspects of 
security and defence matters. 6. Role of the European nuclear States in defence 
and security in Europe. 7. Examination of defence and security issues, taking 
into account the various positions with regard to the Atlantic Alliance." ^ 
Proposal 'A ' goes on to suggest that... 
"According to the importance of the problems, the consultation will take 
place at the level of the Council of Ministers or of the Council of 
Permanent Representatives. In the event of international crisis, provision 
will be made for the meeting to be convened within forty-eight hours." 
While Appendix I I I provides that... 
"In sessions at ministerial level, provision should be made for the 
possibility of restricted meetings, ie. limited to the delegation leaders and 
two collaborators. No minutes would be taken at these meetings, which 
would allow for more informal discussion of certain aspects of the 
problems." 
Proposal ' C suggests that... 
"The Council, at a later date, will consider the political aspects of 
defence matters in order to subject them to preliminary examination, 
taking N.A.T.O jurisdiction into account; this is necessary because of 
their close connection with foreign policy issues. 
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In the same framework, the Council will at the same time try to find the 
appropriate methods for achieving the principles concerning 
standardisation and joint production contained in the revised Treaty of 
Brussels. "^ "^  
Proposal ' D ' provides that... 
"The WEU Council will regularly examine the short-term economic 
situation. It will undertake to discover an increasing number of forms of 
collaboration, above all in the spheres of technology and currency^ by 
providing for the necessary links with the European Communities."^-^ 
It is perhaps worth noting, in relation to proposal D, that, following the 
breakdown of U.K entry negotiations in 1963, it was agreed that the quarterly 
meetings of the WEU Council would include a day devoted to the discussion of 
'economic issues', thus providing an opportunity for the British to remain in 
touch with developments in the Community. These meetings were brought to a 
close on the opening of U.K entry negotiations in 1970. 
The Italian proposals were enthusiastically welcomed by the Member States of 
the WEU, again with the exception of the French delegation which continued to 
employ the tactic of withholding support for the proposals while not going as far 
as exercising the power of veto. According to Gaston Thorn, the then 
Luxembourg Foreign Minister, the French delegation was in agreement with all 
the Member States in expressing their willingness to 'improve foreign policy 
consultations in the WEU framework' and on the 'principle of holding 
emergency meetings to make discussions more effective'. But they drew the 
line at the Benelux decision to put the proposals into immediate effect, a 
decision endorsed by the British, German and Italian delegations. 
Faced by such overwhelming support for the Benelux decision the French 
delegation '...reserved its position on all the fundamental and procedural aspects 
of the Benelux proposal and would make known its position at the latest during 
the next ministerial meeting.' 
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Taking advantage of the Benelux decision British Foreign Secretary, Michael 
Stewart, called an emergency meeting of the WEU Permanent Council for the 
14th February 1969 on the pretext of discussing the situation in the Middle East. 
This meeting, as an 'emergency', invoked Article VII I of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. The French Government reacted angrily to this manoeuvre, arguing that 
the situation in the Middle East had been fully addressed on the 7th February at 
the regular quarterly meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, and that there 
had been no developments in the intervening period which required immediate 
and further discussion. In addition the French based their objections to the 
meeting on their interpretation of Article V I I I , which according to the French 
required that any meeting invoking Article VI I I required both unanimity in its 
convocation and on its agenda. Thus the French questioned the very validity of 
describing the meeting as a WEU meeting, since according to the Treaty 'the 
Council of the WEU cannot validly meet against the will of one of its 
members' 
This interpretation of Article VI I I was disputed by virtually every Member State 
of the WEU, an example of which is found in the statement on the affair by 
Mr.Jahn (Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) to the Bundestag 
on 28-2-69. 
"The Federal Government does not consider that all meetings of the 
Council of Western European Union must be convened unanimously. ... 
Nor did the Federal Government consider the meeting of the Council of 
the Western European Union on 14th February to be 'illegal'. I f it had, 
it would not have sent a representative. ^ ' 
In the event the French Government did not attend the meeting of the WEU 
Permanent Council, adopting a now familiar French policy device the 'empty-
chair', a policy pursued by France until August of 1969, when it signalled its 
willingness to return to WEU Council meetings. Though in so doing they 
continued to insist that the French Government 'bears no responsibility for 
starting this crisis.'^^ 
89 
Superficially, the arguments and counter-arguments of this crisis centred on 
various and dubious interpretations of the legality of the actions of the British 
Foreign Secretary in convening an emergency meeting of the Permanent Council 
of WEU, under Article V I I I of the modified Brussels Treaty. While there may 
have been grounds for a minor procedural dispute over the actions of Stewart, 
the magnitude of the crisis far outweighed the question of whether or not 
paragraph '2' or paragraph '4' of Article VI I I governed the convening of 
emergency-meetings of the Council. In this dispute the 'sub-text' was all. 
As far as the French were concerned this meeting was nothing more than an 
attempt to circumvent the French veto on further discussion of the British 
application to the Communities. 
"It is quite obvious that this manoeuvre by creating a precedent on the 
Middle East is in fact designed to introduce the practice of permanent 
discussion on every problem and that in the final analysis, its purpose is 
to debate the various aspects of Britain's candidacy to the Common 
Market, that is to make ihe Council of Ministers a court of appeal of the 
European Community."^ 
Indeed one would be hard pressed to dispute the French claim. The Council of 
Ministers of WEU had met on the 5th 6th and 7th February, and had discussed 
the problems of the Middle East in detail. When Stewart issued his invitation to 
discuss the Middle East situation in 'emergency session', there had been no 
developments in the situation which would justify the convening of an 
emergency meeting. While there is little evidence to suggest that the meeting 
did other than discuss the Middle East situation, and there is no suggestion that 
it discussed the physical detail of the U.K application, it is clear that the motive 
underlying the meeting had little to do with the Middle East. The presence of 
an ulterior motive is of course vigorously denied by the Member States 
attending the meeting. 
"As to what 'threat to peace' the Federal Government was able to invoke 
for taking part in the meeting, the question to be discussed was the 
situation in the Middle East and it was in fact discussed at the meeting. I 
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recall that the United Nations Security Council has been dealing with this 
question for almost two years because it is a serious threat to peace... "^" 
". . . , we for our part (Luxembourg) can give France the most formal 
assurance that we do not in any way wish to make WEU a Court of 
Appeal for the European Communities, or to make use of it as an 
indirect way of setting aside the obstacle of French opposition to British 
accession to the Common Market, and I am sure that this is also the 
position of our other partners. ""^ ^ 
In spite of these injured protestations to the contrary and the quasi-legal 
justifications for the WEU emergency-meeting, the pretext of discussing the 
Middle East situation was at best tenuous. As reported by the Economist... 
"...neither diplomatic tone nor constitutional niceties are near the heart 
of this dispute. Last week's meeting was strictly and obviously in 
accordance with the WEU statutes. But the 'threat to peace' or 'to 
economic stability' clause, which seems to be intended for exceptional 
meetings, could hardly be stretched to cover some of the topics one 
might wish to discuss; even if, as the Belgians have rightly pointed out, 
answering another Quai d Orsay invention, it was never intended to 
discuss Britain's Common Market application in this forum. And the 
treaty is much vaguer about the routine business of WEU (and Whitehall 
is not really strengthening its case by claiming, after the event, that the 
Middle East meeting was a routine one, when it patently was not). All 
the treaty says is that the council 'shall be so organised as to be able to 
exercise its functions continuously.' The varying national interpretations 
of these words will be subordinate to the real issue : the readiness of 
west European countries to accepl_or defy, a French veto on collective 
political consultation in Europe." 
Indeed this whole episode must be seen as part of a period of intense diplomatic 
effort to pressurise France into re-opening Community entry negotiations with 
Britain. Harmel, as noted, had identified the effecting of British entry to the 
Community as fundamental to his proposals. While Brandt later conceded in a 
speech to the Council of Europe that 'Although the spark that set the differences 
alight was a legal one, basically the crisis was political'.^^ It therefore seems 
reasonable to suggest that in spite of the initial facade of discussing the Middle 
East situation, and denials to the contrary from those involved, the use of the 
WEU Council was clearly part of an attempt to achieve other aims; British entry 
to the Community. 
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In the face of de Gaulle's veto on the discussion of the British application within 
the Community framework, the upgrading of the status of the WEU Council, 
provided a means of both discussing the British application and at the same time 
applying pressure to France to submit to the will of its Community partners and 
open negotiations with Britain. The underlying threat in this development was 
that the 'Five' and Britain within the framework of the WEU could enter into 
various forms of co-operation in Community related fields which would 
eventually render the Community superfluous. 
In the event all that this attempt to use the WEU as a lever on the rock of 
French intransigence managed to achieve was the further souring of Anglo-
French relations, the discrediting of the WEU as a forum for the discussion of 
non-Community issues, and reinforcement of the French view of WEU as little 
more than a vehicle for British influence and an extension of N.A.T.O. This 
development was much regretted by Edward Heath, then leader of the 
Conservative Party and Her Majesty's opposition. 
" I was opposed to the attempt to make WEU part of the means of 
outflanking the French veto on British entry into the E.E.C. The only 
practical result has, been to cause France to exclude herself from 
meetings of WEU."^'^ 
Notwithstanding Heath's interpretation of the episode as a failure, this leads us 
on to the core of the discussion; a re-evaluation of the pressures and influences 
leading to the formulation of the 1970 Luxembourg Report. As noted,^^ the 
prevailing view tends to identify the French as the driving force behind the Co-
operation mechanism's creation. 
In large measure this view derives from the leading role ascribed to Pompidou 
in the initiation and successful conclusion of the Hague Summit of December 
1969, following which the Davignon Committee was established. The essential 
argument advanced by this view is that the creation of the EPC mechanism and 
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its 'intergovernmental' form were the quid quo pro for Pompidou's acceptance 
of the principle of British entry to the Community. 
"The United Kingdom could not be left out of the picture; its entry into 
the Community was part of the price paid at the Hague Conference in 
1969 for the setting up of EPC on an intergovernmental basis." " 
While it is clear that France held significant influence in shaping the future 
development and direction of the Community, this influence has been greatly 
exaggerated. Indeed it will be argued that the calling of the Hague Summit, the 
acceptance of the principle of U.K entry to the Community, and the creation of 
the co-operation framework in the Luxembourg Report, were on the whole a 
damage-limitation exercise on the part of Pompidou. 
As the record of the Hague communique shows, credit for the initiation of the 
Hague Summit rests with Pompidou. Strictly speaking this is entirely accurate. 
The French Foreign Minister, Schumann, issued on 22-7-69,on behalf of 
Pompidou the proposal for the Heads of State or Government to meet at the 
Hague later that year. ' . . . I propose that the meeting of the Chiefs of State and 
Heads of Government of the Community be held at the Hague in 1969."^^ 
It may noted that this proposal for a summit meeting was by no means unique. 
Brandt had on two recent prior occasions made such a proposal. The first of 
these was made in the context of the WEU Council of Ministers meeting of June 
5-6 1969. ° Less than a month later, addressing a joint meeting of the 
Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliaments and the General 
Affairs Committee of WEU, Brandt reiterated his proposal 
"... in the Hague a few weeks ago, I suggested examining the possibility 
of discussing and drawing up, before the end of the year, the broad lines 
of a wide evolution in Europe at an ad hoc conference of Heads of 
Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the six member States 
of the Community and Britain, i.e outside the framework of the existing 
European organisations. This would naturally require preliminary 
discussions between the Six. This is not a patented invention. We 
should also lose the habit of confusing procedural questions with political 
realities. At the meeting at the Hague and since, I have observed that 
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our partners have shown interest in our remarks on the revival of 
European unification."^^ 
Indeed on the 21st July, one day prior to Schumann's proposal to the Member 
States, Brandt indicated the probability of a summit later that year and the 
possibility of re-opening negotiations with Britain in the first half of 1970.-^^ 
This strongly suggests Brandt had prior knowledge of the forthcoming French 
proposal. This of course would not be unusual given the close Franco-German 
relationship within the Community, which though less evident than the early 
1960's was still an important factor in Community relations. 
However, the point to be made here is that the probability of a major European 
summit in 1969, was very firmly on the agenda prior to Pompidou's proposal. 
At a deeper level, this tends to indicate that, far from being at the 'cutting-edge' 
of European integration, Pompidou was in fact in the position of reacting to 
events and pressures, while appearing to be pro-active. Arguably this was an 
inevitable consequence of the politics and power-relations of the Community up 
to the late 1960's. 
In order to repair the damage to relations between France and its Community 
partners, the initiative had to be seen to come from France. Without question 
France and Germany dominated the Community of the Six. Success in any 
major initiative therefore demanded the weight of the 'big-two'. Although the 
stronger partner economically, Germany by virtue of its recent history took a 
back-seat in the political sphere, able to lend enthusiastic support, but not in a 
position where it could be seen to be taking the lead in political initiatives. 
Though, it is notable that in the very act of proposing a summit conference, 
Brandt demonstrated a growing political confidence in the Federal Republic. It 
was however a cautious confidence. Brandt when making his proposal for a 
summit prefaced his remarks by saying... 'We are not considering an ambitious 
'German initiative'.'^^ 
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However, the central issues here are the assumptions of a strong and contingent 
link between British entry to the Community and the creation of the political co-
operation mechanism. 
"The Dutch and German Governments were prepared to yield to the 
French in order to gain acceptance of the principle of admitting the four 
applicant States, hoping that it would prove a temporary arrangement 
which could m time be brought closer and closer to the established 
institutions."-^^ 
For the French, and indeed in most accounts of this issue, the acceptance of the 
principle of British entry at the Hague was wrapped up in the 'triptych' of 
'Completion', 'Strengthening' and 'Enlargement', in that order, and with the 
proviso that enlargement could not be considered in the absence of a completion 
of the Treaties, which in particular meant an agreement on a regulation for the 
CAP . 
While accepting that this is a question of interpretation, it can be argued that this 
was a window-dressing which allowed Pompidou the public dignity of making 
conditional concessions to his Community partners. Pompidou had litde choice 
but to accept U.K entry, i f he was to reach agreement of a regulation for the 
CAP. 
Harmel in unveiling his WEU initiative in 1968, had made the link between 
completion and U.K entry in a formula which can be simply expressed as 
'British entry or no CAP'. Harmel's formula was endorsed by the other 
Community Member States, with the exception of France, and reaffirmed 
throughout the period leading up to and including the Hague Summit. 
That enlargement was an imperative to the 'Five' is clearly evident in the 
opening statements of the Hague Summit. For example, the Dutch Prime 
Minister, de Jong as Chairman of the Conference, making the opening address 
stressed the importance of enlargement over all other issues.-^ -^  Brandt too. 
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(now Federal Chancellor), made the issue of enlargement and specifically 
British entry central to his opening address. 
"... I say with complete frankness that the German Parliament and public expect 
me not to return from this Conference without concrete arrangements regarding 
the enlargement of the Community The German attitude on this has been 
known for years. I mean that we may not put it off any longer. ... In any 
event, I want to say that without Britain and the other countries which have 
applied for membership, Europe cannot become what it should and can be. I 
got the impression from the talks which preceded this Conference that we are 
agreed in principle that the Community should be enlarged. This agreement 
should not be underestimated. At this point I would like to address the French 
President in particular: i f France responds today to our clear will to complete 
and develop the Community with the trust which is a condition for enlargement 
this will be a source of satisfaction and rejoicing for us."-^ '* 
The pressure for France to acquiesce in the matter of enlargement was immense. 
Given the central importance of the CAP to France, its completion had clearly 
been identified as the French 'Achilles heel', and attacked remorselessly. While 
it is eminently debatable whether or not the other Member States would, in the 
final analysis, have been prepared to sacrifice the CAP, the question-mark 
placed over its continued existence, and by implication the E.E.C as a whole, 
should not be underestimated as a factor in persuading Pompidou to accept the 
principle of enlargement. 
That the 'Five' were able to exert such sustained pressure is demonstrative of a 
changing balance within the Community, reflecting the decline of French 
predominance in the Community. In many respects, French vulnerability on the 
question of the CAP, simply reflects a general decline in influence, brought 
about as a result of a series of internal and external reverses in the final phase of 
de Gaulle's Presidency, which in sum led to a loss of French prestige and 
influence among its partners. 
While it is not the intention here to analyse these issues, among the reverses one 
can list as immediate factors in the decline of French influence are; the student 
unrest of May 1968, the financial crisis of Autumn 1968 and the Soviet 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The combination of these 
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factors all served to weaken the leverage of France on its partners. To add to 
this growing catalogue of decline, the now apparent economic weight of West 
Germany, was beginning to show signs of increasing confidence in its identity, 
an example of which was the German refusal to prop-up the Franc during the 
1968 financial crisis. This economic weight alongside the beginnings of 
Ostpolitik, provided for France a further spur to accept British entry, i f only as 
a counterweight to the Federal Republic of Germany. Indeed Brandt, in his 
opening address to the Hague Summit employed this very fear as a reason 
enough for French acceptance of enlargement, '...those who fear that the 
economic strength of the Federal Republic of Germany could upset the balance 
within the Community ought to favour enlargement for this very reason.'-^^ 
It would therefore seem reasonable to suggest that Pompidou was in no position 
to demand or obtain significant concessions in return for his acceptance of 
British entry to the Community. Pompidou was bowing to the inevitable, 
jumping before he was pushed, and therefore able to look for a 'soft-landing'. 
I f this is accepted the first element of the prevailing view looks distinctly 
unstable, and by implication calls into question standard assumptions with 
respect to the second element, that of Pompidou as the driving force behind the 
creation of the co-operation mechanism. 
At the Hague Summit Pompidou did indeed call for foreign policy co-operation 
among the Member States of the Community, '...there should be regular 
meetings of E.E.C foreign ministers, to discuss foreign policy problems, 
Europe's relations with the rest of the world and particularly the U.S and 
Eastern countries [in order to] try to harmonise our foreign policies and in any 
event to inform ourselves better of our respective policies.'36 
Clear evidence of a willingness to develop a foreign policy framework is 
perhaps shown. But this is a further example of the 'reactive' nature of 
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Pompidou's initiatives. In this instance Pompidou can be seen to be reacting yet 
again to a Brandt proposal. Brandt in his opening address on 1st December, 
while stressing the importance of enlargement also proposed the development of 
a framework for the discussion of foreign policy i ssues .Pompidou for his 
part had made no reference to foreign policy co- operation in his opening 
address, concentrating instead on the triptych of 'completion, strengthening and 
enlarging' .^^ While this may be regarded as a superficial chronological point, 
the assumed contingent linkage between acceptance of British membership in 
return for the creation of a political co-operation framework along French lines 
is simply not there. 
Pompidou in making his proposals to the second day of the Hague Summit made 
no attempt to link agreement on political co-operation with the question of 
British membership of the Community. In this respect his statements appear to 
reflect the weakness of his position on enlargement, '...the question of the 
application of Great Britain and the three other countries must be approached 
with a 'positive spirit'.'-^^ 
It must of course be borne in mind that the public statements of the major actors 
involved do not necessarily reflect private discussions and concessions that may 
or may not have been made in the course of such discussions. However, there 
is little evidence to suggest that Pompidou had been beating the political co-
operation drum in the run-up to the Hague Summit, which had been in 
preparation since 15th September. Pompidou's pre-Conference statements had 
continually stressed the 'triptych' of Completion, Strengthening and 
Enlargement. This contrasts with Brandt who throughout 1969 had continually 
stressed the issue of political co-operation as part of the package of measures 
necessary to reinvigorate the Community. 
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In suggesting that Pompidou had arrived at the advocacy of political co-
operation as a response to Brandt's proposals, this is not to argue that Pompidou 
was necessarily opposed to such developments. Rather it is to illustrate that the 
widely held assumption that France was in the vanguard in the initiation and 
advocacy of such proposals is questionable, as is the assumption that the 
intergovernmental character and weak links to the Community institutions, 
found in the mechanism established by the Luxembourg Report were also a sop 
to the French in return for British entry to the Community. Indeed far from 
being pushed down the road to Political Co-operation, the other five Member 
states were way ahead of France in their commitment to establish a system of 
foreign policy co-operation. 
Although regarded primarily as a vehicle by which to bring about British entry 
to the Community in the face of the French refusal to allow further discussion 
within the Community framework, the decision by the 'Five' and the United 
Kingdom to establish a system of foreign policy co-operation in 1968/69 within 
the context of the WEU, not only pre-empted, but went beyond the provisions 
of the Luxembourg Report. 
That the 'Five' and the U.K were prepared to go beyond the strictly limited and 
vague provisions of the Luxembourg Report is made abundantly clear in the 
detailed and ambitious Italian proposals of February 1969. These proposals, in 
their clarity, content and strength are far closer to Fouchet than the tentative 
provisions of the 1970 Luxembourg Report. The Italian proposals, it will be 
recalled, prompted the Benelux countries to agree to the immediate initiation of 
compulsory consultation on foreign policy issues, a decision endorsed by 
F.R.G, Italy and the U.K. Additionally, and in spite of the continuing French 
'empty-chair' policy in WEU, the commitment of the 'Five' to the development 
of a system of foreign policy co-operation was constantly reaffirmed throughout 
1969. For example Gaston Thorn the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, in a 
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Statement to the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, identified foreign policy co-
operation as a constant factor in Luxembourg's foreign policy. 
"The Luxembourg Government has always considered political co-
operation as essential for furthering political construction. This has been 
a constant factor of Luxembourg foreign policy during the last fifteen 
years, and the present government intends to adhere to this course 
We are therefore fundamentally attracted to the idea of foreign policy 
consultations, and I think this is a perfectly natural attitude for a small 
country. "^" 
The Anglo-Italian declaration on Europe of 28th April 1969, which although 
part of the campaign to bring about British entry to the Community, also 
stressed the need for foreign policy consultation . 
"Europe must increasingly develop a common foreign policy so that she 
can act with growing effectiveness in the Internationa affairs. A first 
step towards the harmonization of the various foreign policie|has been 
taken in WEU; this initiative must be pursued and intensified."^^ 
The Italian commitment to foreign policy co-operation was re-stated by the 
Italian Foreign Minister, Mr.Nenni, in a speech to the Council of Europe on 
13th May 1969, in which France was urged to reconsider its refusal to 
participate. ' I should like to hope that it will reconsider its decision, and once 
more contribute, as in the past, towards the building of European unity'.'^^ 
While following the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in June 1969, the 
Belgian commitment to foreign policy co-operation was also re-affirmed by the 
Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr.Harmel.^-^ 
Perhaps the most surprising testament of faith in foreign policy co-operation, is 
offered by the Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns. Meeting with the British 
Foreign Minister Michael Stewart on 20th November 1969 in London, just ten 
days prior to the Hague Summit, Luns indicated a direct and specific 
commitment to the Fouchet proposals on behalf of the Dutch Government. 
"Mr.Luns states that his government is still in favour of the second 
Fouchet plan, put forward in 1962, provided an article is added 
specifying that the Community, from a date to be fixed, will endeavour 
to develop political co-operation in the sense of integration. "^'* 
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Given the level of opposition offered by the Dutch Government to the Fouchet 
proposals, this appears to be a fundamental reversal of policy on the part of the 
Netherlands. Luns in stating that his Government was 'still in favour of the 
second Fouchet plan', was perhaps attempting to indicate a positive approach 
from the Dutch in the forthcoming Hague Summit. This may also reflect the 
knowledge that the problem of British entry had been overcome in the 
preparatory talks for the Hague Summit. 
Thus it can be strongly argued that the decision of the Davignon Committee to 
concentrate on 'foreign policy consultation' was an easy decision to make. The 
groundwork on how 'foreign policy consultation' would operate had been done 
in the context of WEU. The 'Five', along with the British, (for whom entry to 
the Community had in principle been accepted), had demonstrated a clear 
commitment to the development of 'foreign policy co-operation' both in their 
actions within WEU and in their public statements. In short foreign policy co-
operation was not brought to the agenda by Pompidou, it had been knocking at 
the door for some time. 
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The Luxembourg Report 
The Luxembourg Report was prepared by a committee composed of the Political 
Directors of the foreign ministries of the Member States, and was adopted by 
the Foreign Ministers of the Member States in Luxembourg on 27 October 
1970. Also known as the Davignon Report after the Chairman of the 
committee, the report is more properly entided a 'REPORT BY THE FOREIGN 
MINISTERS OF THE MEMBER STATES ON THE PROBLEMS OF 
POLITICAL UNIFICATION'. Despite this rather grand and wide-ranging title 
the report concentrates its efforts on proposals to establish a mechanism for co-
operation between the Member States in the area of foreign policy. The report 
is divided into four parts. Part One is of little significance in respect of the 
machinery of political co-operation. It is, in effect, a statement of European 
identity and a justification for the approach adopted by the authors of the report, 
an approach allegedly based upon three facts. 
"The first fact is that tangible form should be given to the will for 
political union which has always been a force for the progress of the 
European Communities. ... The second fact is that the implementation of 
the common policies ... requires corresponding developments in the 
political sphere, so as to bring about the day when Europe can speak 
with one voice. ... The third and final fact is that Europe must prepare 
itself to discharge the imperadve world duties entailed by its greater 
cohesion and increasing role. "^ ~* 
These statements of 'fact' led the Ministers to conclude that 'foreign policy 
concertation should be the object of the first practical endeavours to demonstrate 
to all that Europe has a political vocation.'"^^ 
Notwithstanding these 'facts', there is little doubt that the authors of the 
Luxembourg Report in choosing foreign policy co-operation as the focus of their 
efforts had chosen the path of least resistance. It had been clear in the recent 
efforts within the context of WEU, that the 'Five' and the British were greatly 
enthused by the prospect of foreign policy co- operation. As a consequence of 
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these recent proposals the groundwork on how such a mechanism would operate 
had been thoroughly laid. Thus the authors of the Luxembourg Report were by 
no means entering uncharted territory. Indeed in oudining their 'three facts' the 
formulators of the Luxembourg Report can be said to have taken a particularly 
tortuous route to avoid stating the most obvious 'fact' of all, that any other 
approach would lead to a return to the deadlock of Fouchet. As Nuttall notes 
the Political Directors were deeply conscious of the failure of Fouchet. 
"The collapse of the discussions in the spring of 1962 had left a deep 
scar. The difficulties which had brought about the collapse remained, 
and the authors of the Luxembourg Report, in order to avoid a repetition 
of the^ experience, skirted around them rather than tackling them head 
on."^ ' 
What this avoidance actually boils down to in the Luxembourg Report is the 
avoidance of institutional solutions and sensitive policy areas. There was little 
to suggest that issues such as the primacy of the Atlantic Alliance and the 
maintenance of the policy jurisdictions of the Communities were any less 
sensitive by 1970 than they had been throughout the Fouchet negotiations. 
There were of course changing political circumstances which increased the 
chances of an agreement of some sort. Perhaps the most notable circumstantial 
change was the resignation of de Gaulle and the acceptance by his successor, 
Pompidou, of a successful outcome to the British application. 
Whilst acceptance of the principle of U.K entry clearly signalled a substantial 
change in French policy it is highly questionable whether this policy reversal 
brought with it, as some commentators have suggested, a concomitant increase 
in the power and influence of France over its Community partners, in particular 
over the form and content of the Luxembourg Report. In this respect it is 
argued that evidence of this increased influence can be seen in acquiescence to 
French opposition to an 'expansion of the role of the Commission and the 
European Parliament'.'*^ Given the lack of commitment, other than rhetorical, 
among the other Member States to the extension of the power of the Community 
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institutions throughout the Fouchet proposals, any perceived concessions to 
French sensibilities are by no means as significant as some have suggested. 
I f it is accepted that the bench-mark for any analysis of the Luxembourg Report 
is the Fouchet Plans, and taking into account the avoidance by the report's 
authors of institutional solutions, the provisions of the Luxembourg Report 
dealing with the European Parliament differ little with those agreed in the 
Fouchet negotiations in so far as they provide for consultation with the European 
Parliament 
"The ministers and the members of the Political Affairs Committee of 
the European Parliament will hold six monthly meetings to discuss 
questions which are the subject of consultations in the framework of 
foreign policy co-operation. These meetings will be informal to ensure 
that the parliamentarians and ministers can express their views freely. ... 
.Once a year, the President-in-office of the Council will provide ihe 
European Parliament with a progress report on the work in question. "-^ ^ 
Of greater significance is the Luxembourg Report's reference to the European 
Commission which provides that, 'The Commission will be consulted if the 
activities of the European Communities are affected by the work of the 
Ministers.'^^ 
There is an ambiguity in this paragraph which can and did lead to differing 
interpretations of its intent. On one hand it can be viewed as an indication that 
the Political Co-operation mechanism would involve itself in issues covered by 
the Community Treaties, thus impliciriy undermining the right and jurisdictions 
of the Community institutions. In this respect it conforms to the French 
viewpoint expressed during the Fouchet negotiations, that although the 
competences of the Community institutions should in principle be respected, 
there were no areas beyond the reach of the Member Governments. On the 
other hand, the explicit commitment to consult the Commission on issues 
affecting the Communities can be regarded as something of a breakthrough for 
the Commission and a step towards breaking down the barrier, so rigidly 
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maintained by the French, between 'high' and 'low' politics. The initial 
reaction to this aspect of the Luxembourg Report by both the Commission and 
the French Government tends to suggest that both were unclear of its 
interpretation and fearful of its consequences for their respective competences. 
"The Commission's reaction was at first defensive, concerned to 
maintain the boundaries of its legal competence against any attempts at 
encroachment and to insist that it alone was entitled to represent the 
common interest in areas of established Community policy. ... The 
French Government was just as concerned to keep the new procedure 
untainted by the insidious atmosphere of Brussels, and to prevent the 
Communities from encroaching on an area of policy so central to 
national sovereignty. "''^ 
Whilst there was an element of ambiguity in the interpretation of this paragraph 
leading to differing interpretations of its intention, its actual effect can be said to 
have favoured the Commission. Though by no means giving the Commission 
an active and clear role in the Co-operation mechanism, the commitment to 
consult the Commission can be regarded as a significant toe-hold, given the 
generally tentative nature of the Luxembourg Report. It is also of note that the 
Fouchet proposals did not include any such commitment to the European 
Commission. Indeed the Commission is not specifically mentioned by any of 
the Fouchet Plans. Moreover the Commission can claim to have played an 
integral role in the initial work of EPC.^-^ 
However, to return to the decision of the Davignon Committee to concentrate 
their fire on 'foreign policy concertation'. The Luxembourg Report identifies 
two objectives for this co-operation. 
"To ensure mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of 
international politics, by exchanging information and consulting 
regularly. To ensure their solidarity by working for a harmonisation of 
views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears 
necessary. "-'^ 
Irrespective of the criteria of measurement employed, be they supranational or 
intergovernmental, the objectives of the report as milestones on-route to 
'political unification' are tentative indeed. In comparison to the objectives of 
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the various Fouchet proposals, which provide the bench-mark for this study, the 
objectives outlined by the Luxembourg Report appear as the pale, but 
nonetheless identifiable, shadow of the Fouchet objectives. The reasoning 
behind this tentative and limited approach is found in the requirement of 
providing a package of proposals acceptable to all Member States, in short a 
need to avoid sensitive policy areas. In this case the most sensitive issue by far 
was that of defence. 
The sensitivity of this issue was such that its presence in the deliberations of the 
Davignon Committee would be to guarantee failure. This is not to suggest 
however, that the Member States were necessarily opposed to the discussion of 
defence issues, indeed the reverse would be true. Clearly in the context of the 
Italian proposals to the WEU Council of February 1969, the 'Five' and the U.K 
had demonstrated a willingness to establish a comprehensive system of political 
co-operation, embracing defence questions. Whilst the emergence of a 
'European' defence identity can be regarded as one of the abiding aims of 
French 'European' policy. 
Thus in light of the apparent willingness of all involved to develop some form of 
'European' defence co-operation, the absence of provision for such discussion in 
the context of the Luxembourg machinery requires explanation. From the 
viewpoint of the 'Five' there had been no difficulty in agreeing to co-operation 
on defence issues within the context of WEU. Notwithstanding the importance 
to the 'Five' of the British presence in WEU , a crucial aspect in the decision to 
undertake consultation in defence issues must be seen as the specific 
subordination of WEU to N.A.T.O command, thus securely locking any 
agreement into the Alliance framework. This provided the essential guarantees 
sought by the 'Five', and in particular the Dutch, during the Fouchet 
negotiations. 
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The apparently obvious solution to the generalised wish to establish a 
comprehensive system of political co-operation would seem to have been the 
adoption of the Italian proposals of February 1969. These proposals had been 
accepted by the 'Five' and the U.K, and as a virtual clone of the Fouchet 
proposals would surely have had some appeal to the French. In addition the 
WEU had the advantage of a pre-existing institutional structure, including a 
permanent secretariat. In contrast the co-operation mechanism established by 
the Luxembourg Report lacked the guarantees sought by the 'Five', was 
virtually devoid of institutional form, and had no Treaty basis. Indeed it was 
not even securely tied to the Community, though membership was contingent on 
Community membership. The WEU thus provided the seemingly ideal vehicle 
with which to realise the consensus that Europe must be able to 'speak with a 
single voice' on the world stage. 
This solution would however have proved unworkable. The specific 
subordination of the WEU to N.A.T.O in operational military matters would 
have caused immense difficulties for the French, resulting no doubt, in further 
WEU crises. In addition the use of the WEU framework as part of the 
campaign to effect U.K entry to the Community can be said to have further 
damaged the legitimacy of the WEU as the vehicle for such developments. 
Thus this particular avenue was closed to the formulators of the Luxembourg 
Report. Conversely, for the 'Five' discussion of defence issues could not be 
countenanced in the absence of a specific linkage to the Atlantic Alliance. To 
use the analogy of the WEU as a 'foster-home'; the issue of a European defence 
identity was still regarded as too difficult a child to return to the family home. 
It would remain in the care of the WEU for the foreseeable future. 
Thus the problem of the Atlantic Alliance/N.A.T.O remained for all concerned 
the issue which could easily have undone what was in many respects an effort in 
rapprochement between France and its Community partners. That this was so. 
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should not be overlooked. There was in the wake of the Hague Summit a 
greater willingness to seek to advance integration, and repair the strained 
relations between France and its partners; the so-called Hague Spirit. While 
much of this discussion has focussed on the conflictual aspects of this episode, it 
should be borne in mind that there was a great willingness among the 
participants in the deliberations of the Davignon Committee to produce a result 
acceptable to all. As previously noted the formulators of the Luxembourg 
Report followed the path of least resistance, avoiding dangerous issues. Clearly 
the Atlantic Alliance presented for all participants a problematic area which had 
to be avoided if a successful conclusion was to reached. 
Returning to the issue of enlargement. The Luxembourg Report in outlining 
proposals to associate the applicant States with the work of the Co- operation 
mechanism, recalls and resolves one of the major areas of dispute throughout the 
Fouchet negotiations, that of the British application to the Communities, the so-
called Prealable Anglais. While it may appear rather incongruous to devote so 
much attention to the issue of British entry in a thesis focussed on efforts to 
establish a 'European' foreign and defence identity, its importance to the 'Five' 
in any venture which may at some future point involve a 'European' defence 
policy cannot be understated. For the 'Five', British membership of the 
Community was integral to the inauguration and credibility of EPC . Thus in 
making specific provision for the applicant States the authors of the Luxembourg 
Report had learned the lesson of Fouchet. 
"The applicant States must be kept informed of the progress of the work 
of the Six, since they will have to be consulted on the objectives and 
machinery described in the present report and will have to adhere to 
them when they join the Communities." 
Additionally, and further recalling the Fouchet negotiations, the Luxembourg 
Report also stresses the essential link between Community membership and 
participation in the Co-operation mechanism. The Fouchet Committee, after 
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much debate decided upon a formula within which it was accepted that it was 
'essential to establish a strict correlation between membership of the European 
Communities and of the Political Union.'^^ The Luxembourg Report mirrors 
the opinion of the Fouchet Committee in its view that, 'The Ministers stress the 
correlation between membership of the European Communities and participation 
in activities making for progress towards political unification.'^^ 
Institutionally the Luxembourg Report's link with the Fouchet proposals can 
perhaps be observed in the negative, in the avoidance of an institutional 
framework. However, although lacking a strong formal institutional 
framework, the Report, in its essential functions does resemble the structure 
envisaged by the various Fouchet drafts. It provides for the regularisation of 
meetings between Foreign Ministers, establishes a Political Committee and deals 
the relationship between the co-operation mechanism and the institutions of the 
Community. Foreign Ministers were to meet 'at least every six months, at the 
initiative of the President-in- o f f i c e ' . I n addition the report provides for 
meetings of the Heads of State or Government within the Co-operation 
framework and outlines the basis of an emergency meeting procedure .^^ All 
four Fouchet drafts contain similar arrangements for regular meetings between 
Foreign Ministers and also for extraordinary meetings of the Heads of State or 
Government. 
Section 3 of Part 2 of the Luxembourg Report provides for the establishment of 
a Political Committee. 'This Committee, comprising the heads of the political 
departments, wil l meet at least four times a year to do the groundwork for the 
ministerial meetings and to carry out any tasks entrusted to it by the 
Ministers.'^^ 
The setting up of the Political Committee has its counterpart in one of the most 
contentious issues of the Fouchet negotiations, the proposal to establish a 
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European Political Commission. Initially proposed in the first French draft, the 
Political Commission was to be composed of, 'senior officials of the Foreign 
Affairs departments of each Member State. ...The European Political 
Commission shall assist the Council. It shall prepare its deliberations and carry 
out its decisions. It shall perform the duties that the Council decides to entrust 
to it. "62 
Again, similar commitments to the creation of a Political Commission are found 
in all four drafts considered by the Fouchet Committee, though it should be 
added that in the case of the drafts submitted by the 'Five' this commitment was 
complicated by the additional proposal for the establishment of the office of 
' Secretary-General'. 
Within the context of the Fouchet proposals it seems clear that there was litrie 
dispute over the need to establish some form of 'secretariat' in order to co-
ordinate the work of the Council and the Committees of Ministers of the 
Political Union. The disputes which divided the Member States on this issue, 
revolved around questions of the Political Commission's role and institutional 
status, its size, its location, and the implications for the powers and jurisdictions 
of the Community institutions, in particular those of the European Commission. 
Thus deeply conscious of the sensitivity of this issue, the authors of the 
Luxembourg Report, in their efforts to create some form of support service for 
the Co-operation mechanism, were assiduous in their avoidance of the raw 
nerves that had so inflamed the Fouchet negotiations. The Political Committee 
was to have no permanent location or permanent administrative support. 
Meetings of the Political Committee were to take place in the Country of their 
Chairman. The Chairmanship of the Committee conformed to that of the 
rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Communities. 
Administrative support for the Co-operation mechanism, dealt with in a separate 
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section of the Report, provided that, 'The host State will take all due steps to 
provide a secretarial service and for the practical organisation of the 
meetings'.^^ Further echoing the Fouchet Plans, the Political Committee were 
given the power to establish Working Parties. 'The Committee may set up 
working parties for special tasks. It may instruct a panel of experts to assemble 
data relating to a specific problem and submit possible solutions.' 
In establishing the Political Committee the Luxembourg Report comes perhaps 
as close as was possible in the circumstances to establishing a new 'European 
institution'. Its ancestry is without doubt found in the basic structure of the 
Political Commission of the Fouchet drafts 
In addition to the Political Committee the Report also provided that, 'Each State 
will appoint one of its foreign affairs officials as the correspondent of his 
counterparts in other countries.'^^ The creation of this group, later to be 
known officially as the 'Group of Correspondents', can be viewed as a further 
means of providing a support network for the Co-operation mechanism, while 
avoiding the sensitive issue of a permanent secretariat. The Correspondents 
were middle-ranking foreign ministry officials from each Member State who 
advised on procedure and helped manage EPC.,^^ thus performing some of the 
tasks ordinarily performed by a secretariat. The political sensitivity of this 
issue, it seems, overrode the logic of providing some form of permanent 
administrative back-up for the nascent Co-operation mechanism . 
In some respects this avoidance of a 'permanent secretariat' returns us to the 
underlying theme of this chapter, that of French influence. In the prevailing 
view, the minimalist non-institutional approach of the Luxembourg Report was 
part of the price paid to France in return for British entry. This is a mistaken 
view. While the approach of the Luxembourg Report to the institutional aspects 
of the co-operation mechanism does suggest an element of compromise on the 
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part of all participants, there would appear to be greater evidence of 
compromise on the part of France rather than by the 'Five' to the wishes of the 
French. 
In suggesting this, the point of reference is the French attachment to the creation 
of an overarching 'European Council' and a permanent 'Political 
Commission/Secretariat. Throughout the Fouchet negotiations this had been the 
cornerstone of French institutional proposals. That this remained the 
institutional blueprint favoured by the French can be observed in the failed 
attempt by Pompidou to resurrect these aspects of the Fouchet proposals. In 
January 1971, less than three months after the adoption of the Luxembourg 
Report, Pompidou, following the practice of his predecessor held a staged press 
conference in order to acquaint the world's press with his views on a range of 
issues. In the course of this press conference President Pompidou outlined his 
views on the future development of European integration. 
"But what kind of Europe ? to my mind, frankly there is only one answer 
and that is to take what we have and build a Confederation of States 
which are prepared to harmonise their policies and integrate their 
economies. I f one takes this view the debate over supranationality 
becomes irrelevant. ... Europe can only be governed as a result of 
national governments coming together to take collective decisions which 
apply to all." 
In positing the future of Europe as 'Confederal' Pompidou effectively revives 
the vision/spectre of de Gaulle's 'Europe des Patries',thus threatening to re-open 
the barely healed wounds of Fouchet. Musing on future institutional 
developments Pompidou suggested the possibility of creating a body of ministers 
permanently responsible for European affairs. 
"At present, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs meet within the Council of 
Ministers, and other ministers also hold specialised meetings when the 
need arises. It is possible that some time in the near future, or maybe at 
a later stage, governments will feel the need to appoint ministers 
specifically responsible for European affairs. ...One might also 
ultimately envisage these ministers performing a strictly European 
function and ,Jio longer playing a role within their national 
governments.""^ 
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In considering the method by which this permanent Council of Ministers should 
make decisions Pompidou, citing the method by which coalition governments 
function, argued the case for unanimity in decision-making,^^ thereby reviving 
the other great landmark of Community development in the 1960's, the 
Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, an issue guaranteed to stir contentious 
debate. Adding further fuel to the fire Pompidou goes on to ask rhetorically; 
'how can the Council of Ministers ensure that its decisions are implemented ? 
Any hopes held by the European Commission that they would be called upon to 
implement the decisions of the Confederation's Council of Ministers were 
quickly dispelled by Pompidou who discarded the idea of a role for the 
European Commission in the creation of a 'European Union' as outdated. 
Pompidou's solution to the problem of implementation had a familiar ring. 
"It can, of course, through the national governments count on the 
national administrations but it is probable and even certain that this is not 
sufficient and that it will require specialised agencies for the preparation 
of its recommendations and for the following up of its decisions. I see 
no objections to this. On one condition, that these agencies for 
enforcement be answerable solely to the Council of Ministers. This rule 
governs the accountability of the administration to the executive: it 
obtains in all states and by the same token should apply to the European 
Confederation." 
Any lingering doubts about the implications or the inspiration for these 
proposals were removed when it later emerged that Pompidou envisaged Paris as 
the seat for these 'specialised agencies ' .Pompidou had thus revived the idea 
of 'Permanent Political Secretariat', and with it the fears for the powers and 
jurisdictions of the European Commission, and of French domination of the 
Community. Not surprisingly these proposals met with strong resistance, 
particularly from the Dutch, which given the vociferous nature of their 
opposition during the Fouchet negotiations is less than surprising. According to 
Nuttall the dispute found expression in the Dutch insistence that i f there was to 
be a secretariat it should be based in Brussels 'in order to ensure adequate co-
ordination with the Community institutions'.^^ This of course was anathema to 
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the French who insisted on Paris. The consequence of this bilateral 
intransigence was the complete abandonment of the proposal prior to the Paris 
Summit of 1972. 
Whilst the feelings aroused by these proposals did not reach the vitriolic heights 
of the Fouchet negotiations, it would be broadly correct to suggest that the 
issues raised by Pompidou were still off-limits for serious consideration. Thus 
in the context of the criticisms levelled at the timidity of the Luxembourg 
Report, the reaction to the resurrection of these issues by the French President 
further validates the circumspection exercised by the authors of the Report in 
their avoidance of issues associated with the failure of Fouchet. 
Although abandoned, the Pompidou proposals were not without consequence for 
the development of EPC. It would appear that most Member States, as a result 
of the initial work-load of EPC, had accepted the necessity for some form of 
permanent support structure to co-ordinate the work of the Co- operation 
mechanism. Paradoxically however, the sensitivities aroused by Pompidou's 
proposals for 'specialised agencies',ensured that, for the foreseeable future, the 
possibility of a Permanent Secretariat was non-existent. Political sensitivities 
had thus ensured that EPC in terms of its administrative organisation would have 
to 'muddle through' as best it could. 
At another level, the failure of Pompidou's proposals further calls into question 
the generally held view of French predominance within the Community at this 
time. Indeed to return to the Luxembourg Report, one can speculate that had 
the French been in as strong a position as some commentators have suggested, 
one would expect that the French would have been in a position to impose such 
a structure on their partners within the context of the Luxembourg Report. The 
inability of the French to do so suggests that they were in no position to insist 
on this line. 
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The same is true of the prevailing assumptions with respect to the 
'intergovernmental' nature of the framework established by the Luxembourg 
Report. Not only were the French in no position to insist and impose their 
blueprint on the other Member States, the assumption that the 'Five' were 
fundamentally inclined to supranationalism in all aspects of European integration 
is spurious, and arguably one of the great myths of the Community. 
While at the level of rhetoric the 'Five' may have, on various occasions 
proclaimed themselves in favour of a fully-fledged supranational/federal Europe, 
their expectations and actions can be observed to fall a long way short of the 
rhetoric. It is arguable that i f the Member States were driven by a faith in a 
vision of a supranational/federal Europe, it was a faith that had by the time of 
the Hague Summit descended to the level of lip-service. As Pickles notes. 
"By 1970 France's partners in the European Community also seemed to 
have lost any real belief that either progress towards the ostensible goal 
of European integration had been made, or that it was likely to be made 
in the foreseeable future. In 1965 M.Couve de Murville had argued that 
some of the integrationist ardour of France's partners in the E.E.C, like 
some of their defence of British membership, was inspired more by the 
desire to find a stick to beat France with than by the intention to take any 
concrete steps towards supranationalism. Five years later they had 
dropped even the pretence of ardour." 
Whilst it is possible to marshal a great deal more evidence to support this 
contention, it is reasonable to suggest that the 'Five' in accepting the 
intergovernmental form of the Luxembourg mechanism, were not sacrificing 
deep rooted supranational ambitions in return for acceptance of British entry. 
Intergovernmental ism, particularly in areas of 'high politics' was an accepted 
fact of Community life. In addition, the fact that the 'Five' were quite willing 
in the context of the 'intergovernmental' WEU to adopt what was essentially a 
version of the Fouchet proposals adds considerable weight to the view that the 
Fouchet negotiations failed not because of fundamental theological disputes over 
the form of a 'Political Europe', but rather that they failed as a consequence of 
the political circumstances of the time. 
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To conclude; this examination offers a new perspective on the influences and 
motivations leading to the establishment of the political co-operation mechanism 
and specifically the Luxembourg Report. In sum, the view offered by the 
standard texts, that of the predominance of French influence in the initiation and 
formulation of the co-operation mechanism, is seen to be less than accurate. 
Whilst the previously neglected role of WEU has been shown to be a significant 
factor in both the promotion of foreign policy co-operation and in the acceptance 
of British entry to the Communities. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
THE DOOGE COMMITTEE AND REPORT 
The Single European Act entered into force 1st July 1987. It marked the 
culmination of a number of initiatives designed to further the progress of integration 
in the European Community. In terms of media coverage and public awareness the 
so-called '1992' objectives attracted the greatest attention, referring to the aims of 
Title 2 of the SEA dealing with provisions for the establishment of the 'Internal 
Market'. However the concern here is with the development of European Political 
Co-operation. Prior to a detailed examination of the various provisions of the SEA 
as they relate to the EPC mechanism it is necessary to consider the various 
developments and debates which led to the inclusion of EPC within the framework 
of the SEA. 
The immediate background to the SEA is to be located in the Fontainebleau 
European Council held on 25th & 26th June 1984. At this Council, the Heads of 
State or Government of the European Communities took the decision to establish an 
'Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs',^ more usually known as the 'Dooge 
Committee' after its Chairman Senator James Dooge of the Republic of Ireland. 
The Committee's terms of reference were 'to make suggestions for the improvement 
of the operation of European Co-operation in both the Community field and that of 
political, or any other co-operation.'^ 
The political atmosphere and context in which the Dooge Committee was 
established may in many respects be regarded as a critical turning point in the 
Community's development. The Community was in crisis. It had been and was 
facing a multitude of problems which threatened to bring it to a grinding halt. 
Nowhere was this atmosphere of crisis more exemplified than in the long-running 
and acrimonious dispute over the United Kingdom's budgetary contribution. Indeed 
the depth and possible consequences of the crisis appear to have been brought home 
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to the main participants in this particular dispute at the Brussels European Council 
of March 1984, three months prior to the Fontainebleau Council. According to 
Taylor, in the hours following their failure to resolve the problem of the United 
Kingdom's budgetary contribution, both Prime Minister Thatcher and President 
Mitterrand 'behaved as i f they had looked into the abyss, and were shocked into the 
awareness of the desperate need to hold themselves back.'^ 
Chastened by an awareness of the possible consequences of a failure to 
resolve this and other problems,^ the Fontainebleau Council met in what may best 
be described as a spirit of compromise and reconciliation6. Agreement was reached 
on Britain's budgetary contribution and a whole range of other issues in a package 
little different to that proposed three months earlier in Brussels. Capitalising on this 
accommodating atmosphere President Mitterrand was able to gain easy acceptance 
for his proposals establishing the Dooge and Adonnino Committees. 
Thus the creation of the Dooge Committee may be viewed as a recognition 
and response to the depth and intensity of the crisis facing the Community. 
However, the IDooge Committee and its subsequent reports was by no means the 
only attempt in this period to breath life into a moribund Community. The early 
1980's saw a number of reports, proposals, declarations and draft treaties with this 
aim in mind. In many respects the most notable of these documents was the 
European Parliament's 'Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union'(EUT), 
adopted by a large majority in the Parliament in February 1984. 
The European Parliament's 'Draft Treaty' is less notable for its content than 
for the rather inflated claims made on its behalf by its advocates. The thrust of 
these claims are essentially to suggest that the EUT was instrumental in the 
movement which led to the SEA and that it was also the primary source of its 
content. Without considering the debate in detail, there does appear to be a prima 
facie case for arguing that the EUT inspired or led Mitterrand to take up the 
'European torch' and propose the creation of the Dooge and Adonnino Committees. 
The source of this claim lies in Mitterrand's response to the EUT in an address to 
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the European Parliament 24th May 1984, one month prior to the Fontainebleau 
Council and the decision to set up the Ad-Hoc Committees'. 
"A new situation calls for a new treaty ... France is ready for such an 
enterprise ... I therefore suggest preparatory consultation, perhaps 
leadmg to a conference of the Member States concerned, be started 
up."^ 
While there is a close chronological link between Mitterrand's statement of 
support for the aims of the EUT and the decision to set up the Dooge and Adonnino 
Committees, it is difficult to not to be a little sceptical of Mitterrand's intentions in 
grasping the 'European flame' at such a late stage in the French Presidency of the 
European Community.^ The presidency was beset by the issue of the U.K's 
budgetary contributions, not to mention domestic problems with the reforming 
programme of the Vth Republic's first socialist President. Given these difficulties it 
is not difficult to gain the impression that Mitterrand has seized upon the 'European 
Union' theme in order to deflect a largely negative view of the French presidency. 
Equally one may argue that the European Parliament, in pursuit of its own 
agenda, exploited Mitterrand's address in a highly selective manner. The extract 
from Mitterrand's speech quoted above was taken from a European Parliament 
report on the impact of the EUT.^^ This report contains an annex entitled 
'Summary of comments favourable to a new Treaty establishing European Union'. 
The annex amounts to a list of quotations favourable to the EUT made by notable 
figures from the each of the Member States. However in the case of Mitterrand, i f 
the full text of his speech is read it becomes clear that his support for the Draft 
Treaty is not as unequivocal as the European Parliament's report would appear to 
suggest. While Mitterrand does clearly state the willingness of France to 'examine 
and defend' the EUT, the bulk of his speech concerning institutional issues is 
focussed upon creating the conditions in which the procedures and practices of the 
Community could be improved. The main thrust is a call for a stricter adherence to 
the application of the Treaty of Rome and to the provisions of the Stuttgart 
Declaration.^^ 
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Viewed from this wider context. President Mitterrand's support for the 
European Parliament's Draft Treaty is less significant and considerably more 
equivocal than the European Parliament's report implies. Additionally where 
Mitterrand does specifically mention the creation of new institution, it is to suggest 
the creation of a 'permanent secretariat' for the European Council a development 
which was anathema to the 'Federalist' orientation of the Parliament's Draft Treaty. 
This then leaves the clear impression that the 'exploitation' of the situation 
was a two-way process with the interests of both parties being partially served. 
Mitterrand's intervention placed the 'European Union' debate on a higher level, 
creating a changed and expectant atmosphere, thus serving the interests of the 
European Parliament. Also Mitterrand's reputation as a 'European' was 
considerably enhanced with the Fontainebleau Council being regarded as the 
'launch-pad'for a new phase of integration. 
Countering this somewhat cynical interpretation of Mitterrand's intentions, 
Burgess presents a reasonable if superficial case to suggest that Mitterrand's 
'European' credentials are consistent and sound. Quoting from a personal interview 
with Alterio Spinelli, Burgess concludes that 'Mitterrand is a genuine European 
socialised in the European spirit of the Hague and well acquainted with the heyday 
of Schuman and Monnet in the 1950s.'^ -^ 
Notwithstanding these inconclusively contestable claims, it is in the area of 
content that claims made on behalf of the EUT are most open to question. The 
principal claim made in this respect is that the EUT's main provisions were 
endorsed and taken up by the Dooge Committee. 
"The ad-hoc committee's report and the Parliament's Draft Treaty 
are strikingly similar in a number of respects: . . . . The fact that the 
Dooge Committee takes up the principal ideas of the draft Treaty is 
furt^ | r proof of the realism and balance inherent in the draft Treaty 
Given that the reports of the Dooge Committee can be regarded as forming 
the basis for discussions in the IGC leading to the 'Single European Act', the 
implication is clear; the main provisions of the SEA have their origin in the 
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European Parliament's draft Treaty. I f it is accepted that the main thrust of the 
EUT was to significantly increase the powers and jurisdictions of the Community's 
'supranational' institutions, thereby creating a new constitutional balance, the claims 
made on behalf of the Parliament's draft Treaty cannot be sustained. 
Indeed even a cursory comparison between the institutional provisions of the 
EUT, the Dooge Reports and the Single European Act reveals the credibility gap in 
the Parliament's claims. The EUT in institutional terms establishes a structure 
which vests the European Parliament with significant legislative powers while 
reducing the European Council to a residual role in which its main function would 
appear to be the approval of the transfer of even more powers to the 'supranational' 
institutions of the 'Union'. 
In sharp contrast to this the Single European Act can be said to have 
consolidated the power and position of the European Council while allowing the 
European Parliament a very slightly enhanced role by means of the 'Co-operation 
p r o c e d u r e ' , a mechanism far removed from the 'Legislative Co-decision' 
envisaged in the Parliament's draft Treaty 
As for the Dooge Report, the Committee confines itself to a single reference 
to the EUT in its final recommendation that... 
"... a conference of the representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States should be convened in the near future to negotiate a 
draft European Union Treaty based on the acquis communautaire, the 
present document and the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European 
Union and guided by the spirit,and method of the draft Treaty voted 
by the European Parliament." 
This is not to suggest that the EUT shares no areas of common ground with 
the Dooge Report or the SEA. There are for instance similar proposals in respect of 
new policy areas, though the point should be made that these proposals were by no 
means unique to the EUT prior to their adoption by the Dooge Committee. Thus 
the absence of acknowledgement does not necessarily indicate the absence of 
influence. Equally, as this example illustrates, claims to have influenced and 
informed events should be treated with extreme caution. 
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In this case however concrete confirmation of the lack of influence exerted 
by the European Parliament's EUT is available. In staking the European 
Parliament's claim to a significant role in the process leading to the SEA, the Croux 
Report makes much of the Dooge Committee's invitation to the President of the 
European Parliament, Mr.Pflimlin, and the Chairman of the E.P's Committee of 
Institutional Affairs, Mr.Spinelli, to take part in two meetings of the Committee. 
The implication is clear. On the basis of the participation of two members of the 
European Parliament in two meetings of the Dooge Committee, the Parliament 
claims direct and significant input on the findings of the Committee. 
There is of course nothing to suggest that these meetings were anything other 
than helpful and constructive to the findings the Dooge Committee, and indeed on 
the basis of this evidence alone it would be difficult to refute any implied claims of 
influence out of hand. However, when questioned about the pattern of the 
Committee's meetings, Willam van Eekelen, Dutch member of the Committee, 
placed the implied claims of the European Parliament in a more objective context. 
Van Eekelen makes it clear that the representatives of the Parliament did not 
actually take part in ful l meetings of the Committee, rather they were invited, in the 
manner of Select Committee hearings, to address the Committee and answer 
questions put to them by Committee members, following which the Committee 
would continue its deliberations in private. In this the representatives of the 
European Parliament were by no means unique, the Committee took soundings from 
a number of quarters. 
Questioned further about the influence of the Parliament and the draft Treaty 
on the deliberations of the Committee, Van Eekelen was dismissive of any such 
claims. 
"... I don't think myself that the European Parliament had any 
influence on Dooge or the Single European Act. ... In historical 
perspectiv£„Spinelli (the EUT) was useful but too far reaching, not 
realistic. 
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Indeed it seems also that in spite of the upbeat claims of influence emanating 
from the European Parliament this was not a view shared by the draft Treaty's 
sponsor and most vocal advocate, Spinelli, who in conversation with Van Eekelen 
following the presentation of the Parliament's position to the Dooge Committee 
expressed his disappointment at the lack of enthusiasm shown by the Dooge 
Committee to the Parliament's proposals. Thus given this first-hand account of 
the meetings between the representatives of the European Parliament with the 
Dooge Committee it would appear that the authors of the Croux Report can be 
accused of somewhat 'gilding the lily ' in their quest to promote the activities of the 
European Parliament. 
While it seems clear that the European Parliament and the Parliament's draft 
Treaty had little or no influence on the deliberations of the Dooge Committee, it 
would be incorrect to infer from this that the position of the Parliament had no 
support within the Committee. The Parliament's agenda was strongly supported 
and argued by Mauro Ferri of Italy. Mr.Ferri however, was it seems, regarded by 
the majority of the Committee as 'a bit difficult' and 'too far out on a limb' to be 
taken seriously. 
On the issue of self-promotion and the European Parliament's quest for 
increased powers, a direct link can be made with the Fouchet episode. The 
European parliament had seized upon the Bonn Declaration's invitation to the 
European Parliament to 'extend to new fields, with the co-operation of the 
Governments, the range of its debates'.^-^ Throughout the Fouchet negotiations the 
European Parliament exercised this new role to the ful l , producing reports and 
passing resolutions which, while appearing to be supportive of the negotiations, 
were little more than attempts to promote the agenda of the, then indirectly elected 
Assembly, an agenda of increased power; wider jurisdictions and the early 
introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament.^^ 
In the context of the various drafts considered by the Fouchet Committee, 
the functions and powers of the Parliament within the proposed Union were of 
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course discussed. A comparative study of the various proposals however, reveals a 
gradual but perceptible dilution of the commitment to give the European Parliament 
a role of anything but symbolic significance. There was in short a general 
unwillingness among the Member States to match the rhetoric of support for the 
democratic principle with concrete proposals. 
Indeed this pattern of rhetorical support for the democratic principle 
followed by gradual dilution in the course of negotiations is graphically illustrated 
in the process leading to the Single European Act. The strictly limited extension of 
power granted to the European Parliament in the SEA represents a considerable 
climb-down from the positions adopted by a number of Community leaders, notably 
Mitterrand and Kohl, on the issue of institutional reform in general and in particular 
of the wish to transform the Parliament into a 'genuine legislative assembly'. 
Creating an Intergovernmental Committee 
The period leading up to the signing of the Single European Act saw the 
publication and promotion of a variety of proposals each with the aim of revitalizing 
a moribund community. While each of these proposals have merit in their own 
right and can claim with varying degrees of justification to have influenced the 
agenda of the IGC which negotiated the fine detail of the Single European Act, the 
most significant of these proposals are to be found in the report of the 'Ad-Hoc 
Committee on Institutional Affairs' - the Dooge Committee. 
The Dooge Report's proposals are significant for a number of reasons, not 
least because of the composition of the Committee. As the personal representatives 
of the various Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the 
Community and the President of the European Commission, it could be expected 
that the Committee's report would reflect the views and interests of the various 
Member States and would therefore not be given to the advocacy of Utopian projects 
with little chance of success. Indeed, as personal representatives of the Heads of 
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Government it could be expected that the various members of the Committee would 
be in a position to speak with a degree of authority on the issues under discussion. 
By and large it is true to say that this expectation was realised. This 
however, is not to suggest that the Committee was lacking in imagination. Nor was 
there any attempt to undermine the existing treaty arrangements. Indeed many of 
the proposals demonstrate vision and a commitment to push the boundaries of 
integration. Equally it was a commitment tempered by the knowledge of what was 
possible and what would be acceptable to the more reluctant of the Member States. 
While the Dooge Report was by no means the last word in the process and 
debates leading to the signing of the Single European Act, it can be argued that it 
was an accurate indication of how far each Member State was prepared to travel in 
search of 'an ever closer union'. Areas of disagreement between the various 
members of the Committee were clearly indicated by means of footnotes and 
annexed statements indicating areas of dissatisfaction, of which there were many. 
However it should also be recognised that these reservations, though numerous, 
originated in the main from a small core of the Committee's membership. Thus the 
Dooge Report marks out the frontiers of the Member States' integrative zeal. This 
being so, the text of the Single European Act contains no surprises, its framework 
and content are firmly rooted in the conclusions of the Dooge Committee. What is 
surprising given its significance is the lack of academic attention to its content and 
• • 95 negotiation.'^-' 
The Committee produced two reports. The first, an "Interim Report", was 
submitted to the Dublin European Council 3-4 December 1984. The Interim Report 
was, in general, well received by the European Council, which requested that the 
Committee submit its final report to the Brussels European Council in March 
1985.26 This task it fulfilled. 
In terms of organisation and administration each member of the Committee 
was assisted by a relevant national official from which a small administrative 
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secretariat was established. The Committee itself met approximately once a month 
from September 1984, with a number of additional meetings to ensure it met the 
deadline of the Brussels Council of March 1985. The Reports themselves cover a 
wide range of issues, most of which, in some form, find expression in the 
provisions of the Single European Act. However while recognising the 
comprehensive nature of the Dooge Reports it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
examine all aspects of the Committee's findings. The particular concerns here lie in 
the Committee's recommendations in the areas of EPC and defence and security. 
The meetings of the Committee were conducted in what may be described as 
an almost academic atmosphere, with the presentation and discussion of papers from 
various members of the Committee on a range of subjects. These papers were not 
simply the presentation of pre-determined national positions from which there could 
be no movement. Rather, they were genuine discussion documents, debated 
between individuals with a clear idea of what would be acceptable to their 
respective governments and, it can be assumed, a fair idea of the maximal and 
minimal expectations of their Community partners. In this respect the meetings of 
the Committee were not of the frenetic 'clock-stopping' variety with last minute 
concessions and telephone calls to home ministries for instructions on an acceptable 
wording for sentence x of paragraph y. This is not of course to suggest that the 
Committee members had an entirely free hand to endorse any point they saw fit . 
Clearly each member of the Committee was constrained in varying degrees, and had 
what Van Eekelen described as 'backstopping positions' from which they could go 
no further. Of these it would appear that Mrs Thatcher's representative, Malcolm 
Rifkind and Mr Schluter's (Denmark) representative. Otto Moller were the most 
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tightly constrained by their national positions. 
While it seems that the other members of the committee were on a 'looser 
lead' than their British and Danish counterparts, this is not to suggest that their 
positions were not subject to scrutiny and change by their respective Governments. 
Indeed as Agence Europe reports, it would appear that the negotiating freedom of 
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Dr Kohl's representative, Jurgen Rhufus, became subject to increasing restrictions 
over the course of the Committee's deliberations, in particular with regard to the 
powers of the European Pari lament. 
Although this would appear to be an isolated example, it can be argued that 
the possession of a clear and unambiguous set of instructions can be advantageous to 
the process of negotiation. Indeed in this respect Rifkind's clear identification of 
subjects which were regarded by the British Government as off-limits earned Mrs 
Thatcher's representative the respect of his counterparts on the Dooge 
Committee. 
There is the danger here of presenting the Dooge Committee as a mutual 
admiration society anxious to agree with one another. This is not the case. The 
number of footnotes alone should dispel any such illusions. The scope for 
disagreement was enormous. Ranging from the federally inclined proposals of the 
outspoken Mauro Ferri at one end of the scale, to at the other end, the reluctance of 
Otto Moller, who questioned the very validity of the Committee's whole approach, 
and appeared intent on creating a record for the number of footnotes entered in a 
single document. In this he competed with loannis Papantoniou. However, what 
can be said of the Dooge Committee is that its deliberations took place in a 
constructive and open atmosphere in which there was vigorous and often heated 
debate alongside a willingness to allow divergent views a hearing. 
In terms of influence and impact on the Committee's deliberations it is 
difficult to judge with any great accuracy the contribution of any individual in a 
Committee-based report on the basis of the text alone. Equally the judgements of 
participants in respect of their own performance should be treated with great care. 
Additionally it can be suggested that influence in these situations is based purely on 
the relative weight of a particular participant's country of origin. This of course 
leads to judgements based on theories of power-politics, a view strongly rejected by 
Van Eekelen who argued that influence was based on the quality of the personal 
contributions of individual members .However , notwithstanding the willingness 
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of the Committee to give a hearing to all opinions, evidence tends to suggest that 
Maurice Faure, President Mitterrand's representative set the tone and style for the 
Committee's deliberations. M.Faure presented a paper to the Committee entitled 
'A Political Document' which served as the framework for their deliberations. 
Additionally the text for the chapter on the sensitive issue of 'defence and security' 
was in the main authored by M.Faure. 
The Dooge Report and Political Union 
In the context of the wider European Union debate it becomes immediately 
clear in the Preface and Section One of the Dooge Report that the Committee view 
their task as political, that they are not merely in the business of offering up 
suggestions for the correction of technical dysfunctions in the operation of the 
Community. 
"The Committee has placed itself firmly on a political level and 
without purporting to draft a new Treaty in legal form, proposes to 
set out the objectives, policies and institutional reforms which are 
necessary to restore Europe the vigour and ambition of its inception 
... we must make a qualitative leap and present various proposals in a 
global manner, thus demonstrating the common political will of the 
Member States. At the end of the day that will must be expressed by 
the formulation of a genuine political entity among European States: 
ie a European Union. "-'"^  
Thus superficially at least the Committee have established an identifiable 
political goal for their work; a European Union. However, in employing this term 
they plunge themselves into semi-darkness and ambiguity. The term European 
Union has been used to infer support for any number of quite different proposals so 
that it has become devoid of any real and consistent meaning. The sensitivity of 
this issue, dating from the doctrinal schisms of the 1960s, is such that strict 
definition of the concept is studiously avoided. Indeed the Tindemans Report of 
1975 -^^  went so far as to suggest that applying strict definitions to the term 
'European Union' would be counter-productive to the Community's future 
development, causing unnecessary friction and closing off alternative strategies by 
which a 'European Union' could be achieved. Regardless of how one interprets this 
133 
aspect of the Tindemans Report, its sentiment appears to have been embraced by the 
Dooge Report which, in outlining the scope and form of the proposed 'European 
Union exhibits remarkable flexibility. 
"... a European Union ... with the power to take decisions in the 
name of all citizens ... and according to procedures which could vary 
depending on whether the framework is that of intergovernmental co-
operation, ihe Community Treaties or new instruments yet to be 
agreed . . ."^^ 
Thus the Committee appear to have neither rejected nor particularly 
endorsed the traditional approaches to European integration, nor have they ignored 
the possibility of alternative strategies. Equally, it could be suggested that this is an 
attempt on the part of the Committee to satisfy all strands of opinion within the 
Community without actually committing itself to a preferred strategy, thereby 
leaving such thorny issues to their political masters in the European Council. 
Whether this is pragmatism or an abdication of responsibility is unclear. What is 
clear, is that the Committee have continued a much revered tradition of ambiguity 
in their treatment of the concept of European Union. 
The Searcli for an External Identity 
Taken at face value and in isolation, the introductory paragraph to this 
section of the Report appears to support the view that the Committee has indeed 
abandoned the rhetorical fundamentalism of the 1960's in favour of a more 
pragmatic approach to the creation of a European Union. 
"Europe's external identity can be achieved only gradually within the 
framework of common action and European Political Co-operation in 
accordance with the rules applicable to each of these. It is 
increasingly evident that interaction between these two frameworks is 
both necessary and useful. They must therefore be more closely 
aligned. "^^ 
The first point to note here is that this is an introductory paragraph in the 
nature of a preamble, and as such it expresses general aspirations rather than 
specific proposals for action. However, at this level of generality, it can perhaps be 
viewed as an acknowledgement that the crude and arbitrary distinction between high 
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and low politics, has in the late 20th century become so increasingly blurred as to 
be nonexistent; a recognition that in this prolonged period of relative peace the 
economic aspects of international relations have assumed a role and prominence on 
par with that of traditional diplomacy. 
In this context the European Commission, by virtue of its external 
competences in such areas as the Common External Tariff (CET) Common 
Commercial Policy and Development Policy, has emerged as an increasingly 
important actor on the international stage, representing Community interests in a 
wide variety of forums, including GATT, OECD and the UN. This role as 
international actor is perhaps exemplified by the participation of the President of the 
European Commission in the G7 Western Economic Summits. 
Thus, given the prominent level at which the Commission participates in the 
external sphere, it would be difficult indeed to argue that it is not deeply involved in 
international politics. Equally there are numerous issues dealt with by the 
mechanism of European Political Co-operation which have an economic dimension, 
most notably decisions involving the application of economic s a n c t i o n s . I t is 
therefore inevitable that in participating at this level, clashes and cross-overs of 
competences will occur. In this respect, it would appear that the introductory 
paragraph acknowledged these developments in recognising the necessity for 
interaction between the frameworks and in the assertion that they should be 'more 
closely aligned'. 
This positive tone is carried through to the conclusion of the introductory 
paragraph with what may be assumed to be the ultimate aim of such closer 
alignment. 
"The objective of European Political Co-operation must remain the 
systematic formulation of a common external policy. 
The clearly stated aim of a common external policy is something of a rarity. 
Statements regarding the aims and objectives of European Political Co-operation 
have traditionally fallen short of such binding commitments and have tended to rely 
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on such non-committal phrases as 'wil l seek common positions'. Indeed 
Mr.Papantoniou thought it wiser that such phraseology be employed and entered a 
reservation suggesting the replacement of the final sentence with something a little 
more equivocal. 
"The objective of European Political Cozoperation must remain the 
systematic search for common positions." 
Notwithstanding Mr.Papantoniou's reservation, one could be forgiven for 
suggesting that the Committee are advocating an eventual supranational solution in 
which the two frameworks are merged. However, regardless of any supranational 
intent, the logic of merger is clearly implied. 
The long-term questions which arose from this prospect revolve around 
issues of the control and distribution of powers and functions within a merged 
framework and on the consequences for existing institutions. This raised a direct 
question: did the Report go beyond the sphere of general aspiration and make 
specific proposals to facilitate closer alignment between the frameworks, thereby 
bringing the goal of a common external policy closer to hand?' The answer to this 
question is a qualified negative. 
In addressing the external dimension of Community activity, the Report did 
little more than acknowledge the existence of the common commercial policy and 
suggest that Community development policy should be intensified.^^ Specific 
proposals for 'closer alignment' appear to have evaporated, with the exception of a 
brief reference to 'cohesion' in the section dealing with the creation of a Secretariat. 
It would therefore be broadly correct to suggest that closer alignment as far as the 
Dooge Report is concerned remained in the rhetorical rather than the practical 
sphere. Thus the commitment of the Committee and by implication the Member 
States to a comprehensive common external policy is questionable. 
In respect of the EPC mechanism itself what is proposed by the Committee 
amounts, with one notable exception, to a consolidation, re-statement and re-
phrasing of proposals contained in past reports and the then current EPC practice. 
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For the purposes of clarity, it should perhaps be explained that what is being 
discussed in references to European Political Co-operation (EPC) is essentially 
foreign policy. This may of course appear elementary, but as P.Neville-Jones, a 
participant in the negotiations leading to the 1983 Solemn Declaration on European 
Union points out, even among those directly involved in the operation of the 
Community there was need for clarification. 
"The proposals for the extension of co-operation in spheres lying 
outside the Treaties occasioned a brief debate on what constituted 
'political co-operation'. Did everything that was not within 
Community competences by definition belong to political co-
operation? Or was political co-operation a term of art to be 
understood to mean intergovernmental co-operation in the sphere of 
foreign policy, everything else being in a different category or 
categories of intergovernmental co-operation subject as necessary to 
their own procedures? The latter was the general view." 
This general view was to be given legal identity in the 1986 Single European 
Act which identified political co-operation in Title Three of the act as 'European 
Political Co-operation in the sphere of foreign p o l i c y ' . P r i o r to the Single 
European Act this framework lay outside the Treaty structure of the European 
Communities, and indeed had no formal Treaty status. 
The Dooge Report's provisions dealing specifically with the structure and 
practices of European Political Co-operation amount to just four paragraphs. For 
the most part the proposals are suggestions for slight improvements in the 
machinery of Political Co-operation, rather than a wholesale shake-up. In this 
respect the Dooge Committee continue in the tradition established by the authors of 
the various reports on European Political Co-operation, that of gradual and 
pragmatic proposals which in many cases simply confirm existing practice as it has 
evolved through the experience of EPC. 
A prime example of this practice is found in the proposal that the Member 
States explicitly commit themselves to a 'prior consultation procedure' before 
adopting foreign policy p^ositions.^ -^ The commitment to prior consultation is first 
found in the 1973 Copenhagen Report which provides that 'each State undertakes as 
a general rule not to take up final positions without prior consultation with its 
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partners within the framework of the political co-operation m a c h i n e r y ' . T h i s 
commitment was further reiterated in the 1981 London Report. In its call to 
Member States to re-affirm their commitment to Political Co-operation, the Foreign 
Ministers sought to 'emphasise their commitment to consult partners before 
adopting final positions or launching national initiatives' in the sphere of foreign 
policy.^^ 
The commitment to the general rule of prior consultation had by and large 
been observed by the Member States, though occasionally it had been ignored. 
French intervention in Zaire in 1977 for example had been undertaken without prior 
consultation, thus presenting the other Member States with something of a fait 
accompli in supporting French a c t i o n s . T h e Dooge Report's proposal can 
therefore been seen as the logical next step from the general rule of the Copenhagen 
report and its re-affirmation in the London Report. It attempts to firm-up this 
commitment in a more binding form of words. 
Similarly Paragraph 3 dealing with the 'desirability of common 
representation at international institutions', in particular the UN and in 'countries 
where only a few Member States are represented'^^ signifies an expansion and 
clarification of past reports and established practice. Indeed the specific mention of 
the UN is simply clarification of the Copenhagen Report's provision that the 
representatives of the Member States to the 'major international organisations ... 
will seek common positions in regard to important questions dealt with by these 
organisations'.^^ While it would be accurate to suggest that the Member States 
attempts to present a common front in the UN had experienced some difficulties^^ 
there were occasions in which the Member States had successfully reached pre-
determined common positions in the UN while common representation in countries 
where not all Member States were represented was an increasingly common 
practice. Thus the Dooge Report in this respect provides yet another example of the 
clarification and re-affirmation of existing practice. 
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Moving away from these procedural clarifications the Dooge Report's 
provisions for the 'strengthening of political co-operation structures' mark the 
crossing of a Rubicon for European Political Co-operation. The report proposes 
'the strengthening of political co-operation structures by: 
"... the creation of a permanent political co-operation secretariat to 
enable successive Presidencies to ensure greater continuity and 
cohesiveness of action; the secretariat would to a large extent use the 
back-up facilities of the Council and should help to strengthen the 
cohesion betweeiujpolitical co-operation and the external policies of 
the Community."-'" 
In some respects this proposal represents a small step forward, an admission 
of the practical necessity for some form of permanent administrative support for the 
ever increasing workload of Political Co- operation. This need had been recognised 
since the first meetings of European Political Co-operation in Munich in 1970, but 
which because of the extreme sensitivities surrounding the issue had been regarded 
as off-limits. Attempts to address the issue of a permanent secretariat had been 
made from time to time, notably by Pompidou in 1971, by Lord Carrington in 1981 
and in the Genscher-Colombo initiative of the same year. All of these rehabilitation 
attempts were of course independent initiatives,^^ and all failed to obtain the 
widespread support of the Member States, including those of Carrington whose 
proposals were regarded as the least contentious and most sensitive approach to this 
issue to date. Thus the previous formulas contained in the reports on Political Co-
operation in attempting to provide some form of administrative support for the Co-
operation mechanism had fallen short of proposing a permanent body due to 
political sensitivities. 
However, the steps that had been taken to support the Presidency had 
actually evolved to semi-permanent status with the introduction of the Troika system 
established by the 1981 London Report.^^ Thus the proposals of the Dooge 
Committee in structural terms do not actually amount to a great leap forward. 
However, what is significant is that for the first time since the failure of the Fouchet 
negotiations in a report commissioned and endorsed by the Heads of State or 
139 
Government, the Dooge Committee was able to reach agreement on the principle of 
a Permanent Secretariat for European Political Co-operation. 
This is not suggest that agreement was obtained with ease. The recognition 
that the growing workload of the Presidency required some form of permanent 
support was tempered not only by memories of Fouchet's Political Commission, but 
also the failure to agree to the creation of a similar body in negotiations on the 
Genscher-Colombo Plan. Additionally, President Mitterrand, in his oft-quoted 
speech to the European Parliament (24 May 1984) had returned the issue of a 
permanent secretariat to the agenda in his call to 'give the European Council a 
permanent secretariat for political co-operation'.^^ 
Although Mitterrand at this stage did not expand on the role and nature of 
this secretariat, it does bear a superficial similarity to the Political Commission of 
the Fouchet episode. It is therefore not surprising given the background to this 
issue that proposals for the creation of a permanent secretariat encountered 
resistance. Van Eekelen, for instance, relates that as a member of the Dutch 
Government he had very few restrictions placed upon his freedom to negotiate in 
the Dooge Committee. However of the few instructions he did have, resistance to 
the creation of an overarching Political Secretariat was high on the list of his 
'backstopping positions'. 
"The Dutch position on a political secretariat was fairly reluctant. 
...The question of a secretariat remained a point we tried to resolve 
by taking a fairly pragmatic attitude of waiting to see in practice what 
the needs (of EEC) were... we were not in favour of making great 
jumps forward. "-''* 
This reluctant attitude was it seems shared by the great majority of 
representatives on the Dooge Committee, the exception being the French and 
German representatives who may be regarded as the main advocates of a political 
secretariat within the C o m m i t t e e . I n part this reluctance may be attributed to the 
Troika system established by the 1981 London Report which was, with some 
reservations, regarded as a successful exercise. Its success can perhaps be said to 
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have fuelled suspicion of Franco-German intentions in wishing to replace a highly 
regarded system with a permanent and possibly expandable political secretariat. 
At this stage, according to Van Eekelen, the German and French members 
of the Committee did not propose the wide-ranging secretariat revealed at the Milan 
European Council, but he suggests that their thoughts appeared to moving in this 
direction.^6 In many respects it appears as a return to times past, the French with 
their German allies at one pole the Dutch at the other, supported by the smaller 
Member States. 
To avoid stalemate it was therefore necessary to balance the functional need 
for some form of permanent administrative support for EPC, a need that had long 
been accepted, with the unquestionable sensitivity of the issue. The consequence of 
this balancing act was a proposal for a permanent secretariat modelled on the 
structure advocated by Lord Carrington prior to the 1981 London Report,^^ a 
modified version of which had formed the Troika system. Thus the step, rather 
than leap, to a permanent secretariat can be seen to conform to EPC tradition of 
pragmatic and gradual change. 
Although the Dooge Report does not go into detail, it is clear that great 
efforts were made to ensure that the secretariat appeared as innocuous and un-
threatening as possible, with no suggestion of a political role. The secretariat is 
clearly subordinate to the Presidency and dependent on the back-up facilities of the 
Council of Ministers of the European Communities. Although there is no 
commitment to a particular location for the permanent secretariat, the provisions of 
sub-paragraph 2 strongly suggest that the option of Paris was not on the agenda of 
possible s i t e s . T h e organisation of meetings in the 'Community's places of work' 
and reliance on the back-up facilities of the Council obviously implies Brussels as a 
location. 
Avoidance of actually naming Brussels when it was plain to see that no other 
location would be suitable may appear petty. But the question of location was 
bound up with the whole issue of a permanent secretariat. The French insistence on 
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Paris as location for the Political Commission during the Fouchet proposals was a 
great source of contention. Similarly the 1971 dispute over Pompidou's proposals 
issued in a quarrel over location: Paris for the French, Brussels and identification 
with Community institutions for the Dutch. Sensitivity to questions of national 
prestige would appear to have been the guiding principle in this matter. 
Thus the giant symbolic leap was managed by taking a small and practical 
evolutionary step within a framework developed over a fourteen-year period. It 
must of course be borne in mind that the proposal to create a permanent secretariat, 
symbolic as it appears, was at this stage just a proposal, with no guarantee of 
acceptance. 
The 'Codification of EPC rules and practices' in Paragraph Four appears to 
be an uncontroversial issue, a simple tidying up of the rag-bag of procedures 
developed over the years, and a means of easing the Co-operation framework into a 
binding Treaty structure. While this assessment of the case for codification does 
appear to be reasonable, and one which would be accepted by the advocates of 
codification, it is not as uncontroversial as might first appear. The issue of 
codification touches upon one of the underlying debates of all post-war European 
developments, that of approaches to integration. For some members of the Dooge 
Committee codification of EPC was a fundamental error which would lead to a 
petrification of EPC. The success of the Co-operation procedure in this 
interpretation, and in the judgement of past reports, lay in its flexibility and 
pragmatism, its ability to change and adapt according to circumstances as they 
arose. The lack of binding constraints was thus seen as the fundamental dynamic of 
the Political Co- operation mechanism. To codify would be to set in concrete a 
procedure which required plasticity. Mr. Moller and Mr Papantoniou both 
expressed this view in footnotes to the text of the Dooge Report. Both entered 
general reserves on the whole question of structural change to EPC which of course 
also includes the creation of a permanent secretariat.-'^ 
142 
Although expressed by only two members of the Committee, and the two 
most prolific footnoters at that, this view was not without sympathy among other 
members of the Committee or among EPC practitioners. The British Foreign 
Office for instance, while accepting codification, and indeed later submitting a 
document advocating codification, were extremely comfortable with the flexible 
approach of EPC. Indeed Douglas Hurd singing the praise of the Co-operation 
structure in 1980 was moved to describe EPC as 'the simplest, leanest and most cost 
effective form of international co-operation yet devised'.^^ 
Further criticism of codification in this period centred around the fear among 
some commentators that codification of EPC would be an excuse to avoid 
addressing the problems afflicting the C o m m u n i t y . T h e tactic of using the 
codification as a means of avoiding substantive treaty commitments was an issue 
which did come to the fore immediately prior to the Milan European Council and 
will be discussed more fully below. However, due to the uncertainty among a 
number of members of the Dooge Committee the issue of the codification of EPC 
was not dwelt upon, and care was taken not expand upon the possibilities. This was 
a problem for the Heads of State or Government to address. 
The Accommodation of Diverse National Interests 
What has marked out the approach of the various EPC reports from other 
more ambitious efforts is the cautious step-by-step approach which seeks at all times 
to accommodate the most reluctant of Member States, a consequence of which had 
been the avoidance of sensitive issues, an approach which was continued by the 
Dooge Committee in their treatment of EPC. However, in directly addressing the 
issues of Security and Defence the Dooge Committee abandoned this cautious 
pragmatic consensus-building approach, grasping the nettles that previous reports 
had studiously avoided. The Dooge Committee can thus reasonably claim to be the 
first report at such a high level in a Community context to make detailed proposals 
in this area. 
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Security and Defence are dealt with in general terms in the explanatory 
paragraph of Section C The Search for an External Identity and in more detail in 
Section C sub-section b. There are also a number of textual alterations and 
additions to take account of between the Interim Report and the Final Report. The 
provisions of the Final Report in this respect are considerably extended and more 
specific in comparison to the provisions of the Interim Report. 
An interesting textual change that does take place between the Interim and 
Final reports is found in the explanatory paragraph. While this paragraph makes no 
specific proposals, the change in tone that takes place is indicative of the continuing 
sensitivity of the issues under discussion. 
" . . . in the case of defence, although the aim of European Union is 
indeed the cohesiveness and solidarity of the countries of Europe 
within the larger framework of the Atlantic Alliance, it will only be 
possible to achieve that aim in a series of stages and by paying 
special attention to the differing individual situations, including the 
situations of the two nuclear powers whidi are members and of 
certain members facing security problems." 
The text of the corresponding paragraph of the Final Report exhibits a 
number of subtle changes. 
" . . . in the case of security, although a fundamental aim of European 
Union is indeed the cohesiveness and solidarity of the countries of 
Europe within the larger European and Western framework, it will 
only be possible to achieve that aim by paying special attention to the 
existing Alliances on the one hand and differing individual situations 
on the other, including the situations of the two nuclear powers 
which are members and of certain members facing specific problems 
in this field. "^^ 
In sum the explanatory paragraph of the Final Report amounts to a drawing 
back and softening of approach, in effect a dilution. The interim report talks of 
defence, the final report of security; the interim report feels capable of mentioning 
the Atlantic Alliance, while the final report is content with the more ambiguous 
'existing Alliances'. Each of these changes reflects the debates that had taken place 
in the period between the submission of the interim and final reports, and the 
consequent re-drafting of the Committee's substantive proposals. 
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Essentially the defence debate between the members of the Dooge 
Committee resulted in an clear seven-to-three split, between the seven in favour of 
taking EPC, and by implication the Community, down the road to the creation of a 
defence identity, and the three opposed to such a development. 
Of those opposed. Senator Dooge representing the Irish Prime Minister 
Garrett Fitzgerald, disassociated himself completely from this section of the report, 
entering a reservation to this effect. Mr.Moller had of course entered a general 
reservation on the whole of Section C Tiie Search for an External identity. The 
other strong objector was Mr Papantoniou of Greece. 
The objections of the Republic of Ireland were to be expected. As the only 
Member State of the Community not to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance, or 
any other military alliance, the Irish had always been uncomfortable with the 
discussion of security-related issues in the context of EPC. Indeed the London 
Report's limitation of EPC's scope of concern to the 'political aspects of security' 
was in many respects, though not exclusively, to accommodate the Irish difficulty in 
this area. 
Given the network of alliances bound up with the whole European project it 
can be suggested that the very fact of the Republic of Ireland's membership of the 
Community compromises irredeemably its claims of neutrality. This according to 
Keatinge is to misunderstand the Irish view of neutrality. Irish neutrality it is 
argued, is first and foremost based upon the avoidance of overtly military alliances 
and secondly is a consequence of its relationship with Britain. Neutrality is very 
simply an 'un-British activity' and in its pursuit, the Republic is able to demonstrate 
its independence from its former master. 
Irish neutrality may therefore be better identified as a position of military 
non-alignment. The term neutrality serves as convenient shorthand for what, when 
explored in depth, is a complex subject full of inconsistencies and ambiguities. This 
neutrality it should be stressed is not a constitutional neutrality but political, 
therefore any difficulties that may arise from Irish participation in EPC present 
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political rather than constitutional difficulties. However, while there may be no 
strict constitutional restraints on Irish involvement in security related issues, the 
principle of Irish neutrality was regarded as beyond discussion. Thus while the 
Republic of Ireland's position may have been the cause of frustration to other 
Member States wishing to expand the discretion of EPC, their position on these 
issues was well known and accepted. 
In the context of his general reservation to the whole of Section C, Mr 
Moller joined Senator Dooge on the fringes of the debate in his insistence that 
'particularly in relation to security, it (EPC) should be confined to political and 
economic a s p e c t s ' . T h e Danish position on defence and security and their 
unwillingness to contemplate the extension of EPC competence derives from a set of 
circumstances which left Mr.Moller as the most tightly constrained of the Dooge 
Committee's participants. 
The background to Mr.Moller's difficulties was found in public perceptions 
of the purpose of Community membership. Entry to the European Community was 
presented to the Danes as a purely economic decision which would have no impact 
on sovereignty or on existing alliances such as NATO and the Nordic Union. 
Indeed in the 1972 referendum on Danish entry it was stressed that there would be 
f.O 
no political implications resulting from the decision to join the Community."" 
Added to this restrictive view of Community membership, Denmark had 
traditionally held a view of NATO similar to that adopted by the Netherlands during 
the Fouchet negotiations, a view which briefly stated amounts to a position that any 
purely European moves in the sphere of defence could lead to a wezikening of the 
commitment of the U.S.A to the Atlantic Alliance and ultimately to the de-coupling 
of the U.S. military guarantee from the European theatre. This view had enjoyed a 
consensus across the spectrum of Denmark's political parties throughout most of the 
post-war period, but by the early 1980's the arrival of the INF debate placed this 
consensus in some doubt. 
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The Social Democrats in particular were uncomfortable with the Reagan 
administration's confrontational approach towards the Soviet Union, and as a 
consequence were increasingly receptive to European initiatives. Although a party 
of opposition since 1982, by virtue of the peculiarities of Danish coalition 
government in which minority government is common, the Social Democrats 
retained a significant degree of control over Danish foreign policy, particularly in 
EC and defence related issues. However, while there may have been a willingness 
to consider European projects, the Social Democrats' enthusiasm was tempered by 
two factors. Firstly, while strongly disapproving of the strategy employed by the 
Reagan administration, the Atlantic Alliance remained as the pivotal alliance of 
Denmark's security policy. Secondly, conscious of the deep-seated public distrust 
towards Community related ventures the option of extending the competence of 
EPC as means of finding a voice for Danish concerns over INF was deemed to be 
off-limits. Consequently the Social Democrats headed down the road of advocating 
closer Nordic co-operation and the creation of a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone.^^ 
Thus as a consequence of public antipathy to the Community, continuing underlying 
allegiance to the primacy of the Atlantic Alliance and coalition impotence, Mr 
MoUer was consigned to immobility. 
Mr.Papantoniou had entered reservations on all aspects of the provisions 
dealing with the structure and organisation of EPC. However his objections to the 
section on security and defence were less clear-cut. Unlike his fellow objectors, the 
Irish, whose neutrality was a largely accepted inconvenience, and the politically 
immobile, but NATO-committed Danes, Mr. Papantoniou did not enter a general 
reserve on the section on security and defence. Rather he entered two reservations 
proposing textual deletions, which, in their effect do not change the basic content of 
the Committee's proposals, but allow the Greek government to distance itself from 
aspects of the report acknowledging the continuing importance and need to take 
account of the Atlantic Alliance as the 'basis of our security' and the reactivated 
WEU.'^O 
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The Greek difficulty in this area was a reflection of an almost total antipathy 
towards the Atlantic Alliance, the WEU and EPC. The antipathy derived in the 
main from Greek perceptions of NATO and WEU attitudes towards Turkey, 
regarded since the 1974 occupation of Northern Cyprus, as the primary security 
problem for Greece. 
In August 1974 Greece left the integrated military command structure of 
NATO. The reasons for this decision are two-fold but interconnected. The seven 
year period of the 'Colonels' regime', between 1967 and 1974, had bred a great 
deal of anti-American feeling in Greece, based, according to Macridis, on 'a 
widespread belief that the junta had been the creature of the United States in 
imposing its domination on G r e e c e ' . T h i s domination was in military terms 
complete to the point of a virtually complete loss of the capacity to act 
independently at any level. 'In every sense of the term the Greek army had been 
satellised.'^^ 
While this satellisation was largely accepted as a fact of life in the 
strategically important Greece of the Cold-War, the expected quid-quo-pro was a 
guarantee of security from all threats. The perceived failure of the U.S.A. to 
prevent the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in July 1974, a crisis which 
brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war, seriously damaged the position of 
the United States in G r e e c e . T h e anger and dismay at the inability or 
unwillingness of the U.S.A. to prevent the invasion was due to the widely held 
perception that Greece enjoyed a position of privilege in the relationship between 
the U.S.A. and its eastern Mediterranean NATO a l l i e s , a n d could therefore count 
on the support of the U.S.A. in any substantial dispute with Turkey. The failure of 
the U.S.A to match this perception was a profound shock to many in Greece and 
fuelled still further the anti-Americanism that had grown throughout the seven-year 
Junta. 
As a consequence post-Junta Greece underwent a fundamental re-evaluation 
of its foreign and defence priorities. Significant among the positions adopted was 
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that of PASOK leader Mr Papandreou in the 1977 election. It was proposed that 
Greece should leave the Atlantic Alliance and NATO completely; a clear vote 
winner in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. It was however, a 
position considerably qualified by the cold realities of office and the need to ensure 
Greek security. Nevertheless the rhetoric of withdrawal and threats to remove U.S. 
bases continued. It is therefore unsurprising, given that Mr Papantoniou was the 
personal representative of Mr Papandreou, that references to the vital role of the 
Atlantic Alliance in the defence of Western Europe were the subject of Greek 
reservations. 
The Greek difficulty with the re-activated Western European Union ran 
along similar lines to their objections to the Atlantic Alliance in that it was 
connected to the continuing tension between Greece and Turkey. As a result of the 
attempt to break away from dependence on the U.S.A. in the wake of the Cyprus 
problem, the decision was taken to apply to the European Community for full 
membersh ip .The perception current among influential circles in Greece was that 
Europe too was beginning to break away from U.S. dependence and was 'bound to 
develop its own defence capability'.^^ In addition, being 'European', the 
Community would give a sympathetic ear to their difficulties with the non-European 
Turks. Thus Greek motivation in applying for Community membership was 
fundamentally political, unlike that of its other dissenting partner Denmark. 
Greek perceptions can again be seen to be wide of the mark. This was 
exemplified from the mid-70s onwards with the revival of Cold-War tensions and 
the concomitant re-evaluations of Western security requirements. The problem for 
Greece in these re-assements was the general consensus that Turkey was of vital 
importance to the security of the West, and should therefore be offered significant 
political and military support. The most explicit of these recommendations were 
made in reports published by the Western European Union, of which Greece was 
not a member. Notable among the WEU reports was the 1980 report from the 
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Assembly of the WEU, published in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
77 
which stressed the importance of re-building the Turkish army. 
Such proposals did not endear the Western European Union to Greece, 
which as a ful l member of the Community had developed a more realistically 
cynical view of the future potential of Western Europe to develop its own defence 
identity. The WEU and by association any West European defence/security 
grouping would be 'almost totally dependent on the United States' and therefore of 
a 'rather cosmetic c h a r a c t e r ' . I n short membership of WEU was not on the 
Greek agenda. Similarly the Greek view of EPC was largely informed by this 
changed viewpoint. As a consequence Greece has placed little importance on the 
work of EPC, preferring instead to concentrate on the maximisation of the 
economic benefits of Community membersh ip .Thus Greek reservations can be 
explained as a reluctance to support endorsements of what are viewed as little more 
than vehicles for American influence. 
Collectively the three dissenting countries, Ireland, Denmark and Greece, 
are often referred to as the 'footnote countries'. This collective term does tend to 
suggest something of a common cause between the three, a coherent viewpoint 
enabling the presentation of a common front on foreign policy and security issues. 
As this brief review demonstrates this impression is illusory. Their cohesiveness 
rests solely in their opposition to the further development of European Political Co-
operation. Their motivations for opposition, as we have seen, were poles apart. 
The combination of Irish neutrality, the Danish cocktail of attachment to NATO, 
coalition control of European and foreign policy questions, and public perceptions 
of the limits of Community membership; the Greek security dilemma, and their 
perceptions of West European and Atlantic disinterest, are testament to the absence 
of a cohesive stand-point. Thus what is presented by the footnote countries is not 
the concerted action of a triumvirate of smaller Member States anxious to preserve 
the status of small states in the face of pressure from the relative giants of the 
Community, but the particular and unique difficulties of individual States. 
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To return to the text of the Dooge Report and the position endorsed by the 
majority of the Committee, the seven. Notwithstanding the softening of attitude 
observed in the explanatory paragraph, the content of the Final Report remains quite 
adventurous, stating its aim as being to: 
"... encourage greater awareness on the part of the Member States of 
the common interests of the future European Union in matters of 
security. The relevant Member States will make the fullest 
contribution both to the maintenance of adequate defences and 
political solidarity, and to the pursuit of security at the lowest 
possible level of forces through the negotiation of„balanced and 
verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament.""^ 
While this falls a long way short of a commitment to a common defence 
policy it is significantly more detailed than the commitment to discuss the 'political 
and economic aspects of security'. Indeed the references to the maintenance of 
adequate defences, lowest possible force levels and arms control etc were in many 
respects a statement of NATO aims. Additionally the report makes a number of 
specific proposals in these areas, to be taken within the confines of EPC. Among 
these proposals are ... 
"... (a) discussion of the nature of external threats to the security of 
the Union; (b) discussion of the way in which Member States' 
security interests may be affected by the international context, in 
particular by developments in weapons technology and strategic 
doctrines, changes in relations between the great powers and the 
progress of negotiations on disarmament and arms control, (c) an 
effort to harmonise, whenever possible, the stances to be taken by 
Member States on, the major problems posed by the preservation of 
peace in Europe."° 
Significantly, in addition to these EPC-related proposals the report moves 
beyond the sphere of 'consultation' and makes proposals for co-operation in the area 
of weapons technology, in particular proposals aimed at agreeing common standards 
for weapons systems, and commitments to collaborate in the production of such 
systems. 
These proposals, alongside the comments on the maintenance of adequate 
defences and arms control represent a significant step in the development in the 
Member States' willingness to contemplate European options in this most sensitive 
area, an area which in the 1973 Document on the European Identity published 
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by the Nme Foreign Ministers, the Member States felt compelled to acknowledge 
their dependence on the United States. 
"The Nine, one of whose essential aims is to maintain peace, will 
never succeed in doing so if they neglect their own security. Those 
of them who are members of the Atlantic Alliance consider that in 
the present circumstances there is no alternative to the security 
provided by the nuclear weapons of the United States and by the 
presence of North American forces in Europe: and they agree that in 
the light of the relative military vulnerability of Europe, the 
Europeans should, i f they wish to preserve their independence, hold 
to their commitments and make constant efforts tei ensure that they 
have adequate means of defence at their disposal. 
However, significant as the Dooge Report's proposals are in these areas, 
their impact is somewhat diluted by the qualification that account must be taken of 
"... the frameworks which already exist (and which not all partners 
in the European Community are members) such as the Atlantic 
Alliance, the framework and basis of our security, and the Western 
European Union, the strengthening of which, now under way, would 
enrich the Alliance with its own contribution.""'* 
Regardless of its effects on the specific proposals of the Committee, a 
significant aspect to emerge from this qualification is found in the acceptance by 
M.Faure, as part of the majority grouping, of the references to the Atlantic 
Alliance. The issue of the relationship between the Atlantic Alliance and the 
projected European Union during the Fouchet negotiations was arguably the most 
fiercely contested issue of those negotiations. The debates surrounding this issue 
have of course been discussed in detail above. It will suffice to restate that, in 
textual terms, the difficulty over the Atlantic Alliance issued in the absence of 
references to the Atlantic Alliance in the French Treaty drafts, and specific but 
disputed references to the Atlantic Alliance in the Treaty texts of the 'F ive ' . °" 
In addressing the issue of French difficulties vis-a-vis the Atlantic Alliance, 
the perception of a blanket hostility is not entirely accurate. The main source of 
difficulty for France lay in the treaty organisation established in the wake of the 
1949 North Atlantic Treaty, and in particular its integrated military command 
structure. NATO in the French view, was completely dominated by the U.S.A. and 
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U.K., a view which in terms of staffing and hierarchy did have foundation.^^ 
More fundamentally, it was argued that American domination of overall Alliance 
strategy and planning in NATO, attacked the bases of French sovereignty by 
restricting French capacity to act independently in the sphere of defence. The 
eventual consequence of this viewpoint was the decision by de Gaulle to withdraw 
France from the integrated command structure in 1966. However, despite a number 
of rumours to the effect that France would follow withdrawal from the integrated 
command structure of NATO with a complete withdrawal from the Atlantic 
Alliance in 1969, in accordance with Article XI I I of the North Atlantic Treaty,^^ 
the French have consistently insisted that withdrawal from the integrated command 
structure did not diminish their commitment to the spirit of the North -Atlantic 
Treaty, which is a conventional treaty of alliance guaranteeing mutual assistance and 
solidarity in the case of international aggression. 
Indeed one can point to a number of instances in which France has 
demonstrated its commitment to the Alliance and to the continuing American role in 
the Alliance. A notable re-affirmation of French commitment can be observed in 
their reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. As a signatory to 
the North Atlantic Council communique condemning the invasion, a communique 
which re-affirmed the Atlantic Alliance as the 'indispensable guarantor of security 
and the essential foundation for the pursuit of European reconciliation', the French 
Government added a clause which as Harrison notes amounted to an 
acknowledgement of Alliance durability '...the French government considers that 
the Alliance must continue as long as it appears to be necessary'.^^ 
M.Chaban-Delmas in his first speech as Prime-Minister in the Pompidou 
Presidency felt able to reaffirm both a commitment to de Gaulle's vision of French 
independence and to the Atlantic Alliance. 
"The golden rule taught to us by General de Gaulle, which is still 
dear to us, is that independence is an essential factor of our policy. 
... France must retain a certain freedom of movement in order to 
play its role in favour of entente, detente and co-operation at a world 
level. Our aim is to re-establish and maintain peace throughout the 
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world . First, therefore, we are keeping to the spirit of this policy of 
rapprochement and remaining loyal to our alliances -„the Atlantic 
Alliance in particular - and friendship with America ..."^^ 
This is not to suggest that use of the phrase 'Atlantic Alliance' does not 
present enormous political difficulties for the French. It will be noted for example 
that Chaban-Delmas' confirmation of French attachment to the Atlantic Alliance, as 
important as it was, signalling a more co-operative phase of Franco-American 
relations, was made in the context of a wide- ranging speech outlining the foreign 
policy direction of the Pompidou Presidency. In this context statements of 
adherence to the Alliance present few problems. However, in the case of a possible 
future Treaty commitment, matters become complicated simply because of the very 
natural and obvious association with NATO, an association which due to de 
Gaulle's almost constant anti-NATO rhetoric had come to imply U.S. domination, 
and diminution of French interests. Thus any reference to either the Atlantic 
Alliance or NATO in a treaty context would be viewed as signalling a fundamental 
change in the guiding principle of independence in foreign and defence policy, a 
principle regarded as sacrosanct by all Presidents of the Vth Republic including 
President Mitterrand. 
Thus it can be suggested that the statement of allegiance to the Atlantic 
Alliance found in the Dooge Report represents a considerable concession on the part 
of France. In this respect its acceptance may in some measure reinforce the view 
expressed here that the period from Fouchet to the Single Act may be characterised 
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as one of declining French influence over their Community partners.^ However, 
while the acceptance by France of a direct reference to the Atlantic Alliance may be 
regarded as a considerable concession, the political sensitivity of the issue remained. 
This being so it would be extremely unlikely that specific references to the Atlantic 
Alliance in a possible treaty document would be acceptable to France without some 
form of qualification or trade-off. This trade-off was found in the inclusion of the 
reference to the recently reactivated Western European U n i o n , i n which the 
French were deeply involved. 
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The reactivation of the Western European Union can in this respect be 
regarded as crucial in obtaining French acquiescence to the inclusion of references 
to the Atlantic Alliance in the Dooge Report and more importantly in the Single 
European Act. However, the importance of the WEU's reactivation goes far 
beyond allowing the French to sign up to a report and subsequent treaty document 
mentioning the Atlantic Alliance. It is therefore necessary to consider the 
background and motivations to the WEU's reactivation and its significance for the 
Single European Act. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEFENCE AND SECURITY: THE ROLE OF WEU 
While not entirely co-incidental the reactivation of the Western European 
Union on 27 October 1984, was something of a happy accident for the formulators 
of both the Dooge Report and the Single European Act. The timing of the 
reactivation can be said to have solved a number of difficult issues and headed-off a 
variety of potentially damaging debates. 
The reactivation of WEU was motivated as a response to a number of 
divergent but ultimately linked issues connected to the wider debate over the 
creation of a European foreign and defence identity. However, prior to a review of 
the factors leading to the reactivation, it is pertinent to ask, what exactly was 
reactivated in the Rome Declaration? 
The Treaty establishing the Western European Union was signed 23 October 
1954 and entered into force on 6 May 1955, though its pre-history can be traced to 
the 1947 Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk which in turn was extended to include the 
Benelux States in the 1948 Brussels Treaty, creating the Brussels Treaty 
Organisation. Significantly in the context of this thesis, the creation of the Western 
European Union was initiated not from a wish to press forward with the creation of 
a European foreign and defence identity, but as a means of resolving what was 
proving to be an intractable intra-alliance problem, the re-arming of West Germany. 
The heightened Cold-War tension resulting from outbreak of the Korean 
War produced great pressure, particularly from the USA, to re-arm and admit West 
Germany to NATO. France being extremely reluctant to consider the direct entry 
of West Germany into NATO, but recognising the necessity of some form of 
German involvement in the defence of Western Europe, sought to mitigate the 
prospect of a rearmed Germany, and conceived the EDC proposals for the creation 
of a European Army. These proposals launched by French Prime-Minister Rene 
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Pleven on 24 October 1950 called for the formation of a European Army under 
supranational control, along the lines of the recently proposed Schuman plan for a 
Coal and Steel Community. ^ 
The eventual failure of these proposals at the hands of the French National 
Assembly in August 1954 thus left unresolved a problem which had been on the 
agenda since 1950. Re-negotiation of the EDC was not a feasible option, holding as 
it did the distinct possibility of a repeat performance on the part of the French. In 
the wake of this failure, American pressure for a rapid solution meant that the direct 
entry of West Germany into NATO was becoming increasingly likely. 
French opposition to such a development had of course been the object of 
the EDC project. Indeed it has been suggested that the whole EDC episode was an 
attempt on the part of France at best to delay indefinitely the question of German 
re-armament or at worst ensure that in the event of re-armament, Germany would 
remain subordinate to France. This meant ensuring that Germany did not gain 
direct NATO membership. NATO based as it was on national armies did not 
provide the guarantees thought necessary by France to control the potential of a 
resurgent Germany. In addition direct entry implied a full return of German 
sovereignty in an organisation dominated by the USA, within which West Germany 
would enjoy equal status with France. To add to this there was a view in French 
security circles that NATO was a purely temporary affair. These perceptions, 
imagined or real, required that there be some kind of safety-net in the form of 
purely European security guarantees. 
The potential damage to the Alliance that would result from any attempt by 
the USA to force the issue of direct German entry to NATO necessitated a 
compromise that would satisfy American impatience and allay French concerns over 
German rearmament. This, as noted, ruled out the re-negotiation of EDC. In the 
event France had to accept the direct entry of West Germany to NATO. This bitter 
pill was however sweetened to an extent by Sir Anthony Eden's proposal to modify 
and extend the 1948 Brussels Treaty. 
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It is interesting to note that the use of the BTO framework had been proposed in October 
1952 by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Van Zeeland, who was convinced that the French 
would never ratify the EDC Treaty.-^ While Van Zeeland's instinct proved to be correct, 
the important aspect of his proposal lies in the desire to include Britain in the construction 
of the 'European Pillar' of Europe's defence. Britain had declined to become fully 
involved in the EDC proposals, preferring to limit itself to the role of a loosely defined 
'guarantee power' alongside the USA. 
British reluctance to become involved was the source of great anxiety among many 
of the participant states in the EDC negotiations, including France which did not at this 
time relish the prospect of being left alone to control a re-armed Germany. This anxiety 
had its foundation in the growing feeling among American sources that the creation of a 
European army could allow for the rapid withdrawal of US troops. In addition there were 
corresponding fears of similar withdrawals by the British, should the treaty be ratified. A 
fear expressed in January 1954.^ 
Indeed a study of the EDC negotiations reveals unease among its participants over 
the absence of ful l British involvement as a constant underlying factor, a factor which in 
most accounts was crucial to the negative decision of the French National Assembly.^ 
Thus, although the failure of EDC can in the context of the European Union debate can be 
regarded as a mortal blow to those with federalist aspirations, the subsequent modification 
and extension of the BTO can be said to have resolved many of the underlying fears and 
concerns held by the participants in the EDC negotiations. 
The use of the Brussels Treaty as a means of resolving the problem had a number of 
advantages. Firstly the Treaty, which in its original form was signed by Britain, France 
and the Benelux states in 1948, is generally regarded as the vital factor in the decision of 
the USA to enter into a commitment to the defence of Western Europe via the North 
Atlantic Treaty and NATO. The BTO can therefore, as Van Eekelen notes,^ be regarded 
as essential in underpinning the establishment of NATO. Thus given the veiled threats of 
an 'agonising re-appraisal'^ on the part of John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, 
the use of a body enjoying the full support of the USA was an astute move. Secondly its 
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use also removed the need to undertake arduous negotiations in order to produce a 
framework acceptable to the USA. Thirdly, and perhaps most importandy, Eden's 
initiative brought a firm and unprecedented long-term commitment to maintain British force 
levels in Western Europe, and specifically West Germany.^ The Modified Brussels Treaty 
being of f i f ty years duration, (at which time signatories have the right to withdraw from 
treaty commitments) effectively locked the United Kingdom into the defence of Western 
Europe up to the 21st century. This went significandy beyond the commitment to the 
Atlantic Alliance, which was to be reviewed after a 20 year period. 
This commitment by Britain to a 50 year treaty was regarded as crucial for a 
number of signatories. The EDC treaty had been given a 50 year lease of life. There were 
fears among a number of participants in the EDC negotiations that should the North 
Atlantic Treaty lapse or significant member states decide to withdraw from the Alliance, as 
was their perogative, after 20 years, they would be remain committed to the EDC treaty. 
The smaller states, the Netherlands in particular, were horrified by the prospect of finding 
themselves in an EDC dominated by France and/or Germany without the overarching 
guarantee of the USA and Britain via NATO. Given these fears, which had been fuelled 
by the speculation over American troop withdrawals, the British signature on a treaty of 50 
years duration came as a welcome relief to the smaller states involved, regardless of the 
future of NATO. 
While it has been suggested above that the long-term British commitment to the 
defence of Western Europe was something of a relief for the smaller states fearful of 
French or Franco-German domination of the Continent, the relief of the French in finding 
a means of tying Britain to the defence of Europe for 50 years should not be 
underestimated. The strength of feeling over this issue was evident in the debate in the 
National Assembly on the occasion of the rejection of the EDC Treaty by a vote of 319 to 
264. 
" I say with my fullest conviction that no international negotiations aimed at securing 
liberty and peace can be carried out without the mutual support of France and 
Britain... I have read the [EDC] texts with anguish. There is nothing to show that 
Britain would be at our side to resist the strength and eventual manoeuvres of 
Germany. Britain must be at the side of France in this matter to act with equal 
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responsibility in the face of a new German threat, should it arise. The absence of 
solidarity between Britain and France is, in itself sufficient to make me reject 
EDC"^ 
It should be noted that while the WEU treaty obtained the commitment of 
Britain to maintain force levels in Western Europe, the treaty specifically 
subordinated itself to NATO thereby remaining militarily inactive.^ In the light of 
this almost total subordination to NATO it can be argued that the modification of 
the Brussels Treaty was a superfluous exercise. In practical terms, and 
notwithstanding the 50 year guarantee of a UK presence, this may be regarded as 
valid argument. Politically however, the WEU commitment to the defence of 
Western Europe was of crucial importance in allaying French fears of a resurgent 
Germany. 
Given the direct entry of the ERG to NATO it was therefore left to the Modified 
Brussels Treaty to meet concerns over German military capacity. These concerns 
were resolved with the inclusion in the Modified Treaty of the force limits agreed in 
the EDC treaty. These forces were specifically assigned to NATO, thus placing a 
further constraint on the capacity of West Germany for independent action. In 
addition to the inclusion of these limitations, the modified treaty was able to exact 
specific German commitments not to manufacture atomic, biological and chemical 
weapons. 
Despite the restrictions imposed by the Modified Brussels Treaty, it has been 
suggested that the compromise creating the WEU represents a failure of French 
security policy towards Germany. Harrison, for instance, argues that the 
indecisiveness and belligerence of the French over this issue demonstrated a clear 
lack of French influence over US and Alliance policy, and helped to create a 'solid 
German-American coalition at the core of the Atlantic Alliance'. 
Taking a long-term view this assessment does have a great deal of validity. 
However, as a counter to this view it can be argued that in the circumstances of the 
time, the 'failures' in French security policy with regard to Germany and the EDC 
were fully compensated in the realisation of the other plank of French security 
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policy in the 1950s, that is to say, a long-term British commitment to the defence of 
Western Europe, and very specific restrictions on German military potential. It is 
notable that the proposals to modify the Brussels Treaty encountered few of the 
difficulties faced by the EDC proposals on their way to ratification. This suggests 
. that the National Assembly at least, did not regard the compromise arrangements as 
a 'significant political defeat'. 
One of the most striking aspects of this whole episode is what appears to be a 
sudden and dramatic shift in British policy towards the Continent. Britain had 
previously not only declined to become fully involved in the negotiations, but had 
been less than clear in its intentions with regard to a continuing commitment to the 
Continent. 
Justifications for the absence of full British participation in the EDC negotiations 
usually revolve around the conventional arguments that Britain had a global role to 
play, was opposed to the supranational content of the proposals and objected to the 
concept of a 'mixed European army' which, in the words of Churchill, would not 
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be an army but rather a 'sludgy amalgam'. While these justifications have a 
degree of validity, being consistent with the accepted view of British policy, they do 
not explain what might be described as the 'destructive inactivity' of the British 
Government throughout the EDC negotiations. Had the guarantees of a continued 
British presence found in the WEU treaty been forthcoming during the EDC 
negotiations and ratification debates, it is entirely conceivable that the French would 
have ratified the treaty. At its most extreme this might lead to the suggestion that 
the British had deliberately set out to destroy EDC. However, while it may be 
accurate to suggest that the British Government were unenthusiastic about EDC, it 
would also be innaccurate to suggest that the 'destructive inactivity' of the British 
was specifically aimed at EDC. Rather the answer to this intriguing about-turn in 
the British position lies in what may be described as the guiding principle of British 
security policy in Europe at this time. This was to elicit from the Americans 
specific guarantees of a long-term presence and commitment to the defence of 
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Western Europe. In spite of the North Atlantic Treaty there were growing concerns 
throughout the EDC negotiations that the USA were preparing the ground to 'bring 
the boys home'-^^ 
For Britain this perception of American intentions derived from a wider debate 
concerning Britain's future role. Britain had yet to come to terms with its reduced 
status in the post-war world, and sustained the belief that it still had a global role to 
play, a role it would it would play alongside the USA via the 'Special Relationship'. 
The Americans for their part did not entirely share this view and saw Britain's role 
anchored to the fortunes of Western Europe, a role fiercely resisted by the British. 
In this resistance to an abandonment of a global role there was a perception in 
Foreign Office circles that the strong US advocacy of European integration was a 
'possible prelude to some future comfortable withdrawal into the more traditional 
American stance of i s o l a t i o n ' . T h u s the view that American intentions were to 
lock the British into Europe as the guarantor power or American agent/proxy, while 
the USA either retreated into isolation or bestrode the world stage as the sole 
representative of the 'free world', gained significant currency 
In policy terms this led to a dogged resistance to American pressure to play a 
constructive role in the early integration efforts, and a determination to elicit 
specific guarantees of a continued American presence on the European Continent. 
Thus the absence of some form of unambiguous British commitment to the 
signatories of the EDC derived from policy viewpoint which in essence can be 
reduced to a position of 'You first', that is to say, no British commitment without 
comparable and concrete American commitments. This was something the 
Americans had refused to undertake during the EDC negotiations, adopting the 
stance that American commitments would only be forthcoming on the successful 
implementation of the EDC Treaty. While this is not to suggest that the EDC was 
doomed from the start, a consideration of these positions does give the distinct 
impression that its chances of success were limited. 
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The problems the EDC proposals had sought to address remained un-resolved -
German re-armament. West European concerns over a UK commitment and British 
concerns over American commitment. 
In the disarray and acrimony attending the failure of EDC, Eden's initiative had 
all the appearances of pulling a 'rabbit out of the hat' thereby rescuing the Alliance 
from the 'agonising reappraisal' threatened by Dulles. There is little doubt that the 
solution proposed by Eden could have been advanced at a much earlier stage. 
However the British position remained unchanged, no British commitment without 
prior American commitment. This strategy was to pay dividends for the British in 
the form of the London Agreements signed on 22 October 1954. The following day 
in Paris the Modified Brussels Treaty was signed. The London Agreements, while 
not as extensive as the Paris Agreements nevertheless elicited from the USA a 
concrete long-term commitment to the defence of Western Europe. 
Thus the Western European Union was born: and while the fine detail and 
motivations for its creation advanced here can be challenged, what is beyond dispute 
is that the primary raison d'etre of the WEU was to resolve what were essentially 
internal European and Alliance difficulties. That is to say, the WEU was not 
created as an end in itself. Although having the form of a mutual defence treaty, 
1 n 
there were few, i f any, discussions of the nature of potential external threats, nor 
was there any sense in which the WEU was realistically envisaged as the vehicle by 
which to achieve the 'holy grail' of a European foreign and defence identity. The 
WEU was created a a means of resolving difficult issues and achieving other aims. 
This is a role to which the WEU has periodically been called upon to fulf i l up to 
and beyond the Single European Act. 
In this role the WEU can be viewed as a kind of 'Foster-Home' for the difficult 
children of European integration. A place of safety in which to reside until family 
difficulties are sufficiently reconciled to allow the return of the children to the 
parental home. The failure of EDC clearly demonstrated that the most divisive 
issue was, and would remain that of a European defence identity. Following 
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closely on its heels was the question of British entry to the Community. Indeed, the 
issues of foreign and defence policy and British entry were, until British entry, 
closely related. 
However, prior to a brief examination of the role of WEU in managing these 
difficult children, an outline of the structure of WEU is relevant in an understanding 
of its vital place in the development of post-war European integration. 
Although the treaty establishing the Western European Union is presented 
primarily as a treaty of mutual defence, its full title gives it a much wider potential 
scope. It was styled a Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration 
and Collective Self Defence. Essentially this wide-ranging remit is the legacy of 
the 1948 Brussels Treaty from which it was developed, and as Pijpers points out, 
these functions were either taken up by or transferred to other European 
organisations over the years. In spite of progressively divesting itself of a role 
the structure of WEU remained unchanged up to the 1984 reactivation. Its principle 
institutions were the Council, the Assembly, the Agency for the control of 
Armaments, and the Standing Armaments Committee. Of these the Council and the 
Assembly are the most important, providing as they do the focus and forum for the 
various attempts to resolve difficult issues and the promotion of various initiatives. 
Thus although progressively surrendering any real capacity to exercise its full 
range of Treaty aims, the WEU retained its structure and with it the possibility of 
discussing and offering opinions on any subject falling within the extremely wide 
remit of 'economic, social and cultural matters and collective self-defence'. It is in 
this capacity to address itself to any subject area that WEU, through the Council and 
the assembly, has proved to be a useful forum and/or dumping ground for the 
difficult and sensitive issues of European integration. 
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WEU and the Fouchet Negotiations 
The role of the WEU in the Fouchet negotiations has been noted above. They 
amount, firstly to a vain attempt on the part of the Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph 
Luns, to head-off or dilute further discussion of de Gaulle's proposals by suggesting 
the WEU as an alternative forum for the discussion of foreign and defence issues. 
Secondly, an equally vain attempt by Edward Heath to request British involvement 
in the Fouchet negotiations, via the platform of the WEU Council. 
Although limited, and having little direct bearing on the outcome of the 
negotiations, these interventions are notable in that they are both concerned with the 
issue of British participation in an enterprise involving the possible development of 
a European defence identity, thus strengthening the impression that the issues of 
British participation and a European defence identity are inextricably linked. 
In the context of the Fouchet negotiations as a whole, the role and involvement 
of the WEU can be said to have been peripheral. A far more significant attempt to 
employ the WEU can be observed in what became known as the WEU crisis of 
1969.20 
From 'Crisis' to 'Reactivation' 
It is not the intention here to conduct an exhaustive survey of the activities of 
the WEU in the intervening period between the 1969 'Crisis' and the 1984 
'Reactivation'; indeed there is little to tell. But the changing perception of the 
WEU among its member states should be noted. 
The development of the WEU up to the 1984 reactivation can be divided into two 
phases, which for the sake of brevity may be described as the pre-and-post British 
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accession to the European Community. Alfred Cahen the former Secretary-General 
of the WEU identifies this first phase, that is up to UK entry to the Community, as 
the 'Active Years', while the post-entry years, that is, up to the 1984 reactivation 
are identified as the 'Somnolent Years'.^^ To the extent that there were no 
meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers following British accession to the 
Community, this is an accurate description, though it should be recalled that the 
Permanent Council and the WEU Assembly continued to fulf i l their functions, even 
though as Cahen points out in the context of the Assembly, there was no executive 
to listen to its pleas for the 'creation of a European security dimension and the 
reactivation of the organisation'.^^ 
Running concurrently with the Active and Somnolent phases of the WEU 
there can also be observed a change in attitudes adopted by the Member States 
towards the WEU. 
In the period up to UK accession to the Community, it would be reasonable 
to suggest that the prevailing perception of the WEU was of an organisation 
dominated by, and directed towards the accommodation of British interests. Indeed, 
it can be argued that the WEU was at its most prominent during this Active period, 
in its role as the vehicle with which to effect UK entry to the Community. This 
achieved, Britain and its collaborators in this task, virtually abandoned the WEU 
and allowed it to fall into disrepair. 
This was unsurprising; defence, for all but the French, remained the 
preserve of NATO, while in the sphere of foreign policy co-operation, the Member 
States were achieving, admittedly limited, but nevertheless, positive and lasting 
progress in the developing EPC framework. 
With the exception of the first years of this 'Active Period' (from the 
aftermath of the EDC failure up to the return of de Gaulle in 1958) it would be 
reasonable to suggest that France viewed the WEU with some suspicion, and not a 
useful vehicle for the pursuit of French interests. It was regarded, with some 
justification, as a British dominated body, which not only reinforced NATO, but 
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was used as a means by which the British sought to exert their influence on the 
Member States of the Communities. The abandonment of the WEU as a regular 
forum for Ministerial-level meetings following UK accession to the Communities, 
somewhat confirmed the French in their suspicions. 
However, in the wake of British accession, the French can be said to have 
performed something of an attitudinal somersault in their approach to the WEU. 
The WEU was now regarded by successive French governments as an ideal 
framework within which to promote defence co-operation between the Member 
States. As Wallace notes 'French governments have repeatedly presented it (WEU) 
to their domestic opinion as an acceptable organisation (at least since 1972-73.)'^-^ 
As a consequence of this attitudinal shift on the part of France, and the 
corresponding decline in the interest of the other Member States, the WEU came to 
be closely associated with the pursuit of French interests. So much so that 
successive French attempts to resurrect the WEU in the 1970s were viewed by the 
other Member States with the same degree of suspicion that the French had reserved 
for the organisation prior to British entry. Thus WEU came to be regarded as a 
French means of undermining and disrupting NATO harmony, in short creating 
mischief. An example of this can be observed in the 1973 proposals of French 
Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, which were regarded by the other members of 
WEU as being little more than an attempt to capitalise on the acrimony between the 
European members of Atlantic Alliance and the USA over Kissinger's 'Year of 
Europe' proposals. 
Indeed, in discussing the 1984 reactivation with Van Eekelen it is clear that 
lingering suspicion of French motives remained among a number of Member States. 
"The French had, from different angles and different ministers, both 
socialist and conservative, from time to time talked about a relancer 
of WEU, it is rather peculiar, but for a long time because of that, 
WEU was not trusted, many people regarded it as a French ploy to 
erode NATO and to build-up something separate. 
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The Reactivation of WEU; 1984 
Whilst the issue of a European defence identity has been a constant 
underlying theme in post-war European integration, attempts to attribute the various 
institutional developments in the sphere of defence and security in the early 1980's 
to some simplistic notion of gradualism or functional incrementalism should be 
treated with caution. Although it is possible to identify a gradualist approach in the 
textual evidence, this gradualism is in large measure a consequence of a variety of 
institutional constraints rather than the inevitable result of a determinist, functional, 
or neo-functional logic. The various provisions extending the remit of EPC into 
the sphere of security, and the decision to reactivate the WEU in 1984, while firmly 
rooted in, and reflecting the long-standing debate over the creation of a European 
defence identity are a consequence of particular and specific issues which brought 
about a resurgence of the European defence debate in the early 1980s. Thus in 
addressing the issue of the reactivation of WEU it is necessary to differentiate 
between two distinct aspects of the debate. The first of which is concerned with the 
issues leading to a revival of the defence debate. Secondly, the debate moves on to 
what may be described as the search for an appropriate institutional framework, 
within which to discuss and co-ordinate a European response to these issues. 
The resurgence of the European defence debate in the early 1980s can be 
traced to the NATO Twin-Track decision of December 1979. The first element of 
which was the decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing 2 intermediate nuclear 
missiles in Western Europe by 1983. The precise locations for these missiles were 
to be ERG, UK, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. The second track was to 
engage in arms-control talks on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) with the Soviet 
Union. 
The Twin-Track decision was largely a consequence of pressure from the 
European members of NATO, in particular from FRG and the UK, to offer a 
response to the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20 intermediate nuclear missiles. 
These missiles, based on Soviet territory, had the capacity to strike targets in 
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Western Europe. The European members of NATO took the view that the 
introduction of these missiles in 1975 undermined the credibility of the NATO 
doctrine of Flexible Response which, unlike the previous doctrine of 'massive 
retaliation', was based on an incremental escalation model whereby the response 
would be appropriate to the threat. At the time of the SS-20 deployment, the 
United States did not maintain on the European mainland missiles capable of 
reaching the Soviet Union, having withdrawn this capacity in the early 1960s 
following the development of strategic nuclear weaponry (ICBMs). Thus the SS-
20s created, in the view of NATO's European members, a strategic imbalance 
which needed to be corrected in order to restore the credibility of NATO strategy. 
In the view of many analysts the ideal response was to be found in the deployment 
of Cruise missiles, the technology of which was developing at a rapid pace in this 
period. 
However, to put the discussion into a wider context it should be recalled that 
in the period under discussion the USA were engaged in the SALT 2 negotiations 
with the Soviet Union. Among the options considered by American negotiators in 
SALT was a ban on the deployment of long-range cruise missiles. In proposing this 
ban the American proposals did not include a ban on SS-20's targeted on Western 
Europe. As Thomson notes, these proposals, 'produced a strong negative reaction' 
from the European members of NATO. In spite of American insistence that 
Cruise missiles were unnecessary, as US strategic forces amply covered targets on 
Soviet territory, European governments were unconvinced. In the European 
analysis of the situation, led by FRG and UK, should the United States reach an 
agreement in negotiations with the Soviet Union which prevented deployment of a 
credible counter to the SS-20s, this would create a 'de-coupling' effect within the 
Alliance between the United States and the European members of NATO. 
Regardless of arguments as to whether or not there was ever a serious 
possibility of the Soviet Union invading Western Europe, indeed such a prospect in 
military circles has often been described as the 'most prepared for but least expected 
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war in history',^^ any strategy if it is to be effective in deterring attack, must be 
credible to any potential opponent. In the case of the pre-1967 doctrine of massive 
retaliation, a doctrine that posited the possibility that the slightest incursion into 
NATO territory would result in all-out nuclear war, this was seen to be less than 
credible when the Soviet Union achieved parity in strategic nuclear forces. Thus 
the decision to move to the doctrine of Flexible Response in 1967 was seen to be a 
more credible strategy, linking conventional forces, theatre nuclear weaponry, and 
strategic nuclear forces, thereby allowing NATO to respond to any potential threat 
'appropriately'. However, the introduction of the intermediate range SS-20 put 
something of a spanner in the works of NATO doctrine, as no counterpart to the 
SS-20 existed. 
In the European view, in particular that of the West German government, 
the overall credibility of Flexible Response rested on a definite and clear American 
commitment to the defence of Western Europe at every level, from conventional 
forces through to strategic nuclear forces, thus creating a series of 'trip-wires' 
which locked the United States into defending European soil. This was a 
commitment which, in the light of the negotiating stance of the United States in the 
SALT 2 talks, appeared to be waning. The Americans were giving the impression 
that they were disengaging themselves from the defence of Western Europe and 
concentrating on the defence of the American homeland, thereby undermining the 
American guarantee, upon which the credibility of the strategy depended. 
The anxiety of the West German government over the prospect of 'de-
coupling' was made public by Chancellor Schmidt in a lecture to the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in October 1977. Schmidt's analysis of the 
consequences of strategic parity focusing on the need to balance forces at the sub-
strategic level was widely interpreted as a call for the deployment of Cruise 
missiles, though as Thomson notes Schmidt 'did not call for the deployment of 
Cruise or anything else'.'^^ 
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The public airing of these views added to the pressure, applied on a less 
public stage within NATO's High Level Group (HLG), for the Carter 
administration to respond positively to European wishes, i f only to restore the 
battered credibility of the United States as leader of the Alliance in the wake of 
President Carter's abortive Neutron bomb proposals. Thus by the beginning of 
1979 the United States had shifted its position to full support for Cruise deployment 
in Western Europe. There then followed a period of intense intra-Alliance activity 
in order to establish a consensus within NATO on the principle of deployment and 
on a deployment programme, i.e missile numbers, location and timing etc. By 
December 1979 NATO was in a position to make the decision to deploy 406 Cruise 
and 108 Pershing 2 missiles with nuclear warheads in Western Europe, with the 
deployments beginning from 1983. 
The 'second track' of the Twin-Track decision, the decision to pursue arms 
limitation talks on INF with the Soviet Union, was something of a late addition to 
the debate. It was largely inspired as a consequence of growing uncertainty among 
a number of NATO members over domestic reaction to the deployment of a new 
breed of nuclear weapons on European soil. The second track, held out the 
'theoretical possibility' that success in arms control negotiations could remove 
the need for deployment of Cruise. This theoretical possibility was hardened to 
official US negotiating policy in the context of President Reagan's November 1981 
'Zero-option' proposals. However, as far as the most ardent proponents of Cruise 
among the Europeans were concerned, the second track was little more than a 
means of inoculating European governments against negative domestic reaction. 
Indeed this judgement can be said to have guided the thinking of both Thatcher and 
Schmidt. The calculation had been made that i f negotiations did take place they 
would at worst result in a reduction of the warheads to be deployed rather than a 
zero outcome.^^ Indeed the number of missiles to be deployed had been set 
deliberately high in order to accommodate the possibility of a breakthrough in arms 
reduction negotiations. 
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Although domestic opposition to the deployment of Cruise and Pershing 2 
was expected, its scale and intensity could not have been foreseen. The period 
between 1980 and 1983 saw an unprecedented mushrooming of the peace movement 
throughout Western Europe. Contrary to the arguments employed by their 
respective governments, the peace movements were of the view that far from 
cancelling out the threat of the SS-20's, the proposed deployment of Cruise and 
Pershing missiles increased the possibility of Western Europe being used as a 
nuclear battlefield for a Superpower conflict. Indeed the fact that Cruise and 
Pershing were to remain under United States control added a further dimension to 
the protests, a virulent anti-Americanism. That the decision to deploy Cruise and 
Pershing missiles was to a high degree the consequence of intense European, and in 
particular West German and British pressure seemed to go largely unnoticed by 
many, who saw the European recipients of the missiles as little more than willing 
stooges for an increasingly aggressive and confrontational United States. 
Thus the decision to deploy Cruise ignited a generalised anti-nuclear and 
anti-American sentiment throughout Western Europe, which, in Britain for instance, 
manifested itself in the permanent 'Peace Camp' outside Greenham Common air-
base, and massive public demonstrations. At the level of conventional party 
politics the anti-nuclear sentiment was expressed in the Labour Party's decision to 
embrace unilateralism. 
However it is to the Federal Republic of Germany where the concerns 
leading to the reactivation of the WEU can be located. As the inevitable 'killing 
field' for a Superpower conflict, opposition to Cruise and Pershing 2 took on an 
added intensity. Whereas in Britain demonstrations had attracted at their high-point 
250,000 demonstrators, their counterparts in the Federal Republic were able to 
attract double this number.-^^ In most respects the protest movement in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, with its anti-nuclear, anti-American sentiment, was the U.K 
protest movement writ large. But in the German case a further element was added 
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to the debate. The debate became linked to the issues of neutralism, pacifism and 
German unification. 
On the fringes of the peace movement, which for years had been tarred with 
the brush of being a front for the West German Communist Party, and thus by 
implication sympathetic to Moscow, and among the emergent Green Party, 
endorsement of the neutralist argument could be expected. Less expected was the 
growing audience for a neutralist solution, within the mainstream parties where 
opposition to INF deployment cut across party lines. This was particularly the case 
within the ordinary membership of the SPD, where support for the peace movement 
was strong. Indeed, although Schmidt as Chancellor is credited with initiating the 
debate leading to the Twin-Track decision, which he endorsed throughout the INF 
debate, the membership of the SPD were less than enthusiastic about the decision, 
and were joined in their opposition by leading Party figures such as Brandt and 
Lafontaine. Opposition to INF deployment within the SPD membership grew into 
open opposition and led in 1982 to the reversal of official party support for 
deployment. 
The SPD was of course a Party of opposition at this point, the FDP having 
decided in September 1982 to withdraw from the SPD-led coalition and form a 
government with the CDU-CSU under the Chancellorship of Helmut Kohl, a 
decision later endorsed by the electorate in the March of 1983. It is notable that 
disquiet over the direction of the SPD on the INF issue came high on the list of 
reasons for the FDP's disaffection from the coalition.-^-^ 
In this context we are brought to one of the pivotal figures in the 
Europeanisation of the defence debate, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the leader of the 
FDP and Foreign Minister in the SPD-FDP coalition.-^^ Whilst concern over the 
INF issue was not the only cause of Genscher's decision to withdraw support from 
the Coalition, it may be regarded as Genscher's domestic response to the growing 
fear that the Federal Government would reverse its position on Cruise and Pershing 
2 and not take the final decision required to deploy the missiles. In the event 
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Genscher's decision was vindicated by Kohl's decision to go-ahead with 
deployment. 
On the wider European stage Genscher's reaction can be said to be 
commensurate with his position as Foreign Minister of the country regarded as one 
of the driving forces of post-war European integration. 
In the November of 1981, Genscher along with Italian Foreign Minister 
Emilio Colombo submitted to the London European Council a Draft European 
Act. More usually referred to as Genscher-Colombo, the proposals resulted in the 
signing of the 1983 Solemn Declaration on European Union. In so far as the 
motivations for its submission are concerned, contrary to the suggestion of Burgess, 
that Genscher's promotion of the European Act was motivated by 'purely domestic 
party political concerns rather than by high- minded European ideals',^^ the Draft 
European Act reflected genuine fears and concerns about the drift of public opinion 
in the Federal Republic. This appeared to be away from what were regarded by 
Genscher as the very foundations of West Germany's post-war prosperity and 
security : the European Communities and the Atlantic Alliance. To the extent that 
Genscher acted to arrest a shift in German public opinion which would inevitably 
have had electoral consequences for the FDP, there is an element of justification in 
Burges/s claim. But to suggest that party political considerations rather than 'high 
ideals' motivated Genscher, rests on the false antithesis that one cannot combine 
idealism and practical political considerations, and ignores an identifiable 
disenchantment with those fixed points of post-war reference. The Germans it 
seems were losing their enthusiasm for the wider goals of European unity and 
security, and were becoming more 'introverted' in their concerns. As Professor 
Eberhard Schulz relates, the feeling that Germany was simply becoming the 
'paymaster of Europe' increased the influence of those who advocated the pursuit of 
a 'nationalist neutralist course'. 
Thus at one level the Genscher-Colombo proposals were an attempt to 
reinvigorate the Community as a whole and to reaffirm the commitment of the 
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Member States and their populations, in particular Germany, to the Community 
ideal, at a time when the Community had virtually ground to a halt, embroiled in 
seemingly endless disputes over budgetary and technical i s s u e s . I n this respect 
Genscher-Colombo was an attempt to resolve the 'other' issues later addressed by 
Title 2 of the Single European Act. 
At another level, the Genscher initiative, was far more concerned with the 
implications of the pacifist/neutralist drift unleashed by the INF debate. In this 
respect Genscher's proposals in the sphere of security can be seen to be an attempt 
to reverse the neutralist trend by recognising and addressing one of the fundamental 
elements of the peace movement's credo. This was the anti-American sentiment 
which was integral to the INF debate. Genscher recognised that despite the fact that 
pressure for the deployment of Cruise and Pershing 2 had originated in Western 
Europe, the impression remained that Western Europe was little more than a 'front 
line defence protectorate for the U.S.A. which lacks the freedom to express itself on 
the great issues of war and p e a c e ' . T h i s impression of European impotence was 
further strengthened by the inability of the Europeans to play anything but a 
spectator's role in arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Indeed the 
impression that Europe was simply a bargaining chip in the Superpower relations, 
was felt not only by the peace movements but increasingly among 'respectable' 
academic and policy-making opinion. There was therefore a pressing need to 
correct this impression of impotence and to identify and define a clear 'European' 
stance on issues of defence and security. Thus the Genscher-Colombo draft 
reflected this need, proposing that the Member States, in pursuit of European Union 
should include among their aims 'the co-ordination of security policy and the 
adoption of common European positions in this sphere in order to safeguard 
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Europe's independence, protect its vital interests and strengthen its security.' 
In proposing the 'co-ordination of security policy', this is not to suggest that 
Genscher was adopting an anti-American position, indeed the Preamble to the 
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Genscher-Colombo draft, recalling the debates of the Fouchet negotiations, 
acknowledges the Atlantic Alliance. 
"convinced that the security of Europe must also be guaranteed by 
joint action in the field of security which at the same time helps to 
maintain the common security of our partners in the Atlantic 
Alliance. "4" 
Although in no sense anti-American, the impulse to identify a European 
security position reflected a wider change in the balance of Atlantic relations. 
Whilst the United States by virtue of its nuclear arsenal was still the predominant 
actor within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance, in particularly 
those who were also EPC members, were, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, less 
inclined and less likely to fall blindly behind the American position on every issue. 
Indeed there were a number of issues where differences in European and American 
responses were the source of friction in Atlantic relations. Significant amongst 
these issues were the differing responses and attitudes to the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the imposition of Martial Law in Poland in 1981 and 1982 and the 
Siberian gas pipeline project. The crucial difference in the response and attitude of 
the Europeans to these and other issues can be said to lie in the willingness of the 
Europeans to seek a 'middle-way' as opposed to the confrontational rhetoric which 
was a characteristic feature of U.S. foreign policy in this period. 
However while the Europeans, through the mechanism of EPC, were quietly 
and subtly offering an alternative European viewpoint on a range of issues, their 
apparent ineffectiveness in influencing the course of major issues was keenly felt, 
and served to reinforce the view of European impotence and American domination 
of the foreign policy agenda. Thus alongside the felt need to establish a clear 
European position on security issues there was a parallel need to give a higher 
profile to European positions on foreign policy issues where they differed from the 
United States. In this respect the inability of the Europeans to establish a peace 
process following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a 
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further trigger to the initiation of the Genscher-Colombo proposals, and also to the 
London Report of 1981. 
Although the Genscher-Colombo proposals were diluted almost beyond 
recognition in the process of negotiating what was to become the 1983 Solemn 
Declaration on European Union, the point to be made here is that the revival of 
the European defence debate has its origins in a particular set of circumstances; the 
nature and scale of the opposition to the decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing 2 
missiles in Western Europe. Thus concerns over the implications of the 
neutralist/pacifist sentiment engendered by the INF debate can be regarded as the 
primary motivating factor in Genscher's decision to revive the European defence 
debate. Indeed this is a view confirmed by Van Eekelen, who made the point that, 
'at the time of the Cruise Missile issue, Genscher saw a need for a European view 
on defence and security questions'.^^ Thus the Genscher-Colombo initiative can be 
regarded as the first step in the search for an appropriate institutional framework 
within which to address the issues raised. On the question of 'appropriate 
frameworks', it is relevant to make the point that, while Genscher was one of the 
most enthusiastic of Europeans, his enthusiasm did not reach the point of a doctrinal 
insistence that the only 'appropriate' framework was the Community framework. 
Genscher, according to Van Eekelen, 'saw no contradiction in pushing WEU, EC, 
EPC, CSCE', and was far more concerned with achieving results than advancing 
'European Union' according to some pre-ordained plan.'^^ Perhaps this lack of 
'European purity' on the part of Genscher explains the scepticism with regard to his 
motives expressed by Burgess . 
In promoting his proposals Genscher did not proceed through the usual 
Franco-German channels that had become the norm for European initiatives, but 
rather found a co-sponsor in the Italian Foreign Minister. It may be suggested that 
Genscher was unsure of the reception his proposals would receive from the Fifth 
Republic's newly installed, and first Socialist, President, and thus preferred to 
launch his proposals with the support of the enthusiastically 'European' Italian 
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Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo. Genscher's uncertainty over the French route 
is to an extent confirmed by Wallace, who points to a period of tension in Franco-
German relations in the period leading up to and immediately after Mitterrand's 
election.^-^ To add to this brief period of tension in Franco-German relations, 
Genscher, who had launched the basic outline of his proposals in the January of 
1981, faced the difficulty of Giscard's refusal to make his views on the INF issue 
public, adopting the stance that it was a NATO issue and thus not the concern of 
France. I f it is accepted that reaction to the Twin-Track decision was the primary 
factor in Genscher's decision to promote a Draft European Act Giscard's reticence 
on the issue did not make France the ideal partner in this initiative. 
However, any thoughts that Mitterrand would hide behind Giscard's 
NATO argument, or, perhaps more worrying for Genscher, follow the line of the 
great majority of Socialist and Social Democratic parties throughout Western 
Europe, and oppose the deployment of Cruise and Pershing 2, would be seen to be 
greatly misplaced. Although Mitterrand did not show any great enthusiasm for the 
form of the Genscher-Colombo proposals, he did share Genscher's concerns over 
the drift towards pacifism and neutralism increasingly evident in the West German 
INF debate. In the view of Mitterrand, and an increasingly large section of the 
French bureaucracy prior to Mitterrand's election, the dangers presented by the 
Soviet SS-20 missiles and the concomitant opposition to the deployment of a 
counteracting weapon, holding with it the prospect of a neutral and unified 
Germany, threatened to undermine the whole basis of the consensus that had 
underpinned French defence and security policy throughout the life of the Fifth 
Republic. 
This 'consensus', based on the possession of an independent French nuclear 
deterrent, specifically allocated to the defence of metropolitan France, required the 
maintenance of certain pre-conditions in order to retain its credibility. These pre-
conditions have been summarised by Lellouche as firstly, that the 'U.S nuclear 
guarantee still worked to protect all non-nuclear Europe', secondly, that 'Germany 
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remained secure and stable within NATO' and thirdly that 'France was able to keep 
modernising her deterrent unconstrained by arms control or diplomatic 
pressures'.^^ 
The deployment of SS-20's by the Soviet Union posed in the French analysis 
a grave threat to the maintenance of these pre-conditions and by association to the 
credibility of French defence strategy. While it would be true to say that the 
French analysis encompassed a wide variety of views, it is possible to identify a 
distinct thread, which when boiled down to its basic ingredient, suggest that the 
Soviet SS-20 deployment created a strategic imbalance, which had as its aim the 
creation of a specific situation, that is to say the 'neutralisation' of Western Europe. 
In this respect the 1979 NATO decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing 2 
provided the necessary corrective to this perceived imbalance of forces, and would 
therefore restore the credibility of French defence strategy.^^ 
Notwithstanding this argument, the pacifist/neutralist trends in the German 
INF debate created the possibility of a reversal of the German commitment to 
deploy the missiles and with it the distinct possibility of the nightmare scenario for 
the French; a Germany 'de-coupled' from the Atlantic Alliance, prepared to make a 
deal with the Soviet Union in return for unification. Indeed a German refusal to 
accept Cruise and Pershing 2 would, in all probability, have led to similar decisions 
among other intended recipients on the Continent, thus achieving the goal attributed 
to the Soviet Union by French opinion, that of the neutralisation of Western 
Europe. As Viviret has argued neutralisation was sought not in order to occupy 
Western Europe but prevent the spread of Western European influence in the 
Eastern bloc. 
" I am certain they do not desire or intend to 'occupy' Western 
Europe and thereby take on the headache of 250 million Poles....For 
the Soviet Union, the real threat from the West is not military but 
political and ideological. Internally they are terrified of a Walesa or 
a Dubcek, but unperturbed by the rantings of a Ceausescu. Their 
real reason for maintaining and extending the 'glacis', for attempting 
the neutralisation of Europe, is their terror before the spread of 
democratic ideas." 
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This, while an apparently alarmist viewpoint did have currency in 
government circles, and was regarded as a situation to be avoided at all costs. Thus 
on the public stage Mitterrand took the unprecedented step, in a strongly worded 
speech to the Bundestag in January 1983, of urging the Germans to continue to 
support the Twin-Track decision and to make the final decision necessary to go 
ahead with the deployment of Cruise and Pershing 2. 
" I believe and assert de-coupling is in itself dangerous ....That is 
why the joint determination of the members of the Atlantic Alliance 
and their solidarity must be unequivocally confirmed." ° 
In making this speech Mitterrand effectively, and quite deliberately 
intervened in the German election debate, and in so doing gave his support to 
Chancellor Kohl's CDU-led coalition. Mitterrand's concerns over the drift towards 
neutralism in the SPD, would appear to have overridden any notion of 'solidarity' 
between the socialist/social democratic parties of Western Europe. Unsurprisingly 
relations between the two parties, which historically had enjoyed a close 
relationship, took something of a nosedive. That Mitterrand was prepared to risk 
this r if t with the Parti Socialiste's natural partners in the Federal Republic, can in 
many respects be regarded as a measure of his concern in this matter. 
A further aspect of this speech which does raise questions, is Mitterrand's 
ringing endorsement of a NATO decision and his call for Alliance solidarity. 
Whilst this does appear to be at odds with his professed adherence to the 'Gaullist 
orthodoxy' in defence matters, and that while it may be untypical at the level of 
public rhetoric, it does not represent a significant divergence from the Gaullist 
'consensus', which for all its anti-American rhetoric and denunciation of NATO, 
has always relied on the assumption of the continued existence of the American 
guarantee. In this respect the anti-American sentiment occasionally expressed by 
the French was of a wholly different order to that found in the anti-nuclear debate in 
West Germany and throughout Western Europe at this time. Indeed as noted 
above,"^^ France in times of increased international tension has shown itself to be a 
staunch defender of Alliance solidarity. 
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Thus Mitterrand's strong and public endorsement of the Atlantic Alliance 
and of a NATO decision, is not without precedent. Indeed in justifying his public 
statements on this issue Mitterrand has argued that the Soviet deployment of SS-20s 
and the ensuing opposition to Cruise and Pershing 2, created a situation of similar 
scale and magnitude to the Cuban Missile Crisis. In so doing Mitterrand associates 
his actions with those of de Gaulle whose support for the American position in this 
crisis was unwavering. In addition, seen as an attempt to maintain the pre-
conditions necessary to the credibility of French defence strategy, Mitterrand's 
actions may be regarded as consistent with Gaullist orthodoxy and therefore 
legitimate. 
It has also been suggested that Mitterrand's willingness to support the Twin-
Track decision so strongly and openly was an attempt to wrong-foot any attempts by 
the 'New Right' driven Reagan administration to undermine the policy programme 
of Mitterrand's Socialist Government. As Smouts suggests, Mitterrand's ringing 
endorsement of the Twin-Track decision and his Atlanticist rhetoric were part of a 
concerted effort on the part of Mitterrand 'to get along with the most conservative 
President the United States had known for a long time'.^^ 
Given the scale of opposition to Cruise and Pershing 2 in the countries ear-
marked for deployment the support of the Mitterrand was in general regarded as a 
great boost to the governments faced with justifying their position to domestic 
audiences. In offering such strident support Mitterrand was of course in a unique 
position. France, while supportive of the Twin-Track decision was not a party to 
the decision and thus not among the countries chosen to site the missiles. France 
was therefore inoculated from any adverse reaction. Indeed the question of nuclear 
weapons was something of a non-issue in France, attempts to involve the French 
public in the Europe-wide protest movement at this time met with little success, as 
Lellouche wryly notes. 
" I f Voltaire were among us today, and if Candide, his hero, were 
travelling successively through the various nations of Western 
Europe, reporting on the deep social and political controversies 
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which surround the question of intermediate-range nuclear forces 
(INF), no doubt France would appear to him as a nuclear El Dorado 
- a Panglossian wonderland where, apparently at least, everyone is 
for the French nuclear force, against the Soviet SS-20 missiles, and 
for the impending NATO deployment of Pershing 2 and Cruise 
missiles in Europe. Everyone, that is, except for a small but divided 
minority composed of Communists, some right-wing politicians and 
analysts, a few left-wing Socialists and a tiny group of die-hard 
'ecologists'. Al l in all, Candide would draw the conclusion that all is 
well in Socialist France - at least insofar as nuclear weapons are 
concerned - and that it must be depressing indeed to be an anti-
nuclear 'peace' activist in such a bizarre country."-'^ 
Thus free from the possibility of adverse domestic reaction Mitterrand could 
give full vent to his concerns in this matter. In this respect his speech to the 
Bundestag marks the clearest demonstration of his attempts to address and influence 
opinion at a public level. Although it is unclear how effective Mitterrand was in 
this regard, it can perhaps be suggested that as a Socialist, his endorsement of a 
decision originally taken by his SPD counterpart, and which was now opposed by a 
strong element within the SPD, allowed and persuaded those SPD supporters 
uncomfortable with the drift in the Party away from the post-war consensus, to 
transfer their allegiance to the CDU on a matter such import. 
At a less public level, and prior to Mitterrand's Bundestag speech, the two 
governments had begun efforts to discuss their mutual concerns within a formal 
institutional framework. Almost from the beginning of the negotiations of the 
Genscher-Colombo proposals it had been clear that Genscher's proposals for the 
'co-ordination of security policy' would run into the same objections from the 
'footnote countries'^^ as those faced in the formulation of the 1981 London Report. 
Given the time-span between the London Report and Genscher-Colombo this was 
hardly surprising. However, in spite of what amounted to a permanent veto on the 
extension of EPC's remit in the security sphere, there remained, in the view of both 
the French and West German governments, a pressing need to find a framework 
within which to discuss and co-ordinate a European position on defence and 
security. 
In this respect it should be noted that although it was possible for Mitterrand 
to reaffirm French commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and to offer the strongest 
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possible support for the Twin-Track decision, one option not open to him, was to 
seek to rejoin the integrated command structure of NATO. Indeed within the so-
called Gaullist consensus, a consensus riddled with inconsistencies and ambiguities, 
that was arguably the only aspect of the consensus not open to question. The 
framework within which to discuss and co-ordinate a European position had of 
necessity to be solely European. However, due to the continuing negotiations on 
the Genscher-Colombo proposals, a high-profile, wider-based initiative, was 
inappropriate. Indeed it would appear that from taking office in 1981 Mitterrand's 
preference had been for the WEU as a forum for the discussion of European defence 
interests. It was therefore decided at the regular Franco-German Summit in 
February 1982 to breathe life into the inoperative defence provisions of the 1963 
Franco-German Treaty. 
The 1963 Franco-German Treaty provides yet another link with the Fouchet 
proposals. Following the breakdown of the Fouchet negotiations in April 1962 and 
the failure of the various attempts to revive the negotiations in the following months 
by Cattani, the French and German governments entered into negotiations in 
September of 1962 the consequence of which was the Franco-German Treaty signed 
in Paris on 22 January 1963. It was in effect a bilateral and diluted version of the 
Fouchet proposals, a consolation prize to soften the blow of Fouchet's failure. 
Included in the provisions relating to defence, the Franco-German Treaty provided 
for Ministers for Defence or the Armed Forces to meet every three months, the 
setting up of a Franco-German institute for operational research, the exchange of 
armed forces personnel and the initiation of joint armaments projects. 
These provisions on defence were to remain largely inoperative due to the 
Bundestag's insistence on the addition to the Treaty ratified by West Germany, of a 
highly Atlanticist Preamble,^"^ which was effectively a testament of allegiance to the 
very issues which had been the source of difficulty throughout the Fouchet 
negotiations. This dampened French enthusiasm for the defence component of the 
Treaty. In addition, the retirement of Chancellor Adenauer in the October of 1963 
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bringing in Erhard, whose relationship with de Gaulle can best be described as cool, 
ensured that the defence provisions of the Franco-German Treaty would remain 
largely inactive for the foreseeable future. 
Thus the Franco-German Treaty, which had continued to operate on a low-
key, provided a ready-made solution in the face of the reluctance of other Member 
States to Europeanise the defence debate and the continuing negotiations on the 
Genscher-Colombo proposals' Building on the February decision to employ the 
defence provisions of the Franco-German Treaty, it was decided at the October 
1982 Franco-German Summit to establish a joint commission which was to meet 
every three months, within which several specialised groups were set up, including 
a 'nuclear group'. 
Whilst the fears and concerns which led to the activation of the defence 
provisions of the Franco-German Treaty have been discussed in reasonable detail, it 
is interesting to briefly note the differences in the initial approach to the bilateral 
discussions. 
"The dialogue began under conditions of intense secrecy, largely 
concealed from the French public and political debate. It covered a 
wide agenda in its regular meetings, with both sides determined to 
influence perceptions and priorities within the other government. It 
is hard to assess how far French arguments had, by 1984, influenced 
German approaches to Western strategy and German perceptions of 
the Soviet threat - partly because French concerns were in many ways 
exaggerated, trying to convert their German colleagues to views they 
already held. German concerns were more concrete: to gain a firmer 
commitment to the conventional defence of Germany; to establish a 
framework for consultation on the deployment and potential use of 
French nuclear weapons; and to re-open the question of the rple of 
French territory and French supply lines in European defence."-'-' 
Thus it would appear that, initially at least, the French were more concerned 
with the reinforcement of the Federal Republic's commitment to the Western 
Alliance at a symbolic level, than with offering practical proposals to alleviate their 
mutual concerns. Conversely their German counterparts, were concerned to extract 
a clear and tangible commitment to the defence of German soil, of bringing France 
back into the ful l NATO fold without actually rejoining NATO. Some German 
officials it seems were initially sceptical that the French commitment was anything 
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more than rhetoric. Indeed as Howorth notes, 'during the bilateral discussions 
between France and Germany on military co-operation, France's commitment to 
conventional role was turned into a 'test' of its seriousness about trying to create 
some form of Euro-defence system'.^^ In the event the bilateral discussions did 
bear fruit for the Germans, when it was revealed in the latter half of 1983 that the 
new French Force d'Action Rapide (FAR) would be tasked with confronting Soviet 
'Operational Manoeuvre Groups' in German territory in the event of a European 
conflict, and that it would be dependent on logistic support from NATO. 
Regardless of initial scepticism, the Franco-German defence dialogue helped 
to coalesce French and German viewpoints on a range of issues and created an 
atmosphere in which, following the difficult period in Franco-German relations in 
the first half of 1981, the Franco-German axis took on a new lease of life as a 
motive force in European integration. 
Following the electoral victory of the CDU-led coalition in March 1983, 
which virtually guaranteed that deployment of Cruise and Pershing 2 would 
proceed, it could perhaps be assumed that the impetus of the European defence 
debate would fade, and with it the search for a framework within which to discuss 
and formulate a European position on defence and security issues. Indeed this is 
argued by Coker in oudining the motivations for the reactivation of WEU. 'With 
cruise missile deployment beginning in 1984 the initiative lost its immediate 'raison 
d'etre' and with it its momentum'. 
While it is accepted that once the deployment programme had been initiated 
in the final months of 1983, the initial raison d'etre of the defence debate had been 
removed, the suggestion that the European defence debate had also lost its 
momentum is highly questionable. Indeed at the moment it could have been 
expected to have faltered the European defence debate was given a massive boost. 
On 23rd March 1983, speaking from the White House, President Reagan 
announced the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) the so-called Star Wars 
programme.^^ Broadly speaking SDI was a wide-ranging programme of research 
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into new concepts of ground-and space-based defence against ballistic missiles. 
Reagan expressed the hope that the end result of SDI would be the deployment of a 
system that would provide a totally impenetrable shield of defence. The 
deployment of such a system would represent the most radical shift in US defence 
strategy since the arrival of the nuclear-age. Its implications were the source of 
wide-ranging debate and argument. 
It is not the intention here to conduct an exhaustive survey of the pros and 
cons of the SDI debate, rather, it is to note the perceived implications and reactions 
of the United States European allies to the Star Wars initiative and its impact on the 
European defence debate. 
Initial European reactions to Reagan's March 1983 speech were rather 
muted, and perhaps became sidelined in the more pressing priorities of ensuring 
Cruise and Pershing would be deployed. In many respects SDI was viewed by 
Europeans as a kite-flying exercise which would go the way of previous attempts to 
develop Ballistic Missile Defences (BMD's) and die a quiet death once the financial 
and technical difficulties of such ambitious day-dreaming became apparent. 
However by 1984 West European governments began to realise that there was 
considerable political momentum behind SDI. This as Hoffmann points out gave 
rise to a number of worries on the part of Western Europe, the most pressing of 
which was the revival of the 'de-coupling' debate. 
"... the perennial fear of 'de-coupling' was revived by the 'Star 
Wars' programme - immediately after INF deployments intended to 
dispel i t . . . An American repudiation of deterrence in favour of 
defence... makes West Europeans wonder whether a 'safe' America 
would be willing to take any risk at all for the defence of outlying 
areas. To the argument that American invulnerability should make 
the United States more rather than less willing to help its allies. West 
Europeans answer that i f both Superpowers have defensive systems, 
NATO's strategy of nuclear response capable of hitting the 
U.S.S.R... would obviously collapse. As a consequence Europe 
would be doomed to the kind of conventional war, or of 'limited' 
nuclear war, that has beeaits nightmare and that extended deterrence 
was intended to prevent." 
In many respects some of the European worries sketched by Hoffmann took 
some time to germinate, and in their fully-fledged form ante-date the moves to 
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reactivate the WEU. However the point to be made here is not that the fears 
aroused by SDI in Western Europe, led directly to the reactivation of the WEU, or 
indeed that it was the only reason for reactivation. Though it should be noted that 
the first substantive issue tackled by the re-activated WEU was to attempt to co-
ordinate a European response to Reagan's offer of European participation in SDI 
research. Rather the point to be stressed is that the concerns raised by SDI, 
reinforced and highlighted the perception in a growing number of European capitals 
of the need to identify and formulate a European response to events and decisions 
which directly affected European interests but over which the Europeans had little 
influence. In short, contrary to Coker's assertion that the initiative to reactivate the 
WEU had lost its momentum with the initial deployments of INF, the arrival of SDI 
ensured that the European defence debate remained firmly on the agenda, and with 
it the motivation to find a European framework within which to formulate a 
European position on defence-related issues. 
In this respect, the preferred framework of the majority, that of EPC, was 
inadmissible. The attempts to extend the remit of EPC in the context of the 
Genscher-Colombo negotiations had petered out in the overwhelmingly 
disappointing Solemn Declaration on European Union signed in Stuttgart on 19 June 
1983. However the conclusion of the Genscher-Colombo negotiations allowed for 
the promotion of the wider and more high-profile initiatives that would have been 
regarded as disruptive and undermining to the efforts of the negotiators in the 
Genscher-Colombo talks. Thus from this point onwards, and in a wider context one 
can observe the development of the various initiatives which led to the IGC and the 
Single European Act. 
In the context of the defence debate, the signing of the Solemn Declaration 
allowed the French to aggressively promote the WEU as, 'the only European 
organism through which questions of European defence can be addressed'.^^ In 
noting the French enthusiasm for the revival of the WEU, it should also be noted 
that while the motivations for French interest in the development of a European 
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defence identity can largely be attributed to genuinely held fears and concerns, the 
potential growth in French influence in a revived European defence framework must 
also be regarded as a consideration, indeed as noted above the revival of WEU 
had since the 1970s been a fairly constant theme. 
It was also recognised by both French and German officials that although the 
discussions within the framework of the Franco-German Treaty had brought great 
benefits in mutual understanding and commitment, it had its limitations. Firstly, i f 
they were serious in their intention to make a significant European impact on major 
defence issues it was necessary to include the British. Secondly, the development 
of a strong and exclusive bilateral defence relationship would be a source of concern 
and resentment among fellow Community members, as indeed would a tripartite 
relationship to include the United Kingdom. It would look, taste and feel like a 
Directoire of the Big Three of the Community. As Wallace notes, German officials 
thus saw in the WEU a useful multilateral cover for the development of the Franco-
German dialogue on defence and security issues. 
The revival of the WEU also held for West Germany the additional and 
largely symbolic opportunity to remove the last vestiges of subordination to its 
partners, in the form of controls over the manufacture of arms. Thus by February 
1984, with a suitable period of mourning for the Solemn Declaration on European 
Union having elapsed, the French with the full backing of FRG, felt able to 
embark on a concerted effort to revive WEU.^^ 
Put into the wider context it should be recalled that the February 1984 
announcement by the French of their intention to seek the revitalisation of WEU, 
coincides with a general push to resolve the various crises facing the Community, 
which at the Fontainebleau European Council of June 1984 saw the creation of the 
Dooge Committee. Also Spinelli's Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union was adopted by the European Parliament in February 1984. Thus, while in 
some respects it was a propitious moment to seek the revitalisation of the WEU, the 
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efforts to promote it as a high-profile initiative were to a large extent sidelined in 
the efforts to re-launch the Community. 
Regardless of this relative obscurity, or perhaps even because of it, events 
towards the revitalisation moved forward quite quickly and with little substantive 
opposition, though note should be made of the alleged British reluctance. The 
British for their part, while sharing the concerns of the French and the Germans in 
the sphere of defence and security, have in the majority of accounts of the WEU's 
reactivation been cast as the 'doubting Thomas' of the piece. Coker for instance 
presents a sceptical and dismissive picture of the British attitude towards the 
reactivation proposals, arguing that Britain only agreed to reactivation in order to 
restore their tarnished 'European i m a g e ' . I n a similar vein Tsakaloyannis 
suggests that for Britain WEU was little more than a means of watering down the 
potential emergence of a 'Franco-German condominium' and 'having been left out 
of earlier initiatives in the 1950s and 1960s, London was not prepared to repeat the 
same mistake.'^^ 
Thus one gains the distinct impression that British agreement to the idea of 
WEU reactivation was based on purely negative grounds. Indeed the public 
statements and actions of Michael Heseltine, the British Defence Minister at the 
time of reactivation, do seem to bear this out. As reported in The Times Heseltine 
viewed the reactivated WEU as a 'restricted forum' which should avoid the 
'duplication of work done more profitably elsewhere', in particular in respect of 
arms collaboration, NATO's Eurogroup and the Independent European Programme 
Group (lEPG) were cited as the appropriate bodies for such developments 69. 
While this evidence of a negative and reluctant attitude to the reactivation of 
WEU appears to be strong, it was not a view universally held within 'official' 
British circles. Indeed contrary to the prevailing line of British reluctance which 
neatly fits the generally negative profile of Britain in the Community, a more 
positive and objective view of the UK's attitude to the reactivation of WEU can be 
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found in the views of a senior Foreign Office official involved in both the 
reactivation of WEU and the IGC negotiating the SEA. 
"WEU was important, because that was the escape route on defence. 
We were very keen, all the main governments, the French, the 
Germans and ourselves, to build up the European element of 
defence. There was a great deal of discussion going on over the 
question of reinforcing WEU.. . That involved a great deal of 
discussion about what the European contribution could be, how it 
could be made, and identifying or meeting American concerns that 
the Europeans were setting up something independent of NATO; that 
would have given the Americans licence to pull out of NATO...we 
wanted to build up WEU, both to reinforce the European element of 
NATO, and to provide a counterbalance in WEU to what we could 
not do in EPC. To be talking about foreign policy questions without 
defence, in some areas makes no sense at all. So we wanted to try 
and explore ways of building up WEU to that sort of useful role 
without risking going down avenues which would be damaging. That 
was quite tricky but it was very relevant to the work that was being 
done in EPC.. . By building up WEU, in which the French were 
perfectly happy to be involved, we hoped to draw WEU more into a 
relationship with NATO, so that it was not undercutting what NATO 
was doing, but reinforcing the European contribution to NATO... 
We saw that as an indirect route to bringing the French more closely 
to NATO. But the reality was that the French were much more 
involved in NATO than their own politics would ever allow them to 
acknowledge. I think we did see WEU as^way of easing them back 
and helping them get over their problem." 
While the comments and actions of Michael Heseltine are evidence of an 
undeniable degree of British opposition to the reactivation of WEU, they are 
perhaps suggestive of a difference of viewpoints and attitudes between British 
ministries. The Foreign Office appeared far more willing to embrace the idea of 
WEU reactivation than their counterparts in the Ministry of Defence. This may be 
regarded a consequence of differing perceptions and experience of European 
organisations between the two Ministries. In the case of the Ministry of Defence it 
would be true to say their experience of Community Europe ranged from limited to 
non-existent. Conversely the Foreign Office, in particular through their work 
within the framework of EPC, had come to value and appreciate the experience of 
'living and working together' with their counterparts throughout the Foreign 
Ministries of the Community. Thus as a consequence of the high degree of trust 
and friendship built up between the foreign policy elites of the EC, the Foreign 
Office was by inclination far more receptive to European ventures. In addition the 
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Ministry of Defence were anxious to protect their position of influence in lEPG 
which could be undermined within an organisation they perceived to be a vehicle 
for French interests. 
Following the February memorandum announcing the French intention to 
seek to reactivate WEU, events proceeded with relative ease. On 12th June 1984 at 
a WEU Council meeting it was agreed to set up a Working Group 'to examine the 
prospects for reactivating WEU as the basis for a more assertive European presence 
in the field of defence and security'. This working group was instructed to 
complete its work in time for an 'extraordinary session' of the WEU. to mark the 
30th anniversary of the WEU. This meeting was to be a 'joint meeting of foreign 
and defence ministers'. Thus in October 1984 the foreign and defence Ministers of 
WEU Member States adopted the organisation's 'certificate of re-birth' in the form 
of the Rome Declaration.^^ 
In its aims and objectives the Rome Declaration bears a remarkable 
similarity, both in tone and content to the Dooge Committee's recommendations on 
79 
defence and security . The similarities between the two documents while evident 
are unsurprising given the relationships between those involved in the Dooge 
Committee and those involved in the formulation of the Rome Declaration. Rifkind 
for instance was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, Van Eekelen too was Dutch 
Defence Minister at this time. While Faure, the personal representative of 
President Mitterrand on the Dooge Committee, credited with the authorship of the 
main elements of the provisions on defence and security, was in constant and close 
touch with Mitterrand who was an instrumental figure in the reactivation of the 
WEU. Thus the provisions of the Dooge Report in the sphere of defence and 
security (endorsed by the majority of the Dooge Committee), clearly reflect the 
consensus achieved in the formulation of the Rome Declaration. 
Whilst reference to the individuals involved in both sets of negotiations does 
go some way in explaining the close correspondence between the two texts it also 
raises questions with regard to the intentions of the 'Seven' in virtually duplicating 
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the commitments of the Rome Declaration in the recommendations of the Dooge 
Report. In particular, why continue to pursue the EPC route when one of the 
primary reasons for WEU reactivation was frustration among the Seven, in 
particular FRG, at their inability to make progress on defence issues within the EPC 
framework ? Indeed any thoughts that by 1984-85, the 'footnote countries' would 
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have softened their attitude on this issue were evidently unfounded. As noted, 
the Republic of Ireland, Denmark and Greece had made their objections to any such 
developments abundantly clear. As Van Eekelen comments, the Seven did not 
harbour any illusions about the likelihood of an about-face on the part of the 
'Footnote countries' on this issue. 
" . . . i t was the aftermath of Stuttgart and the Danes, the Greeks and 
the Irish did not want to talk about defence, and that remained, . . . i t 
was clear that we could not go much further ... because ofJhat the 
interest of the others in WEU was much greater at this time." 
Indeed the acceptance by the Seven of the inadmissibility of defence within 
the framework of EPC is largely confirmed in the draft proposals which followed 
the Dooge Report,^^ both the British Draft Agreement on Political Co-operation, 
the Franco-German Draft Treaty on European Union, and indeed the SEA itself, 
make no attempt to extend the remit of EPC beyond that agreed in the Solemn 
Declaration on European Union, that is to say, 'The political and economic aspects 
of security'. Thus in the strictest sense, the resistance of the 'Footnote countries' to 
the majority view of the Dooge Committee appears to have been successful. 
The presence of such detailed defence and security provisions in the Dooge 
Report therefore requires explanation. The Seven in continuing to press the defence 
issue, when it was so obviously a non-starter in the context of EPC, can be seen to 
be serving notice on the 'footnote countries' that this was the direction the majority 
were intent on moving. The message they intended to convey was that, whilst it 
was preferable to move in this direction together and within the EPC framework, 
there were alternative frameworks available to the Seven. Indeed the specific 
reference to the 'strengthening' 76 of the Western European Union in the Final 
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Report can in some respects be regarded as a veiled threat to the recalcitrant three. 
The nature of the 'threat', i f indeed 'threat' is the most appropriate word to use in 
this context, is one of a loss of prestige and influence. As Tsakaloyannis comments 
this is a possibility the 'footnote countries' should take care to avoid. 
"Despite the lack of enthusiasm for EPC displayed by the three non-
WEU EC members, especially Greece and Denmark, they simply 
cannot afford to ignore the political implications which the 
reactivation might bring about. I f the WEU becomes a more potent 
forum for the seven to discuss political and security issues and EPC 
is relegated to a rather consultative role then its non-members are 
going to be net losers. For it is one thing to have a low opinion of 
EPC when you are a member and another to be an outsider unable to 
influence decisions. 
In other words the reactivation of the WEU has presented Denmark, 
Greece and Ireland with a dilemma: either they reconsider their 
position in EPC^r they may run the risk of being relegated to the 
second league." 
In the event the 'Footnote countries' were untroubled by the potential 
consequences of such a development and maintained their resistance. Though the 
threat of EPC's relegation remained implicit in the Single Act's provision that 
'Nothing in this Title shall impede closer co-operation in the field of security 
between certain of the High Contracting Parties within the framework of the 
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Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance.' 
However, to return to the Western European Union, it can be said in 
tentative conclusion that in the 1984 reactivation the WEU was again performing its 
role as the 'Foster-Parent' of European integration. Whilst the revival of the 
European defence debate was triggered by external factors, the decision to employ 
the WEU as the framework for this debate was based on internal, intra-European 
and intra-Alliance considerations. At the intra-AUiance level the use of WEU boils 
down to the domestic political difficulties for France of even contemplating a return 
to the NATO structure, difficulties which were such that this was never a serious 
option. At the intra-European level, the preferred option of the great majority of 
Member States, that of EPC was deemed inadmissible following the failure of 
attempts to extend its remit in both the London Report and the Genscher-Colombo 
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initiative. While the stop-gap use of the bilateral Franco-German Treaty was, in the 
pursuit of a European defence forum, a vital but ultimately limited catalyst. 
As did the formulators of the Luxembourg Report before them, those 
instrumental in the reactivation of WEU, chose the path of least resistance. As a 
consequence of the fact that the seven countries in favour of discussing defence 
issues in a European context also made up the full membership of the Western 
European Union, this provided the ideal solution to one of the most intractable 
problems of post-war European integration. Thus the troublesome child of 
European integration was found a temporary but familiar home. 
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CHAPTER F I V E 
FROM DOOGE REPORT TO MILAN COUNCIL 
As originally instructed, the Dooge Committee presented its Final Report to the 
Brussels European Council of March 1985. It had however been decided at the 
Dublin European Council of December 1984, not to make the Committee's findings 
the focal point of the Brussels Council, the Dooge Committee's findings would 
instead form the centerpiece of the Milan Council of June 1985, a decision 
confirmed at the Brussels Council 1. 
An examination of the period of activity between the submission of the Dooge 
Report to the Brussels Council at the end of March and the Milan Council at the end 
of June, provides an interesting contrast to the generally held perceptions of the 
Member States, willingness to support further European integration. The central 
issue in this intervening period concerns the final recommendation of the Dooge 
Report, their recommendation that an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) should 
be convened. 
"The committee proposes that a Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States should be convened in the near future to 
negotiate a draft European Union Treaty based on the aquis communataire, 
the present document and the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European 
Union and guided by the spirit and method of the draft Treaty voted by the 
European Parliament: ..."2 
In the weeks following the Brussels Council, Mauro Ferri, who had been Prime-
Minister Craxi's personal representative on the Dooge Committee, was dispatched 
on a round of visits to the capitals of the Member States in order to gauge the level 
of support for the convening of an IGC. Whilst it seems that the response to Ferri's 
enquiries was at best mixed 3, the Italian Government, as holders of the EC 
Presidency at this time, took the decision to promote the recommendations of the 
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Dooge Report, and in particular to make the convening of an IGC the central aim 
of their agenda for the Milan Council. In pursuit of this aim the Italian Government 
presented to their Community partners, on 21st May 1985, a Preliminary Draft 
Mandate for an Intergovernmental Conference. In so far as the main objectives 
are concerned the Draft Mandate is little more than a restatement of the objectives 
outlined in the Dooge Report, notably the 'creation of an integrated internal 
market', the 'promotion of common values of civilisation' and the 'pursuit of 
common external policies by strengthening the structures of Political Co-operation 
and by extending it to security'4. 
In attaining these objectives the Draft Mandate outlined changes in the institutional 
framework which again closely reflect the conclusions of the Dooge Report, in 
respect of greater use of majority voting in the Council of Ministers, restoring the 
role of Commission as an effective 'initiator, executor and manager', and the 
'formalisation of Political Co-operation'5. The exception to this was the provisions 
dealing with the role and powers of the European Parliament, which in the Italian 
Draft Mandate go beyond the recommendations of the Dooge Committee, reflecting 
a traditional Italian advocacy of a greater role for the European Parliament. As for 
the means of bringing about these changes the Draft Mandate outlines the aim, 
scope, composition and timetable for an IGC . 
"An intergovernmental conference with the task of negotiating a treaty 
leading gradually to European Union has been called. This treaty will not 
only cover present and future action by the European Communities, but also 
all forms of intergovernmental co-operation which are of considerable 
importance in the process of the building of the Union. ...The conference 
will present its conclusions before 30th November 1985, so as to enable the 
Heads of State or Government to adopt the necessary decisions at the 
European Council on 3 and 4 December 1985."6 
Although the institutional and policy reforms outlined by the Draft Mandate 
broadly reflected the consensus of the Dooge Report, and were thus, on the whole, 
acceptable to the Member States, the method of bringing about these reforms, the 
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convening of an intergovernmental conference with the specific aim of negotiating a 
new treaty, was guaranteed to create difficulty. 
Indeed the difficulty over this issue was presaged in the Dooge Report. In keeping 
with the transparency so evident throughout the Dooge Report, the Committee's 
final recommendation, that an intergovernmental conference be called, is subject to 
reservations entered by Rifkind, Papantoniou and Moller. 
"Mr Papantoniou and Mr Rifkind consider that the recommendations of 
this report should be the subject of consultations between the governments 
before the June European Council, so that decisions can be token by the 
Heads of Government at that meeting. 
Mr. Moller shared their view, but pointed out that according to the 
Committee's terms of reference it was not its task to put forward 
recommendations on the conclusions which the European Council might 
draw from the report. "7 
Although the reservations of the Mr. Moller and Mr. Papantoniou should not be 
disregarded as irrelevant, in realistic terms it is the British reservation that is crucial 
in this matter. Essentially the British opposition turned on two arguments, firstly, 
that, whilst a degree of institutional and policy reform was necessary in order to 
reinvigorate the Community, these reforms could and should be carried out without 
recourse to the negotiation of a new Treaty. Secondly, the British took the view 
that the regular meetings of the European Council, which were not provided for in 
the Treaties, in effect constituted intergovernmental conferences, with the capacity 
to make the decisions necessary to promote the well-being of the Community. In 
this respect. Prime Minister Thatcher at the Milan Council pointed to the decisions 
taken at Fontainebleau and the successful conclusion of the enlargement negotiations 
as evidence of the capacity of the Community, in its then current form, to take 
major decisions. Indeed the British argued, that although the convening of an 
intergovernmental conference might well clarify the positions of the various 
Member States, an intergovernmental conference on the lines of that proposed by 
the Italian Draft Mandate would, at the end of the day, look to the Heads of State or 
Government for final approval. This would effectively replicate the work so 
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recently completed by the Dooge and Adonnino Committees, as well Cockfield's 
White Paper on the Single Market. 
The British viewpoint on these issues was given definite form in the so- called 
Howe Plan, presented to the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Stresa on 8-9 June 
1985, at which time it was finally confirmed that discussion of institutional matters 
should remain the priority of the Milan Council. 
The Howe Plan, which began life as a projected Milan Declaration, was a 
package of proposals covering both Community related issues, in particular 
proposals relating to the process of decision-making in the Community, and 
proposals in the sphere of EPC. In the area of Community decision-making Howe 
made four proposals: 
"... more frequent use of majority decisions for the 'daily management' of 
the Common Market; - when tltie Treaty provides for unanimous decisions, 
considering that the decisions be adopted, even if there are one or two 
abstentions; - when the European Council has voted unanimously on a clear 
guide-line, considering that the competent Council of Ministers can take the 
decisions whjch arise from this guide-line, i f necessary on a majority vote. -
to oblige the State which invokes the defence of a 'vital interest' in opposing 
a decision, to justify this argument at the level of the Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs. "8 
Clearly the specific aim of these particular proposals was to cure the paralysis in 
the Community decision-making process brought about by the Luxembourg 
Compromise of 1966,in effect it is a call for a return to the 'spirit of the Treaties'. 
In so doing Howe was by no means making new proposals. The proposal that the 
Council of Ministers could vote on issues in which the European Council had given 
a 'clear guide-line' had been proposed by the Dutch Prime Minister, at the Dublin 
Council of December 1984, a proposal which had the support of the British Prime 
Minister. While the proposal obliging Member States to justify 'vital interest' 
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vetoes to the General Council was proposed by Rikind in a footnote to the Dooge 
Committee's proposals9. 
Whilst these proposals and those concerning EPC were by no means radical or 
new, they are noteworthy for a number of reasons, not least of these is the simple 
fact that they were a British initiative, a factor which, to an extent, took the other 
Member States by surprise. As Agence Europe comments in reporting the 
proceedings of the meeting of Foreign Ministers at Stresa. 
"Everyone at Stresa expected to hear the U.K. Minister follow Margaret 
Thatcher's speech and say no to any intergovernmental conference, to any 
change in Community rules, and to any abandoning of unanimity (a 'no' also 
pronounced by Francois Mitterrand a few weeks ago). There was much 
surprise when Howe took the initiative and occupied the ground left by 
France and Germany." 10 
It should be recognised that although these proposals may be viewed as a genuine 
attempt on the part of the British to resolve one of the most intractable problems of 
the Community, the underlying motive of these proposals and those concerning 
E.P.C, was to avoid the convening of a full blown IGC which, in the view of many 
in British circles, would lead to substantial and unnecessary institutional changes. 
The Howe Plan was thus a concerted effort to head-off any such developments, and 
was recognised as such by commentators. 
"It is certain and even a little too obvious, that Sir Geoffrey Howe has made 
a considerable effort at seduction,..." 11 
This however, suggests possible policy differences towards the European 
Community within the British Government, and in particular between Downing 
Street and the Foreign Office, or even more specifically between Margaret Thatcher 
and Geoffrey Howe. As noted above it came as some surprise that Sir Geoffrey 
Howe did not follow the lead of Prime Minister Thatcher and rule out all suggestion 
of reform, though he did repeat British opposition to the convening of an IGC. 
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Instead the package of proposals presented by Howe was, on the whole, viewed as a 
positive contribution to the debate. 
This does not necessarily suggest that the Foreign Office in submitting the Howe 
Plan to the Foreign Ministers meeting at Stresa were adopting an independent line, 
that is to say initiating a policy change without the full approval of Downing Street. 
To make such a suggestion would be to go too far. Indeed when addressing this 
issue to a senior Foreign Office official involved in the submission of Howe's 
proposals, it was made abundandy clear that 'British government simply does not 
work like that'. It was stressed that although the Howe Plan was in the main a 
Foreign Office initiative, it was an initiative which had the been scrutinised and 
approved by Downing Street prior to its submission. 
"The British initiative on this was the result of a long process of 
correspondence between 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office. ... Yes 
it was a Foreign Office initiative in the sense that the Foreign Office were 
looking for ways of making our negotiating stance more acceptable to the 
rest of the Community; so we were looking for positive things that would 
off-set some of the things that we were going to have to say on the other side 
of the balance which would look rather negative. But, no, it was not a 
Foreign Office initiative in the sense of somehow undercutting or going 
behind, or trying to undermine what the overall policy of the Government 
was The final version was certainly fully agreed between all the parts 
of the Government that had been involved. "12 
While strictly speaking it would be inaccurate to suggest that the Foreign Office 
pursued an independent policy on this matter, the existence of a great gulf between 
the Foreign Office and Downing Street on virtually all things European in this 
period of the Thatcher administration was confirmed. Presenting itself in clear 
differences in tone, style, presentation and emphasis, it was a gulf which de facto 
bordered on the edge of the Foreign Office and 10 Downing Street pursuing 
different and arguably contradictory policy goals. Indeed, while it was unsaid the 
distinct impression given was that, far from the Foreign Office deviating from 
'Official ' government policy, the Official line was constantly and systematically 
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undermined by Downing Street, by Prime Minister Thatcher herself and by her 
personal staff. 
"There was very often a difference in tone; even at press conferences 
where both Margaret Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe were present. When she 
would be putting her particular views, and lets call a spade a spade, her anti-
European visceral instincts kept coming out into the open. ... This was one 
of the problems with Margaret Thatcher's governance; she would be 
persuaded in the process of rational argument to accept that Britain's 
interests would be best served by a certain course of action, she would agree 
to that against her own instincts, all of which were saying 'this is not what I 
think is ideal for Britain'. So when her spokesman or she herself were 
speaking in public, she would very often start off by drawing on the agreed 
form of words, but then one of the cleverer interviewers would get at her, 
and start stoking up her instincts, and then out it would all come. And over 
and over again having agreed to something she would then appear to 
contradict herself in her own statements. ... (Bernard Ingham) would be 
jerfectly capable of injecting into the officially agreed form of words, what 
le knew to be the Prime Minister's own views. And that's why you got 
very different tones when briefings on the same subject came from No 10 
and the Foreign Office. Even on subjects where there was probably most 
agreement; and there was no great disagreement on EPC for example ."13 
Whilst it must be recognised that this view of the relationship between the Foreign 
Office and Downing Street is essentially an unofficial Foreign Office perspective, it 
is a view which finds further confirmation in the resignation speech of Sir Geoffrey 
Howe, who when referring to the difficulties put in the way by Downing Street to 
creating an effective British policy in the Community, suggested that negotiating in 
Europe was 'rather like sending your opening batsman to the crease only for them 
to find the moment the first balls are bowled that their bats have been broken by the 
team captain.' 14 
Although it would be difficult to judge with great accuracy how these apparently 
differing messages from London were interpreted in the capitals of the various 
Member States, one can speculate that, regardless of what appears to have been a 
genuine effort on the part of the Foreign Office to make a positive contribution to 
the resolution of long-standing Community problems, these and other proposals 
would have been treated with a high degree of scepticism. This scepticism it can be 
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suggested would range from those who saw in the Howe Plan nothing more than a 
British ploy to do nothing, while others, although recognising the proposals as a 
genuine attempt by the Foreign Office to make a positive contribution, were only 
too well aware of the capacity of the Prime Minister Thatcher to 'pull the rug' from 
any initiative at a moment's notice. Thus the Howe Plan was fundamentally 
handicapped by the knowledge of Prime Minister Thatcher's 'anti-European 
instincts'. 
Notwithstanding this speculation, the Howe Plan was circulated to the Member 
States as the official and agreed British position on the resolution of the 
Community's difficulties. Thus the lines of the debate on the run-up to Milan were 
drawn: between the maximalist position of an IGC and a new Treaty of the Italian 
Draft Mandate; and the 'minimalist' return to the spirit of the Treaties advocated by 
the British in the Howe Plan. 
Superficially it would be relatively easy to project this whole episode as one of 
British failure. The reservations to an IGC entered in the Dooge Report and the 
bare statistic of the 7-to-3 vote in favour of convening an IGC, appear to confirm 
preconceptions of the U.K, Denmark and Greece as the most un-communautaire and 
difficult of the Member States, whilst confirming the remaining Member States in 
their European vocation. Indeed based on this evidence one can again point to the 
Dooge Report as a clear indicator of the positions likely to be adopted by the 
various Member States on virtually every aspect of the Single European Act. 
However, in this matter, the apparent transparency of Dooge, and the 
confirmation of the Milan vote tends to obscure the impact of Howe's proposals on 
the debate, and also obscures evidence of a growing reluctance on the part of two of 
the major actors, France and Germany, to support the convening of an IGC. Thus 
regardless of any initial scepticism over U.K. intentions, the Howe Plan was, in 
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general, quite well received, and it can even be suggested that in the period between 
its presentation at Stresa and the Milan Council vote in favour of convening an IGC, 
the 'seductive' efforts of Sir Geoffrey Howe were beginning to bear fruit. Indeed 
in the week prior to the Milan Council the normally well informed Agence Europe, 
confirming that 'few still recommend the convening of an Intergovernmental 
Conference', was confidently asserting that one of the few certainties of the Milan 
Council was that there would be no IGC to negotiate a new Treatyl5. 
Whilst the Howe Plan did obtain a relatively positive reception, this is not to 
suggest that it was welcomed with open arms, as evidence of changing attitude on 
the part of the British towards the Community. Rather it was welcomed in the 
absence of any similar proposals, as an escape route from the prospect of an IGC 
which would negotiate a new Treaty, a goal to which the Italian Presidency 
appeared to be particularly attached. 
The determination of the Italian Presidency to succeed in their aim of convening 
an IGC at Milan is beyond doubt. What is questionable is the motivation behind the 
zealous pursuit of this goal. It is not the intention here to conduct an exhaustive 
investigation of the 'European' policy of the Italian Government; however , 
evidence appears to suggest that the pursuit of the maximalist position and 
specifically the convening of an IGC was motivated partly as a forum for inter-
coalition rivalry between the Socialist Prime Minister, Craxi, and the Christian 
Democrat Foreign Minister, Andreotti. As Daniels notes ... 
"The political competition between Bettino Craxi and Giulio Andreotti was 
undoubtedly an important element in the Italian decision to force a vote on 
the issue of an intergovernmental conference. ... Craxi, exploiting to the full 
the high profile and close scrutiny of his role as President of the Council of 
Ministers, played a crucial role in securing an intergovernmental conference 
in the face of opposition from the governments of the U.K, Greece and 
Denmark. Andreotti, underlining his own Europeanist credentials, was 
responsible for promoting the Dooge report at a time when the Paris-Bonn 
axis was in some disarray. Not for the first time, Italy's diplomacy was 
rooted in domestic political considerations. "16 
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The view that personal and party prestige dominated the behaviour of the Italian 
Presidency is somewhat underlined in the acrimonious aftermath of Milan when 
Craxi effectively washed his hands of the issue once the primary aim of an IGC had 
been achieved, and the Presidency handed on to the Luxembourg government. 
"One is left with the impression that behind the idealistic rhetoric about 
progress towards European Union, the Milan Summit has in fact succeeded 
only in postponing major decisions,..., and opened deep rifts between the 
Member States that are likely to be difficult to heal, and will in any case 
leave deep seated scars. ... Perhaps the most significant statement by Craxi 
following the Summit was that he had handed over the dossiers to the 
Luxembourg Presidency. In other words, the Italian Presidency has 
achieved its objective of an 'intergovernmental conference', despite the 
bitterness this has caused, and it is now left up to Luxembourg to try to sort 
out the details. "17 
The source of the post-Milan bitterness was rooted in the decision of Craxi to 
force the issue of an IGC to a vote, an unprecedented step in the context of the 
European Council. In pushing the issue to a vote, the 7-to-3 result in favour of an 
intergovernmental conference confirmed and reinforced existing preconceptions of 
the Member States' 'European' credentials. However, this vote masked a growing 
reluctance on the part of both France and West Germany to support the convening 
of a full-blown IGC Indeed there is little doubt that, by the time of the Milan 
Council, both Kohl and Mitterrand had come round to the view that it would be 
preferable to resolve the Community's difficulties without recourse to an IGC Thus 
had the question not been put to the vote, an IGC would not have been convened. 
Given the relatively positive, that is to say, pro-European Union, coverage 
accorded to both Mitterrand and Kohl in the creation of the Single European Act, 
such a claim appears to be out of step with the 'founding father' image promoted by 
both figures. There is however sufficient evidence in the actions and statements of 
both Member States to support this contention. Indeed, even prior to the 
submission of the final report of the Dooge Committee, questions were being asked 
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of Kohl's commitment to thorough-going institutional reform, thus suggesting that 
the Chancellor's post-Fontainebleau enthusiasm for a new Treaty was on the 
wanel8 . Perhaps the most damming indication of a gap between Chancellor 
Kohl's pro-European Union rhetoric and his actual willingness to participate in 
wholesale institutional reform, is found in the West German use of the 'vital interest 
veto', the so called Luxembourg Compromise, in May and June 1985. 
Given the general consensus that the indiscriminate and generalised use of the veto 
was the greatest barrier to forward movement in the Community, and should 
therefore, with certain exceptions, be abolished, a view shared by the majority of 
the Dooge Committee, including Kohl's representative, it is surprising indeed to 
find West Germany invoking the Luxembourg Compromise. 
The British position on the use of a vital interest veto did not call for the 
abandonment of the Luxembourg Compromise, but proposed that any Member State 
invoking the veto should be required to justify its decision at the level of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers. 
On both occasions, the West German use of the Luxembourg Compromise, 
concerned agricultural issues, specifically the setting of cereal prices, the fine 
details of which are not relevant here. What is relevant is the timing of the vetoes. 
The first (17-5-85) fell on the eve of a meeting in London between Prime Minister 
Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl. Given the often 'holier than thou' approach adopted 
by German Governments to upholding both the spirit and letter of the Community 
Treaties is not difficult to imagine the damage caused to credibility of the German 
position by this incident, which was grist to the mill of the British campaign against 
the convening of an IGC, not to mention the personal embarrassment to Kohl. 
"Mr Kiechle (German Agriculture Minister) could not have chosen a worse 
moment: on the eve of the Khol-Thatcher meeting when the Chancellor was 
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due to try to persuade the British Government to accept the conclusions of 
the majority of the Dooge Committee, which calls for the total abolition of 
the 'Luxembourg Compromise'. ...the Foreign Office is delighted at what 
happened at the Agriculture Council since it exposes 'German rhetoric' on 
European Union as hot air'."19 
Surprisingly, given the open secret of a personal antipathy between Thatcher and 
Kohl, and taking into account the tendency of Prime Minister Thatcher to allow her 
'anti-European visceral instinct' to show, Thatcher did not take the opportunity to 
exploit the Chancellor's embarrassment as a vindication of the British viewpoint 20. 
The sensitive handling of Kohl's predicament by the British can be regarded as 
part of the attempt to draw the Germans into the British camp at a time when the 
West Germans were both vulnerable and receptive to British overtures. 
Notwithstanding the political embarrassment of the veto, the Franco-German 
relationship, so often regarded as the central and defining alliance in the 
Community, was undergoing a period of discord and tension. The source of this 
tension can be attributed to differences in the respective positions of the two 
countries in the Bonn Economic Summit of April 1985 (G7), and over the SDI and 
Eureka initiatives. The essence of the difficulties was the appearance, from the 
French viewpoint, that the Germans had given priority to their relations with the 
U.S.A. over those with France its closest continental partner. In these matters the 
German position closely corresponded to that of the British, thus it can be 
speculated that being more closely aligned to the British orbit in this period, the 
ERG would be more inclined to take British views into account than would normally 
be the case. 
If, from the perspective of those in favour of an IGC, the timing of the FRG's use 
of the Luxembourg Compromise was judged inopportune, the second occasion on 
which the ERG resorted to the Luxembourg Compromise was arguably even more 
damaging to their cause. It was invoked just two weeks prior to the Milan Council 
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and on the same day that Portugal and Spain were signing the acts of accession to 
the Community. 
Despite protestations to the contrary, the credibility of the German attachment to 
the abolition of the veto was in tatters. Given the fact that the ERG had invoked the 
Luxembourg Compromise over, what in the context of Germany's economic 
strength within the Community, was a relatively minor point, the decision to 
employ the veto was interpreted by many commentators as a clear signal on the part 
of the West German Government, of a shift away from its previously enthusiastic 
support for the maximalist position. The prognosis for the Milan Council looked 
extremely bleak. Indeed in a vitriolic editorial, under the heading 'Europe betrayed 
: from the German veto to the sinking of the Milan Summit', Agence Europe came 
within a hair's breadth of accusing the German Government of attempting to 
sabotage the Milan Council. 
"... Mr.Kiechle struck his blow - doubtless with his government's 
solidarity - two weeks before the meeting of a European Council the chief 
aim of which was up to yesterday (obviously this is no longer the case today) 
to take an important step towards European Union, . . . . One can ask oneself 
whether this gesture of exceptional gravity is not a precise political choice on 
the part of FRG, aimed at speeding the slide visible already for some time, 
towards transforming the Community into a 'free trade area', seen by 
important German circles as more in line with the German nation's interest. 
It is thus that in this specific case recourse to a 'very important interest' is 
only a pretext:... The German veto has created a new, intolerable situation 
and it is going to cause difficulties for the Italian government who, it is said 
is preparing a 'strategic retreat' in anticipation of the Milan European 
Council. "21 
Further indication of a shift in the German position can be observed in the 
comments of Foreign Minister Genscher in the week following the second German 
veto. Genscher re-affirmed his country's commitment to the abolition of the veto, 
but added that "...the British proposals relative to political co-operation and the 
number of occasions on which unanimity is required constitute a good basis for 
discussion. "22 
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This is a clear indication of not only a significant shift in the German position and 
further evidence of their growing reluctance to embrace the maximalist viewpoint. 
The increasing attractiveness of Howe's proposals was largely due to the absence of 
a viable Franco-German alternative at this time, the absence of which can be 
attributed to the temporary rupture in Franco-German relations. 
Irrespective of the reasoning behind the pronounced shift towards the U.K's 
viewpoint on the part of FRG, Foreign Office sources have suggested that these 
overtures were, up to the point of the actual vote on the IGC, successful. A 
Foreign Office Official in the British delegation to the Milan Council confirmed that 
on the evening prior to the vote, the Germans had indicated their support for British 
opposition to an IGC 
"The Germans had not been very keen on it (an IGC). I remember at the 
Milan Council, there was tremendous rage in the British camp, when we 
thought we'd kept the Germans on-board for opposing the idea of an IGC 
We had always felt that everything that was achieved in the Single Act could 
have been achieved without an IGC We thought when the thing finished at 
dinner on the Friday night (first day of the Council, at which time 
institutional issues were discussed), that it was virtually over, we still had 
the Germans. There must have been an Italian-German meeting after that, 
because by breakfast the next morning Genscher had gone round 180 
degrees, and much to our surprise and rage came down on the side of the 
Italians; and all of a sudden we were saddled with an IGC I will never 
forget Margaret Thatcher's press conference afterwards; she gave an 
absolutely blistering performance ! "23 
Prime Minister Thatcher's post-Milan press conference was indeed something of a 
'tour de force' in which she allowed her 'instincts' full rein. Indeed in describing 
Thatcher's disposition following the Council, her press secretary, Bernard Ingham 
was particularly graphic. 
"She had but one emotion - fury. The Richter Scale ceases to operate when 
it applies to the Prime Minister. It is a total volcanic eruption. Krakatoa 
has nothing on it. "24 
221 
It can be assumed that in Thatcher's scathing references to the 'inconsistency and 
hypocrisy' of 'certain Member States', the West German delegation could count 
themselves included 25. 
In the case of France, evidence of opposition to the convening of a full-blown IGC 
is by no means as hard as the evidence of West German reluctance. It does 
however indicate that France had drawn back significantly from the maximalist 
position Mitterrand had allowed himself to be associated with around the period of 
the Fontainbleau Council. Indeed as indicated 26, Mitterrand's speech to the 
European Parliament of 24-5-84, is, when examined closely, by no means as 
'Europeanist' as is often claimed. Crucially, given the central importance accorded 
to the abolition of the Luxembourg Compromise, Mitterrand in this speech, while 
acknowledging the difficulties caused by the generalised use of the Luxembourg 
Compromise, did not support its abolition, rather he adopted a position which 
resembles very closely the stance of the British. 
"The French Government which was behind this compromise, has already 
proposed that it be used in only in specific cases. The more frequent 
practice of voting on important matters heralds a return to the Treaties. 
..."27 
Notwithstanding the actual content of the speech, Mitterrand entered the lists as 
the champion of the 'Europeanist' cause, an image he readily allowed himself to be 
portrayed. In this, as in the case of Craxi and Andreotti, Mitterrand courted the 
'Europeans' for domestic advantage during a period of internal difficulty. The 
image of Mitterrand the committed 'European' was reinforced somewhat by the 
President's choice of Maurice Faure as his personal representative on the Dooge 
Committee. M . Faure had been a member of the Spaak Committee, a signatory of 
the Treaty of Rome, and was regarded generally as a strong advocate of European 
Union. As expected the 'Europeanist' inclined Faure took the side of the majority 
on the issues of voting in the Council of Ministers and of convening an IGC to 
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negotiate a new Treaty, thus raising expectations of a French lead in the advocacy 
of substantial institutional reform and the negotiation of a new Treaty. 
Such a lead was not to materialise. Indeed one can observe a definite retreat from 
the rhetoric of 'European Union', and a clear attempt on the part of Mitterrand to 
dampen expectations of a great leap forward at Milan. Even prior to the meeting of 
Foreign Ministers at Stresa on 8-9 June 1985, Mitterrand had rejected any 
suggestion that the Luxembourg Compromise should be abolished. In attempting 
to dampen expectations the French adopted what can be described as a strategy of 
deflection and ambiguity, in which they attempted to give the impression that 
although they were enthusiastic 'Europeans', present circumstances and the 
behaviour of other Member States stacked the odds against a spectacular outcome to 
the Milan Council. The 'deflective' aspects of this strategy can perhaps be best 
observed in press statements surrounding a summit meeting between Mitterrand and 
Craxi in Florence 13-14 June 1985, a fortnight prior to the Milan Council, a 
meeting also coinciding with the second German veto. 
"... According to Mr.Vauzelle (Mitterrand's spokesman), France is 
approaching the Milan Summit 'with caution', not wanting to 'arouse great 
hopes' which might not materialise. Milan should however allow a 'major 
step to be taken in the European construction' as 'it seems impossible for us 
today to lower our arms'. But he immediately added that 'it is better to be 
modest in approach rather than fail in a more ambitious approach which 
would be contested by some of our principal partners'."28 
In addition to this deflection and dampening-down of expectation there was in the 
French strategy an ambiguous and non-committal intimation that the French had a 
dramatic proposal which would save the Milan Council from the failure increasingly 
predicted by commentators. Mitterrand following his summit with Craxi, adopting a 
sphinx-like attitude, intimated that he had a surprise in store. 'On the eve of the 
Milan Summit, or during it, I will explain my position and make suggestions.29' 
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Was Mitterrand a sphinx with or without a riddle ? Was there any substance 
behind these intimations ? It is difficult to offer a definite conclusion. There had, 
since late February 1985, been suggestions that the French were on the verge of 
announcing a 'surprising initiative ... which will contribute to changing the 
European institutions.'30 
What this 'surprising initiative' was or would be is unclear. Speculation over the 
content of the impending French initiative exercised the imaginations of the 
European press, prompting reports ranging from the suggestion that Mitterrand 
would call for a Europe-wide referendum on the conclusions of the Dooge Report, 
to the submission of radical proposals in the sphere of defence and security. Thus, 
if nothing else, a mood of expectancy was created. However, it would be difficult 
to suggest that the expectancy was in any way rewarded with definite proposals in 
the following months. Certainly the possible nature of the proposals intimated to be 
imminent by sources close to Mitterrand around the time of the Craxi-Mitterrand 
summit, fall a long way short of being 'surprising'. They are if anything suggestive 
of window-dressing to mask the projected failure of the Milan Council, and an 
indication of French reticence on the issue of an IGC 
"... France is looking for 'possible institutional progress' without having to 
go by a new Treaty. This might mean (according to the AFP which claims 
to have it on good authority) a general political Declaration on Political 
Union, accompanied by limited progress in E.P. powers and probably the 
announcement of a Political Secretariat. "31 
However, something of a surprise was sprung on the very eve of the Milan 
Council, in the form of the Franco-German Draft Treaty of European Union. 
Was this Mitterrand's 'surprising initiative' of February ? I f it was, then it must 
surely have been a grave disappointment to those who had pinned their hopes on 
Mitterrand's Europeanist rhetoric. The Franco-German draft masquerading under 
the misleading title of a Draft Treaty of European Union is little more than a 
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Treaty codifying EPC, and for the most part is virtually identical to the previously 
submitted British Draft Agreement on Political Co-operation 32. 
Two questions arise when confronted with this draft. Firstly, why was it 
submitted so late in the day, and secondly what was the purpose of its submission ? 
In answer to the first question, we are returned to the rift in Franco-German 
relations. This cooling of relations, which although temporary, occurred at a 
crucial juncture with respect to the debate on European Union and the question of 
an IGC, largely accounts for the absence of substantive French and German 
proposals in the period between the Brussels and Milan Councils. The timing of 
this r if t can also lend weight to the view that Mitterrand was indeed on the verge of 
launching an initiative, and also account for its non-arrival. One can speculate that 
the emergence of differences between the French and German Governments shortly 
after Mitterrand's announcement of an impending initiative, resulted in the 
proposals being either abandoned or put on ice. To put forward substantive 
institutional proposals, without the full support of the German Government, 
particularly in view of expected British opposition, would be to guarantee failure. 
Accepting this invites the question; were the proposals in this 'surprising initiative' 
of the same scope and intent as those submitted to the Milan Council ? The Franco-
German draft simply does not strike as a document which has been the subject of 
rigorous examination and debate. Rather the impression is of a hastily thrown 
together set of ideas, some of which may well have been the subject of preliminary 
discussion prior to the breach in Franco-German relations. 
Support for the view that the decision to submit the Franco-German draft was 
almost literally a last-minute decision can be found in the comments of Mitterrand 
following the bilateral summit with Craxi on 13-14 June, suggesting that the rift in 
Franco-German relations was not yet healed. Referring to the German use of the 
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veto, Mitterrand appeared to rule out the possibility of a successful conclusion to 
the Milan Council. 
" I feel that in Milan the Italian Presidency should, under normal 
circumstances, lead us towards progress; this may appear presumptions, 
though, when heels are being dragged in Luxembourg. "33 
Further informed evidence that the Franco-German Draft was a hurried and last-
minute effort is provided by a British official who suggested that the Franco-
German Draft was a consequence of a meeting between Kohl and Mitterrand 
immediately prior to the Milan Council. 
"The French and German initiative was never consulted about within their 
own governments. It was something that cropped-up at a Kohl-Mitterrand 
meeting before Milan. I think one French Official put it forward, and the 
Germans thought it was a good idea. It was done uncharacteristically 
without any serious preparation or thought. It was a silly document, it was 
not thought out at all. "34 
This leads directly to the question of the motivation behind its submission. In this 
respect two differing but connected possible explanations can be broached. Firstly a 
superficially petty explanation can be found in the irritation of finding the British 
occupying the ground normally the preserve of the French and German 
governments. Indeed in this respect British officials had gained the distinct 
impression that the French and German Governments had been wrong-footed by the 
British proposals 35. Secondly, the submission of the Franco-German draft can be 
viewed as a measure on the part of France and FRG to avoid the convening of an 
IGC and the discussion of substantive issues connected with the Treaties, such as the 
Luxembourg Compromise. But retaining their 'Europeanist' credentials behind the 
facade of the grandiose title Treaty of European Union. The evidence is far from 
conclusive. However the indications presented above of the growing reluctance of 
both France and West Germany to tread the maximalist path suggest that this 
assertion is plausible. Indeed according to news agency reports, this interpretation 
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of the intent of the Franco-German draft was, among informed political sources 
quite strongly represented. 
"Political sources are now wondering whether such an initiative might not 
in fact be designed to nip any effective revival of European Union in the bud 
..."36 
Why then, i f both France and FRG were opposed to the convening of an IGC, did 
they support Craxi and vote in favour of an IGC ? The short and perhaps very 
obvious answer to this is that both Kohl and Mitterrand were 'hoisted on the petard' 
of their own pro-European Union rhetoric of the previous months. In this respect, 
and regardless of his motives, Craxi, in pursuit of the stated aim of the Italian 
Presidency, an IGC, outmanoeuvred everyone. 
The great majority of reports on the eve of the Milan Council and indeed 
following the first day of the Council's proceedings were confidently predicting a 
compromise formula more closely aligned to the minimalist position promoted by 
the U.K. It would appear that this compromise would involve immediate agreement 
on the British proposals for decision-making in the Council of Ministers, and an 
agreement to convene an IGC with a strictly defined and limited mandate of 
examining modifications to the existing Treaties, rather than the full-blown 
negotiation of a new Treaty advocated by the maximalist camp. However, it seems 
that agreement on this compromise, which would have the advantage of 'immediate 
decisions' and the fulfilment of the primary aim of the Italian Presidency, an IGC, 
was undermined by the Greek Prime Minister Mr. Papandreou who refused 
absolutely to discuss further institutional reform if the Italian Presidency retained its 
insistence that an IGC be convened. Faced with this threat to the prestige and 
domestic credibility of the Italian Presidency, which had hung its colours very 
firmly to the mast of an IGC, Craxi took the totally unprecedented step of asking 
for a vote on the convening of an IGC 
227 
Thus from a position where it would appear that a limited compromise was likely, 
the agenda of the Council suddenly shifted to the simple question of Yes or No to 
an IGC, at which time the French and German support for 'immediate decisions' 
evaporated. 
In pressing the issue to a vote Craxi was on reasonably safe ground in so far as the 
acquiescence of France and FRG were concerned. Craxi was only too well aware 
that Kohl and Mitterrand were undergoing a period of domestic vulnerability, and 
that both were very sensitive of their 'European' reputations. Thus Mitterrand and 
Kohl had backed themselves into a corner with their own rhetoric, and were very 
simply astute enough not to make common cause with the devil by voting with the 
British, who had for years been the convenient scapegoat for all of Europe's ills, a 
role previously held by the France of de Gaulle. 
While Craxi's tactic was a personal success, the actual mandate of the IGC agreed 
by the Member States (including Britain) under the auspices of the Luxembourg 
Presidency, was in line with the limited and strictly defined compromise on the 
table prior to the vote on the IGC, and also with the broad outline of the Dooge 
Report. It can therefore be argued with some justification that the Howe Plan was 
a relatively successful exercise. Although unsuccessful in its aim of avoiding an 
IGC, it can claim to have played a significant role in re-defining the Community 
agenda towards the minimalist view. Indeed following the Milan Council, work 
began on initiating 'pragmatic' changes to the decision-making procedure in the 
Council of Ministers prior to any conclusions from the IGC 
However, regardless of the actual events, the lasting impression of this period is of 
the U.K, along with Denmark and Greece, marginalised by the vote of the Milan 
Council. Both France and FRG emerged from Milan with their 'European' 
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credentials intact and enhanced, whilst the British had simply reinforced their 
negative image. This in diplomatic terms was unnecessary. Whilst it may be more 
apparent in hindsight, it should have been obvious to the British delegation, given 
their previous contacts with, and the recent actions of Paris and Bonn, that 
irrespective of their actions in voting for an IGC, France and FRG were not in the 
market for the full-scale institutional reform so feared by the British. Indeed once 
down to the real business of negotiation, the positions adopted by the French and 
German negotiators were on the whole very similar to those of the British. Voting 
for an IGC was simply a matter of presentation, of playing the 'European' game of 
perceptions and image. Milan was a lost diplomatic opportunity to remedy the 
generally negative perception of Britain in the Community. 
Although in some respects this chapter may appear to diverge from the main 
themes of the thesis, some attention to the issues discussed above is vital for a 
greater understanding of where the various EPC proposals fi t into the wider context 
of the factors leading to the Single Act negotiations. In this respect this chapter 
offers an interesting insight into the negotiating strategies of the major actors. In so 
far as the various proposals in the sphere of foreign and security policy are 
concerned, one can observe these proposals as negotiating tools to achieve other 
aims. Previous chapters have focussed on the pressures leading to the re-emergence 
of the 'European' defence debate, and the initial attempts to provide an institutional 
framework for this debate. In this brief three-month period we can observe these 
same ideas and proposals employed with the specific aim of avoiding an IGC with 
wide terms of reference and in consequence the avoidance of major institutional 
reforms. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT NEGOTIATIONS 
Having had the 'baby' of the Milan Council thrust upon them in the final act 
of the Italian Presidency, the Luxembourg Presidency set about the business of 
establishing a definite mandate and timetable for the IGC. Meeting in the General 
Council on 22-23 July 1985, the Foreign Ministers unanimously agreed to the 
mandate set before them by the Luxembourg Presidency and formally convened the 
Intergovernmental Conference. Britain and her partners in opposition to the 
convening an IGC were brought on-board with the guarantee that what would be 
negotiated would be revisions to the present Treaties. There would be no new 
Treaty. 
"The Ministers for Foreign Affairs instruct a Working Party to 
prepare its proceedings concerning the revision of the Treaty. Each 
Member State will appoint its representative to the Working Party. 
The Chairman will be designated the President of the Conference." ^ 
This Working Party was in fact made up of the Permanent Representatives 
of the Member States in Brussels and chaired by Mr.Dondelinger, Secretary-
General of the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry. In the usual fashion the Working 
Party became known as the Dondelinger Group. In so far as European Political Co-
operation is concerned the Foreign Ministers instructed EPC's Political Committee 
to draw-up a 'draft treaty', 'on the basis in particular of the Franco-German and 
United Kingdom drafts concerning political co-operation with a view to a common 
foreign and defence policy.'^ 
It is interesting to note that this instruction to the Political Committee was 
given in the context of a decision of the Council of Ministers, within the jurisdiction 
of the Community Treaties, in which EPC had no formal status. Whilst there may 
be an interesting legal point to consider here, the inclusion of EPC in the. 
framework of the IGC can be regarded as something of a 'first-round' victory for 
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the Commission, who in the face of some opposition, had pressed the case for both 
the 'Unicite' of the Treaty and of the Conference. 
" I f there is a genuine desire to move towards European Union, it is 
imperative that the two areas of activity be combined Realistic 
conditions for osmosis between economic, social, financial and 
monetary affairs on the one hand and foreign policy on the other 
must be established I f Community and political co-operation 
activities are to remain in a single institutional framework, it is 
essential that a single conference deal with both."-* 
Thus although the Foreign Ministers had established two distinct and 
separate groups to work through the Conference agenda, their conclusions would be 
considered together by the IGC, which, in its formal guise met at the level of 
Foreign Ministers.^ However, while the Commission was successful in convincing 
the Council of Ministers of the need for a unified Conference, there was 
considerable doubt that the conclusions of the IGC would be embodied in a single 
document. Indeed the form of words found in the EPC aspects of the Single 
European Act would suggest that the Political Committee had worked on the 
assumption that what they were drafting was a conventional, and entirely separate 
Treaty document. 
The Foreign Ministers set themselves the deadline of submitting their 
conclusions to the Luxembourg European Council scheduled for 2-3 December 
1985. Given the range of issues to be discussed by the Conference, in particular the 
issues within purview of the Dondelinger Group the IGC would need to set a 
cracking pace in order to complete its work. But in the context of the issues to be 
discussed by the Political Committee, which also included the text of Title One of 
the Single European Act, there was less need for intense and fevered discussion. 
According to one participant,^ the Political Committee, whilst focussing their 
efforts on the task of formulating a Draft treaty did not need to convene specific 
meetings to discuss the Treaty texts under consideration. The work on what was to 
become Title 3 of the Single European Act took place largely within the confines of 
the regular monthly meetings of the Political Committee. In addition there were the 
normal ad hoc meetings of the Political Committee that would take place in the 
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margins of other meetings at which the Political Directors were present such as the 
quarterly meetings of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. There would also be 
regular bilateral contact between the various Political Directors via telephone and by 
personal visits to the various capitals, usually undertaken by the Political Director of 
the current Presidency team. 
The reason for this lack of urgency among the Political Committee was very 
simply that most of the spade-work in this area had been done in the form of the 
U.K. and Franco-German drafts on Political Co-operation. What remained was to 
discuss and resolve the areas of difference in what (with one notable exception) 
were very similar texts. 
Forming as they do the basis of negotiation for the final provisions of Title 3 
it is necessary therefore to examine the texts in question, the British Draft 
Agreement on Political Co-operation and the Franco-German Draft treaty of 
European Union. Given the great similarity between the two texts it would be 
unnecessarily repetitive to examine both drafts article by article, this examination 
will therefore focus on the British draft agreement and will then proceed to draw out 
the major points of textual difference between this draft and the Franco-German 
draft. 
The Draft Agreement on Political Co-operation 
The Draft Agreement on Political Co-operation was submitted to the 
meeting of Community Foreign Ministers at Stresa on 8-9 June 1985. Although a 
self-contained text it formed part of the Howe Plan, a package of British proposals 
which had as its underlying objective, forestalling the convening of a IGC, which it 
was feared would lead to radical and unnecessary institutional reform. However, 
regardless of the underlying aim of the Howe Plan, the Draft Agreement on 
Political Co-operation was generally regarded as providing a firm basis for 
discussion. 
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Although the text is not designated a 'draft Treaty', the document is 
presented in the traditional Treaty format, containing a Preamble, nine Articles and 
three Annexes. The reasoning behind the reluctance to give their document treaty 
status can be attributed to the wish on the part of the British to avoid the trials and 
tribulations of ratifying a 'European' treaty in Parliament, as in the case of the 1983 
Solemn Declaration on European Union, though as Nuttall has pointed out, this 
would not have been the case for all Member States had the Draft "Agreement 
remained an 'Agreement'.^ In addition the Foreign Office in formulating the 
document had in their calculations to take into account the limits of what Prime-
Minister Thatcher would find acceptable. It should also be recognised that the 
avoidance of legally binding ties in favour of a pragmatic approach, forms an 
integral part of Foreign Office and British constitutional practice in general. Indeed 
this is an aspect of the British position recognised by Ripa di Meana in attempting to 
persuade the U.K. to accept the necessity of binding institutional change. 
" . . . in this country (the U.K. ) politics do not so much concentrate on 
the desirable than on the necessary. It is my intention to show that 
the gap between the desirable and the necessary is narrower than 
people think." 
Regardless of the traditions of British political culture, the events of Milan 
and the mandate of the Luxembourg presidency had placed the British in what at the 
outset had been the situation they had sought to avoid, that of participation in an 
IGC. Though paradoxically, particularly in the case of EPC, they found 
themselves in a position of unaccustomed strength in the context of European 
negotiations, that is to say, negotiating a draft Treaty based largely upon their own 
Draft Agreement. 
In content the Draft Agreement on Political Co-operation contains no 
surprises; it is not by any stretch of the imagination a radical document. It is, with 
one notable exception, a codification of the accumulated rules and practices of 
European Political Co-operation. The issues surrounding the question of EPC 
Q 
codification have of course been examined above. However, in the context of this 
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debate, given that the pragmatic approach advocated by Mr Moller was also closely 
associated with, and advocated by the British, it is relevant to question whether or 
not the decision to submit the Draft Agreement on Political Co-operation represents 
a reversal of the British position on the approach to Political Co-operation. 
Notwithstanding the pressing need to present a more positive profile of 
Britain in the Community, the justification and aim of the codifying exercise was, 
according to British Officials, not to set EPC in stone but rather to provide a basis 
for further development.^ Indeed any lengthy discussion with British participants in 
the framework of Political Co-operation invariably reveals a genuine commitment 
and attachment to the process of European Political Co-operation. 
"EPC is a very useful process. One that journalists never 
understood, because it did not come out with dramatic new 
proposals; Europe was not out there threatening to send planes to 
bomb Libya or wherever, that was all left to the Americans! They 
(the press) felt that things like the Venice Declaration on the Middle 
East were just pieces of paper; but what they never saw was the real 
work of EPC. ...and for those of us involved, we attached a great 
deal of importance to the process. I felt that it was making a quite 
significant contribution to one of the original objectives of the British 
in joining the Community; and that was to find a way of expressing 
Europe's collective interests in an effective way, and although there 
were lots of areas we did not cover, defence for instance, there were 
some areas where EPC was quite something."^ 
Thus whilst the decision of the British Government to submit proposals to 
codify EPC was based to a large extent on an attempt to head-off the possibility of 
an IGC, the British commitment to the flexibility of the EPC process remained 
strong. As the examination of the Draft Agreement will show, there was no attempt 
to close-off the capacity of EPC to do 'something that it makes sense to do'. The 
alternative side of this lack of restriction can also be viewed as means of ensuring 
that the capacity of Member States to act independently of their partners in EPC 
remained unimpaired. Indeed in submitting the draft for Prime Minister Thatcher's 
approval, retaining this capacity was regarded as essential if the document was to 
gain the Prime-ministerial nod! 
"We were very much constrained by what Margaret Thatcher would 
live with, and she would live with very little ! The draft that we put 
forward to her was sold to her on the basis that it did not actually add 
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anything to what had been done already; it simply formalised it, and 
she was prepared to live with that. I f it had added to any significant 
degree of co-operation, or an additional role for the Commission, or 
a constraint on Britain's foreign policy dealings she would not have 
agreed." 
It can therefore be suggested that what was presented in the Draft Agreement 
on Political Co-operation was not the desirable nor the necessary, but rather the 
acceptable. 
The Text of the Draft Agreement 
Article One outlines the objectives of the agreement and thus the objectives 
of EPC. What is immediately apparent is the continued reticence of the British to 
make definite and binding long-term commitments in this area. While many take 
the view, and indeed many documents support the view, that the long-term 
objective of EPC is to create a common foreign policy, this document fails even to 
contemplate the possibility of such an outcome, confining itself to the objectives of 
'...regular consultations and exchanges of information... the alignment of their 
positions and particularly joint action.'^^ 
Although joint action may suggest the possibility of a common policy it still 
falls short of such an aim and in reality simply conformed to the then current 
practice of EPC, thereby confirming the document as a consolidation and 
codification exercise. In addition it can also be seen to be something of a retreat 
from the objective of the 'systematic formulation and implementation of a common 
external po l i cy ' ag reed by the majority of the Dooge Committee including Prime-
Minister Thatcher's personal representative, Mr Rifkind. 
However i f we are to locate the source of this hesitancy on the part of the 
British draft, we are again returned to their difficulty of the acceptability of the text 
to Prime Minister Thatcher, of what the P.M 'would wear'. In this case it would 
appear that the Prime Minister simply would not wear such a clearly stated 
objective. Indeed it was confirmed that the wording of the objective of EPC in the 
Title 3 of the Single European Act was a particularly difficult aspect of the 
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negotiation and also the last issue to be resolved. Central to this difficulty was 
Prime Minister Thatcher's strident opposition to the formulations proposed by other 
Member States, which in the view of Thatcher suggested a level of commitment and 
constraint Britain was not prepared to accept. 
Article Two is a four-part article outlining the areas in which EPC should 
operate. Again these 'areas of activity' are nothing more than a consolidation of 
EPC rules and practices, the most notable aspect in the context of this thesis being 
the commitment to 'consult on all important questions of Foreign Policy including 
the political and economic aspects of security'. 
This in itself was by no means a breakthrough. The commitment to consult 
on the 'political aspects of security' having being made in the London Report of 
1981, followed very quickly by the commitment to extend this to the 'political and 
economic aspects of security' in the 1983 Solenm Declaration on European 
Union. However, this aspect of Article Two should be read in conjunction with 
Article Eight which deals with the specifics and extent of this commitment. In 
essence Article Eight is a distillation of the recommendations of the Dooge 
Committee's report in the sphere of defence and security. 
Given the absence of any reservations to this aspect of the Dooge Report on 
the part of Mr Rifkind, it can be therefore be suggested that its recommendations 
represent a reasonably accurate reflection of the extent to which the British were 
prepared to travel on the defence and security road. Thus the lack of ambition and 
innovation evident in Article Two cannot be attributed to British reluctance to 
address this issue, but rather is a reflection and recognition of the difficulties 
presented by the 'foot-note countries'. Article Eight thus presents the possibility of 
an escape route for those Member States prepared to move beyond the restrictive 
formula of the 'political and economic aspects of security'. 
"The Member States agree that closer co-operation on security 
matters is an essential component of the effort to develop Europe's 
external political identity. The aim of such co-operation shall be to 
maximise the contribution which Member States can make to the 
objectives of the organisations specifically established to guarantee 
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Western Security, in particular the Ijtorth Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation and Western European Union. 
Although not explicit, the inference that can be gleaned from this paragraph 
is the possibility of employing other institutional frameworks for the realisation of 
'European' defence and security ambitions. Thus, by virtue of WEU's reactivation, 
the divisive potential contained in the defence and security issue can be seen to have 
been neutralised. Indeed, as argued above^^ the WEU's reactivation was in many 
respects a direct consequence of the frustration of the majority of Member States at 
their inability to widen the remit of EPC beyond the 'political and economic aspects 
of security' in the face of the resistance of the 'footnote countries'. However, in 
keeping with the U.K.'s strong attachment to NATO and the Atlantic Alliance, any 
intensification of security co-operation is subordinated to the overarching presence 
of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Article Three is an extremely brief article subordinating the work of EPC to 
the European Council and may be accorded the character of an 'iceberg'. Its bulk 
lay below the surface in the form of the referral to Annexes. 
"The work of European Political Co-operation shall be carried out 
under the general guidance of the European Council. The structure is 
set out in Aroexes 1 and 2, which may be amended by unanimous 
agreement. 
Annexes One and Two are actually of equal length to that of the nine 
Articles of the Draft Agreement. Annex One under the self-explanatory heading; 
The Structure of Political Co-operation is a nine-paragraph section outlining the 
mechanics of the Co-operation machinery. Paragraphs A to F are simply a re-
statement of the then current procedures of EPC, and can be located in the various 
EPC reports. For example, paragraph C outlining the frequency of Foreign 
Ministers' meetings'^ ^ has its antecedents in the 1973 Copenhagen Report. 
"Henceforth, the Foreign Ministers will meet four times a year. 
They may also, whenever they consider it necessary to consult each 
other on specific subjects between meetings, meet for Jiiat purpose 
when they happen to come together on other occasions. '"^^ 
In the context of this thesis the most notable aspects are found in paragraphs 
G and H of Annex One. 
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" The Presidency shall be assisted by a small Secretariat based in the 
main place of work of the Communities. The office space and 
services shall be provided by arrangement with the Council 
Secretariat. The Head of the Secretariat shall be appointed by 
agreement among the Member States." 
In providing for the creation of a Permanent Secretariat the Draft 
Agreement returns to one of the most contentious and sensitive areas of the whole 
'European Union' debate. The formulators of the Draft Agreement were of course 
well aware of the sensitivity of the issue in question, and were at pains to ensure 
that their intentions in proposing a Permanent Secretariat were not misunderstood. 
Indeed the specific reference to a 'small secretariat based at the main place of work 
of the Communities', was deliberately designed to deflect two of the issues, size 
and location, which were to re-emerge with the submission of the Franco-German 
draft treaty. In addition. Annex Two entitled The Functions of the PoUtical Co-
operation Secretariat makes it abundantly clear that the structure proposed would 
be a purely subordinate body, whose task would be to provide little more than 
administrative support. 
"The Secretariat shall: 
(a) Advise the Presidency as necessary of the conduct of Political Co-
operation, in particular on maintaining coherence between the 
external policies of the Communities and the policies agreed in 
European Political Co-operation; (b) provide support for Political 
Co-operation meetings - including as necessary the preparation of 
texts, keeping of records and preparation of conclusions; (c) assist the 
Presidency in the preparation of texts to be issued on behalf of the 
Member States including replies to European Parliament questions; 
(d) keep a Political Co-operation archive; (e) prepare, and update as 
necessary, ^  full codification of Political Co- operation rules and 
practices." 
In mapping out the role and function of the Secretariat the Draft Agreement 
rests on reasonably secure ground, and simply reflects and amplifies the majority 
viewpoint found in the report of the Dooge Committee. Thus once again the 
Dooge report finds itself as the most useful of reference points for any study of the 
Single European Act and of the negotiating positions of the Member States. 
Negative reaction to the British proposal for a Permanent Secretariat was 
limited, and largely confined to the President of the European Commission, who 
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saw in the British proposal for a Permanent Secretariat a potential rival to the 
Commission, precisely the argument used during the Fouchet period in opposition 
to the proposals for a Political Commission. 
"We refuse a Community of two pillars, one economic and the other 
political, for one cannot separate the two aspects, or reduce the 
Commission's role in external commercial policy or create 
institutional rivalry. The creation of a second pillar would be a 
fundamental mistake; the Commission as a whole is opposed to it. I f 
one needs a secretariat for political co-operation, it must be entrusted 
to the European Commission itself,^which will know how to exercise 
it with discretion and competence." " 
It should perhaps be noted that the comments of the Commission President 
were made prior to the submission of the Franco-German Draft Treaty on PoUtical 
Union. Following the submission of the Franco-German draft which contained 
proposals for a large and active Political Secretariat, those involved in the IGC 
report little or no objection from the Commission to a secretariat based on the 
British model.-^ "^ 
In respect of the major themes pursued throughout this thesis there is little 
else of note contained within the text of the Draft Agreement on Political Co-
operation. With respect to what could be described as one of the secondary themes 
pursued throughout this thesis, that of the status of the Commission in the Political 
Co-operation framework. Article Four appears to reduce the status of the 
Commission within EPC. 
unless in any particular case all Members agree to the contrary, 
the Commission shall be invited to all meetings of Political Co-
operation. "^° 
Although it may be regarded as a relatively minor point to make, the fact 
that since the 1981 London Report, the Commission had attended all meetings of 
EPC as of right, this apparently positive proposal represents a diminution of the 
Commission's status, containing as it does the possibility of exclusion from 
meetings of Political Co-operation. This perhaps reflects Prime Minister Thatcher's 
antipathy towards the Commission, as an institution which should at every turn be 
curtailed, and undermined. 
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All-in-all, the Draft Agreement on Political Co-operation is a truly 
unremarkable and uncontroversial document, it does not in any sense purport to be 
anything other than a codification exercise. The same cannot be said of the Franco-
German document accompanying the U.K. 's Draft Agreement to the IGC 
The Draft Treaty on European Union 
Presented on the very eve of the Milan European Council, the Franco-
German Draft Treaty on European Union was the surprise package of the 
Council, and also the source of great anger and suspicion. These reactions were 
based largely on the timing of the submission and of its content. The speculation 
surrounding the timing of the submission has been discussed elsewhere,^^ what 
follows is an examination of the relevant content of the proposals. 
The first point to make is the discrepancy between its title and content. 
Styling itself a Draft treaty on European Union, and employing the aspirational 
language so often associated with Community documents, the Preamble of the 
Franco-German document attempts to place itself on the same footing as the 
Community Treaties and offers the impression that what is to follow is an all-
embracing Treaty of European Union. 
" - moved by the will to continue the work begun on the basis of the 
Treaties setting up the Communities and to transform without delay 
the whole of the relations among their States into a European Union, 
...resolved to implement European Union through, on the one hand, 
the European Communities operating through their own rules and, on 
the other hand. Political Co-operation among the States^  Signatory, 
and to provide it with the necessary means of action,..."-'^ 
The fiction of an all-embracing document is however very swiftly shattered 
in Article 1 of the Treaty proper in which a much more limited objective is sought, 
that of 'the progressive implementation of a European foreign policy'.-^^ Indeed 
in reaction to the submission of the Franco-German document, British spokesmen 
were at pains to allege that '90% of it was taken from the British proposal on 
Political Co-operation'.-^^ 
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It was also pointed out by British spokesmen that, in some areas such as the 
voting procedure in the U.N. , the British Draft Agreement was more ambitious 
than the proposals of the Franco-German document. 
On first impressions Article One appears to be an area where, in comparison 
to the U.K. draft, one could identify a more positive and forward-looking approach 
to the long-term aims of EPC. The use of the phrase 'European foreign policy' 
when compared to the circuitous phraseology of the U.K. draft's objectives of 
'regular consultations and exchanges of information etc',-^ -^  immediately sets an 
aspirational tone. Whilst it can be accepted that the tone of a document such as this 
can in some respects be as vital as the content, it should also be recognised that in 
the context of Community-related documents, a great deal of energy is often 
expended in pursuit of a phraseology acceptable to all Member States, resulting in a 
situation in which very often, ambiguity is all. 
In this respect the phrase 'European foreign policy' is a case in point. It can 
be taken to mean everything and nothing. Does it imply the pursuit and 
implementation of common policy, common positions, joint action, common action 
etc? Article 2 holds the answer to this question in a form of words which in effect 
places the aspirations of the nascent 'European Union' on the same level as the 
commitments made by Article 1 of the U.K draft, that is to say joint action and 
common positions. 
" 1 . The Signatories undertake : - to consult and inform each other on 
a regular basis on all important questions of foreign policy of 
importance to them all. - to achieve among themselves a wide 
identity of points of view and to harmonise their positions with a 
view to joint actions in international relations. 2.- Such 
consultations will take place before the signatories take up their final 
position. 3.- The fixing of common positions will constitute a 
reference point for their policies. In order to widen this area of 
activity, they will continue to identify progressively the principles, 
interests and objectives they have in common. "^^ 
The pursuit of a Common foreign policy does not appear at this stage to be 
on the Franco-German agenda. 
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Article Eight is a four-paragraph article dealing with security issues, and 
covers much the same ground as the corresponding Article in the U.K. draft. In 
some respects this Article is more restrained than its U.K. counterpart, while in 
others it makes explicit the implicit intimations of the U.K. draft. In this respect 
the most relevant aspects are the references to the WEU. Whereas the U.K. draft 
identifies NATO and WEU as the appropriate bodies for European security co-
operation, intimating in a rather heavy-handed manner that EPC's potential role in 
this sphere has become peripheral and secondary as a consequence of the objections 
of the 'footnote' countries, the Franco-German draft explicitly creates the 
possibility, in the security sphere, of the development of a two-speed Europe or 
Europe of variable geometry, providing that... 
"Those Signatories who wish to co-operate more closely in the field 
of security will do so in the Western European Union, respecting the 
r o l ^ ^ f the Alliance and their specific situation and strategies within 
Although paragraph 3 of this same article opens the future possibility of 
extending security co-operation beyond the confines of WEU and of extending its 
present membership, this represents a clear signal of French and German impatience 
with the limitations of EPC and of their preparedness to abandon EPC as the 
preferred vehicle for the further development of 'European' defence ambitions. 
Article Ten, along with Article 11, provides by far the most contentious 
aspect of the Franco-German draft, the creation of a Secretariat-General under the 
direction of a Secretary-General. 
"The Presidency of Political Co-operation will be held by the 
Signatory State which holds the Presidency of the Communities. It 
will be assisted by a Secretaxiat-General of the Council of the 
European Union^rmanently installed in the main place of work of 
the Community."^ 
Although the U.K. draft and the Dooge Report both propose the creation of 
a Permanent Secretariat, their proposals are clearly intended to ensure that any 
Secretariat is restricted to a purely supportive, administrative role, and crucially 
under the control of EPC. Fully aware of the sensitivity of this issue, the U.K. 
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draft consigned the proposals for the Permanent Secretariat to the confines of an 
Annex of the Draft Agreement proper, thus denying the Secretariat any sense of 
independent institutional status. The Franco-German draft, however, places the 
status of the Secretariat on an entirely different footing. While the Secretariat of the 
U.K. draft can be seen to be a creature of EPC, the Secretary-General of the 
Franco-German draft enjoys the status of being the Secretariat-General of the re-
named European Council; the 'Council of the European Union'. While it 
recognised that the draft provides that the Secretariat-General will be under the 
direction of a Secretariat-General, specifically charged with responsibilities to 
EPC^^ the potential for the expansion of the role and function of the Secretariat-
General is evident. Suspicion that such an expansion was in the minds of the 
formulators of the Franco-German draft, was to an extent borne out in the 
submission by the French of an Act of European Union at the November meeting 
of the IGC, a draft which in consolidating EPC and the Community Treaties 
provided that... 
"The Council of the European Union shall be assisted, in as,far as 
necessary by a Secretariat (executive, permanent, general)...."-^^ 
The fate of the French project for a European Union will be discussed 
below. However, while the form of Secretariat proposed by the French Act of 
Union can be traced to its predecessor, the Franco-German Draft Treaty on 
European Union, the antecedents of the Secretariat-General and its accompanying 
Secretary-General are located very firmly in the Fouchet proposals of 1961-62. 
The 'Secretariat-General of the Council of the European Union' had its 
direct counterpart in the Fouchet proposal for the creation of the institution of a 
'European Political Commission'. Although the status of the Political Commission 
within the institutional frameworks outlined by the various Fouchet Plans was the 
subject of slight variation, there is little doubt that the Secretariat-General of the 
Franco-German draft bears the mark of Fouchet.-^^ It is notable however that the 
inclusion of the office of Secretary-General in the draft Treaty proposed by the 
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'Five' was of German origin, and was very strongly opposed by the French 
delegation, whilst the delegations of the Netherlands and Luxembourg preferred not 
to commit themselves either way on the question of a Secretary-General, a point 
made clear in the explanatory report accompanying the final Joint Draft of the 
Fouchet Committee.^^ 
However, to return to the Franco-German Draft Treaty on European 
Union: although not given the specific guarantees of independence outlined by the 
draft of the 'Five' in the Fouchet negotiations^^ the status of the Secretary-General 
proposed by the Franco-German draft did accord the Secretary-General a potentially 
high p r o f i l e . T h o u g h it is unclear whether or not the office of Secretary-General 
would be allowed to develop a significant autonomous executive role or whether it 
would simply be a figure-head which remained the creature of the Council of the 
European Union. 
In proposing the creation of an overarching Secretariat , the Franco-German 
draft had once again raised the spectre of Fouchet and with it the objections that had 
accompanied the proposals for a Political Commission. These objections had 
centred around fears for the rights and jurisdictions of the Community institutions, 
in particular the European Commission.'^•^ In this respect, and basing his 
opposition on the threat to the 'unity of the institutions' the President of the 
European Commission, Jacques Delors, was at the forefront of opposition to the 
proposals, using every opportunity to voice his concerns, which were initially 
directed towards the British proposal for a small Permanent Secretariat, and were 
intensified on the submission of the Franco-German proposals. 
"...we arrived in Milan with the idea of maintaining the unity of the 
institutions; hence our hostility to any political secretariat outside the 
existing Community institutions. Why ? Not out of any petty 
jealousy of our perogatives but simply because it was necessary to 
avoid two risks in future: the first is the possibility of a clash between 
two institutions which had to draw a line, on what basis I know not, 
between on the one hand economic and social matters, and on the 
other hand, political issues; the second risk is that one day, if 
agreement could not be reached on how the Community should be 
developed, some States might be tempted - as they already have been 
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- to opt for political co-operation instead of dealing with the real 
problems of the Community." 
Although virtually alone in his blanket opposition to the creation of any form 
of permanent administrative support for EPC, in so far as opposition to the 
Secretariat-General of the Franco-German draft is concerned, Delors could count 
himself, and the Commission, in the majority camp, indeed there was universal 
opposition to the Franco-German proposals in this area, confirming the continuing 
sensitivity of this particular issue. 
As for the remaining Articles of the Franco-German Draft Treaty on 
European Union there is little to note. They amount to a codification of the rules 
and practices of EPC, and with the exception of the Secretariat proposals differ only 
in minor textual variations from the British Draft Agreement on Political Co-
operation. Thus the discussions of the Political Committee in the context of the 
IGC would inevitably revolve around a limited number of issues; the objectives of 
EPC, the security mandate of EPC and the creation of a Secretariat. Indeed even 
within the context of these issues there was really only one substantive issue, that 
of the Secretariat, the other two being a question of gaining agreement on the 
particular wording of the final proposals. 
In addition to the British and Franco-German drafts there were two other 
submissions for the Political Committee to consider. The first of which was 
submitted by the Dutch on 26 July 1985, the second an Italian draft was presented 
on 13 September 1985. Both texts are presented in draft treaty form, and are in 
effect revised and amended versions of the U.K. and Franco-German drafts. Below 
are the textual details of the relevant articles. 
Article One of the Dutch draft, in stating the aims of EPC, employs the text 
of the Dooge Report 'The objective of EPC must be the gradual implementation of 
a common external p o l i c y ' . A r t i c l e One of the Italian draft meanwhile, calls for 
'the systematic formulation and implementation of a common foreign policy'. 
Thus both texts, though not radical departures, are a little more adventurous and 
more specific than their U.K. and Franco-German counterparts. 
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Article Eight deals with the security mandate of EPC. Both the Dutch and 
Italian versions of this article rely heavily on the text of the Franco-German draft 
with a number of additions which serve to strengthen the commitment to security 
co-operation. The Dutch draft in particular is almost identical to the Franco-
German draft, the only difference of note being the omission of the reference to the 
'political and economic aspects of security'. The Dutch draft replaces this reference 
with a general commitment to 'Increase co-ordination of their positions in the field 
of s e c u r i t y r a t h e r than the restrictive formula of the Stuttgart Declaration. 
The Italian version of Article 8, again using the Franco-German text as its 
base offers a more detailed outline of the commitment to security co- operation, 
encompassing elements of the recommendations of the Dooge Report and the Rome 
Declaration. However, while the Italian draft's proposals in this area are more 
detailed than the corresponding articles of the other drafts under consideration, it 
does not in any sense depart from the overall emphasis of closer security co-
operation and the possibility of employing 'other forums' to pursue European 
security ambitions. 
On the crucial and sensitive issue of a Permanent Secretariat, the Dutch draft 
deals with these aspects in an Article 10, while the Italian draft employs the British 
formula of Annexes oudining the 'Structure of Political Co-operation' and the 
'Duties of the Secretariat of Political Co- operation'. Although the Dutch draft 
uses the text proper to deal with this issue it in no sense replicates the proposals of 
the Franco-German draft. In a four-paragraph article outlining the structure of 
Political Co-operation, a single short paragraph is given over to the provision of a 
purely administrative permanent secretariat. Leaning heavily on the circumspect 
proposals of the Dooge Report and the U.K. draft, the Dutch text is arguably even 
more tentative, thus reflecting the long-standing Dutch suspicion of a political 
secretariat. 
"A Secretariat, based in the main place of work of the Communities, 
shall assist the Presidency on administrative matters and the 
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preparation and implern^tation of the political work of European 
Political Co-operation. "^^ 
In the case of the Italian draft, the Annexes dealing with the form and 
functions of the Secretariat are almost identical to those found in the British draft. 
In Annex 1 'The Structure of Political Co-operation', the only difference in respect 
of the Secretariat is a slight elaboration of the mandate of the Head of the 
Secretariat and of the size and form of the Secretariat. 
"...he (Secretary-General) will have a mandate for... number of 
years. The core group of officials of the Secretariat will be 
composed by the Troika of Political Co-operation extended to five 
Presidencies." 
Similarly the only change made to Annex 2 of the British draft by the Italian 
version is a slight elaboration of paragraph A on the issue of coherence and reflects 
the Italian pre-occupation with enhancing the role of the Community institutions vis-
a-vis EPC. 
"It will (the Secretariat) ... ensure close co-operation with the 
Commission and the European Parliament, as well as links with the 
Council Secretariat in relation to European Political Co-operation."-'^ 
With respect to the status of the European Commission in EPC, the Dutch 
draft deals with this in Article 3 stating simply that, 'the Commission will take part 
in the proceedings of Political Co-operation'.^^ 
The Italian draft covers the status of the Commission in Article 4 dealing 
with coherence between the external policies of the Community and the policies 
established in EPC, as do the British and Franco-German drafts. Again the Italian 
draft differs only in its elaboration of the relationship between the two areas, rather 
than in any substantive difference with either the U.K. and Franco-German texts. 
Thus with four very similar drafts before them, excepting of course the 
highly contentious aspects of the Franco-German draft, the bulk of the Political 
Committee's work in the context of the IGC had been done. What remained was 
largely a question of ironing out the textual nuances in a form acceptable to the 
more pedantic of the Member States, and of course, resolving the thorny issue of 
the size and nature of a Secretariat. 
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Within the context of the deliberations of the Political Committee it would 
appear that the most active and influential participants were also those who had 
made prior submissions to the IGC; the UK, France, ERG, Italy and the 
Netherlands. Indeed in this aspect of the IGC negotiations it is arguable that the 
British were the most influential participants. This can be attributed to the U.K. 
finding itself in that most unusual situation, of leading the majority view in 
opposition to particular aspects of Franco-German, and later to French proposals, 
which were anathema to the great majority of Member States and to the 
Commission. Indeed British officials involved in the negotiations confirm that their 
efforts in the negotiations were directed towards steering the discussions away from 
what they regarded as rather outlandish and ill-conceived proposals. 
"What we kept trying to do on the British side was to bring 
discussion back to what seemed a realistic basis, which for us was 
our own Treaty. And in fact the final version of Title 3 was not very 
far distant from our original draft. That was parriy due to the fact 
that when we were in the chair we were able to steer things away 
from other undesirable Treaties."'' 
Whilst one can agree that the final version of Title 3 does resemble very 
closely the British Draft Agreement on Political Co-operation, it must be 
recognised that the perceived ability of the U.K. delegation to steer the negotiations 
towards the British viewpoint on certain issues was by no means an uphill struggle, 
they were for the most part attempting to convert the converted. One need only 
look to the Dutch and Italian drafts for confirmation of this. In addition Denmark 
and Greece were said by British officials to have played a very useful 'negative' 
role, in so far as their reluctance to consider any extension of EPC's mandate let 
alone support the creation of a large overarching secretariat, led them to stubbornly 
oppose any radical proposals for EPC,^^ thus leaving the Franco-German proposals 
for a Political Secretariat isolated. 
Notwithstanding Franco-German isolation on the question of a Secretariat 
the Draft Treaty on Political Co-operation presented to the formal meeting of the 
IGC, on 19th November 1985 can, on the major issues discussed, be said to reflect 
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the weight of opinion found in all four drafts submitted to the IGC for 
consideration. 
In considering the wording of Article 1, the Committee had four variations 
from which to choose. Ranging from the rather woolly British commitment to 
'regular consultations and exchanges of information ...the alignment of their 
positions and particularly, joint action' at one end of the scale, to the more 
forthright and ambitious Italian objective of, 'the systematic formulation and 
implementation of a common foreign policy' at the other. The difficulty over the 
wording of this aspect of the November draft is reflected in the decision to submit 
an intermediate, compromise position. Opinion, as expressed in the four drafts 
clearly favoured a clear statement of objective, or at least the impression of clarity. 
This immediately ruled out the rambling British version as a feasible option. 
Equally the implications of the Italian 'common foreign policy' and the Dutch 
'common external policy' were unacceptable to the majority. Thus the decision 
was taken, in typical Community fashion, to use the ambiguous Franco-German 
wording of a 'European foreign policy', with the added option of the Dutch text's 
'external'. 
"The High Contracting Parties, members of the European 
Communities, set out as their objective the formulation^nd 
implementation together of a European external/foreign policy." 
Although this was to become something of a difficult issue, due mainly to 
the reservations of Prime Minister Thatcher (the Danish and Greek participants also 
had difficulties in this respect), the similarity of the November Draft to the 
corresponding article in Title 3 is demonstrative of the Political Directors' 
familiarity with the limits and restrictions placed upon their counterparts. The 
frequency of meetings between Political Directors either in the monthly meetings of 
the Political Committee of EPC or in the margins of other Community-related 
meetings is regarded by its participants as one of the greatest assets of the Political 
Co-operation framework. As a consequence the Political Directors have gained an 
intimate knowledge and appreciation of the aspirations and constraints of the their 
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partners. In this respect the negotiation of what was to become Tide 3 was no 
different. ^ '^ 
Evidence of the almost entirely symbolic nature of the dispute over the 
precise phrasing of Article 1, can be observed in Article 2 which deals with the 
actual level of the commitment of Member States within the context of EPC. The 
result was a text which is a combination of all four submissions, and which in effect 
did not add substantively to the current level of commitment to EPC. It was simply 
a codification and consolidation of current practice and the limits of their 
aspirations. 
"The High Contracting Parties shall undertake (to provide solidarity 
in all areas covered by the present Treaty) to mutually inform and 
consult each other on all foreign policy matters of general interest in 
order to ensure that they can exercise their combined influence in the 
most effective manner, through consultation, convergence of their 
positions and the undertaking of joint action. Consultations shall take 
place before the High Contracting Parties decide on definitive 
positions. Each High Contracting Party ... shall fully take into 
account the positions of other partners, and duly consider the value of 
adopting and putting into practice joint European positions. ... 
Determining joint positions shall constitute a point of reference for 
the High Contracting Parties. ... "-'^ 
Given the record of opposition and obstruction to the development of EPC's 
security mandate among a number of Member States and the equal determination of 
other Member States to develop a 'European' security identity, most recently 
evident in the report of the Dooge Committee, one might well have expected the 
agreement of a joint text in this area to be one of the most difficult of hurdles to 
overcome. This however, was not the case. Agreement of the text of Article 8, 
was achieved with relative ease. Article 8, which is a three-paragraph Article, is 
based on the Franco-German text, which was also largely taken up by both the 
Dutch and Italian drafts. 
" 1. The High Contracting Parties believe that closer co-operation on 
European security questions is such as to make an essential 
contribution to the development of Europe's foreign policy identity. 
They are prepared to co-ordinate their positions to a greater extent on 
the political and economic aspects of security. 
2.The High Contracting Parties are resolved to preserve the 
technological and industrial conditions necessary to their security. 
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They are striving for this purpose both at national level, and, where 
indicated in the relevant institutions and bodies, including the 
European Economic Community. 3. The provisions of the present 
Treaty are not an obstacle to the existence of closer security co-
operation between certain High Contr^ting Parties in the Western 
European Union and Atlantic Alliance."''^ 
Agreement on this particular version of Article 8 presented no great 
problems for the British, who in the corresponding article of the U.K. Draft 
Agreement had expressed very similar aims in respect of increased security co-
operation. The difference between the U.K. version of this article and the version 
found in the Franco-German draft lies mainly in the clarity with which the aims are 
expressed. This is particularly the case in respect of the paragraph 3 allowing for 
security co-operation in WEU and the Alliance. It was therefore possible for the 
British to bend to the will of the majority without actually adjusting their basic 
position on security co-operation. Indeed in accepting the Franco-German based 
form of wording, the British were able to effect a slight change of emphasis to 
paragraph 3. The Franco-German draft (para 2 art 8), while recognising the status 
of the Atlantic Alliance, emphasised the possibility of closer security co-operation 
in WEU. The version submitted by the Political Committee removes this emphasis, 
thus recognising British sensitivity over the status of the Alliance. 
In explaining the absence of the spirited objections by the 'footnote counties' 
that had become the norm in this issue one can point to two differing but 
complementary developments. Firstly, as suggested above, one could argue that 
those Member States in favour of increased security co-operation had given up the 
EPC framework as a lost cause. In this respect, although all four submissions to the 
IGC offer the impression of forward movement they do not commit the EPC 
framework to move beyond the Stuttgart formula, realising that to go beyond this 
restrictive formula was to invite the objections of the footnote countries. Thus the 
references to the reactivated WEU sidestep direct confrontation over this issue by 
providing a possible escape route for those Member States who were willing and 
able to increase security co-operation. 
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Secondly the inclusion of the references to the WEU in the draft submissions 
to the Political Committee, can be regarded as a clear indication that the majority 
would no longer be frustrated by the reservations of three of the Community's 
smallest Member States. The implied threat within the various drafts was the 
promotion of WEU as the primary focus for foreign policy co-operation among the 
Member States. Thus by implication the devaluation of the EPC framework and 
with it the increased international influence realised by the smaller Member States 
as a consequence of their participation. Indeed Peter Bruckner, a Head of 
Department in the Danish Foreign Ministry, writing before the results of the IGC 
were known, acknowledged the message to be found in the reactivation of the 
WEU. 
"The revival of WEU did not pass unnoticed among the smaller 
Community countries outside WEU The Danish Foreign 
Minister saw the new developments as a signal to those Member 
States of the Community which so far have been hesitant to reinforce 
co-ordination on security policy issues within EPC. Moreover, the 
Danish Social Democratic Party - now in opposition but retaining a 
decisive influence on Danish security policy - seems to realise that 
countries like Denmark would be faced with a dilemma if the 
European security discussions were given better conditions of growth 
in a forum like WEU. Indeed, whether they accept such a 
development - or perhaps even welcome it with satisfaction - these 
countries would run the risk, over time, of being deprived of the 
opportunity to exert influence on the European security policy 
debate. "^^ 
The message was it seems received loud and clear by the 'foot-note 
countries', who given the absence of radical proposals within the EPC framework 
raised no serious objections to the references to WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. 
The Political Committee, ever in search of agreement, were therefore able to 
reach compromise solutions on the form of words to be employed in the difficult 
areas of the 'objective' of EPC and its security dimension, with relative ease. The 
difficulties centred on semantics rather than substantive changes. This was not the 
case in that most sensitive of issues, the creation of a Permanent Secretariat. On 
this issue the Political Committee adopted the strategy of their predecessors in the 
Fouchet Committee. Unable to reach agreement they submitted two versions of the 
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Articles dealing with the proposals to create a Secretariat. The first version broadly 
reflected the structure envisaged by Annex 1 of the British Draft Agreement on 
Political Co-operation and that of the Dutch and Italian drafts, as well as the 
Dooge Report. The creation of a Secretariat was dealt with in the final paragraph 
of the first version of Article 10. 
"A secretariat set up in Brussels helps the Presidency in preparing 
and implementing European Political Co-operation activities and 
administrative questions. It operates under the Presidency's 
authority. 
Article 11 of the first version, dealing with the status of the Head and 
officials of the Secretariat ensures that the members of the Secretariat remain under 
the control of national governments by conferring upon them the same diplomatic 
status as that enjoyed by the Permanent Officials of the Member States working in 
the Community. 
The second version of Articles 10 and 11 are specifically designated as an 
'Alternative version of Articles 10 and 11' , thus indicating its minority status within 
the Committee. It is identical to the corresponding articles in the Franco-German 
Draft Treaty and seeks to establish an overarching Secretariat-General of the 
Council of the European Union, to be headed by a Secretary-General responsible 
for European Political Co-operation. 
This alternative version is clearly a minority view. Opposition to the Franco-
German proposals in this area was, as indicated above, universal. Evidence to 
support this is most evident in the drafts submitted by the U.K., the Netherlands 
and Italy. Add to this the strident opposition to such developments in the Dooge 
Committee on the part of the 'footnote countries', the opposition expressed by the 
Benelux countries on the submission of the Franco-German draft to the Milan 
C o u n c i l , a n d one is presented with a solid block of opposition to the Franco-
German proposal. 
It can also be speculated that although the German delegation continued to 
support the Franco-German proposals in this area, their support for what was 
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primarily a French draft was lukewarm. Evidence to support such speculation 
though limited and circumstantial is based primarily on the previously mentioned 
submission of an Act of European Union to the IGC by the French Foreign 
Minister M.Dumas on 19th November. This draft, which strengthened suspicions 
that the original Franco-German proposal for a Secretariat-General held the 
potential for infinite expansion, did not enjoy the status of being a joint Franco-
German document, thereby suggesting that the hastily repaired Franco-German 
alliance of the Milan Council was not yet restored to its former stature. The 
coolness of Franco-German relations at this time can perhaps be gauged from the 
statement of the Catherine LalUmiere, the French Secretary of State for European 
Affairs, on the submission of the French draft. 
"There wil l be no Franco-German documents on this reform. 
...France when it spoke of 'joint proposals' meant onlv work co-
ordination and not necessarily the writing of a joint text."" 
In addition, participants in the work of the Political Committee have 
indicated that the French and German representatives on the Political Committee, 
faced with the strong opposition from the other Member States, failed to mount a 
strong defence of their proposals for a Secretariat-General.^^ Given the potential 
influence that a fully mobilised and motivated Franco-German alliance could bring 
to bear on the outcome of any Community-related issue, one would expect that their 
combined strength would enable them to extract some kind of concession from their 
Community partners. Their failure to do so, and the extremely late submission of 
an unsupported Treaty draft does tend to suggest that the French were becoming 
somewhat isolated in their ambitions to create an overarching Secretariat-General. 
This is a view further reinforced by the ease with which the French draft was 
dropped by the Political Committee meeting later in November, when the French 
proposal was apparently 'disposed of without too much difficulty'.^^ 
Given the strident universal opposition to the Franco-German proposals on 
this matter, the decision of the French Government to follow these with proposals 
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reinforcing those rejected by the majority is nothing short of bewildering, and leads 
one to question the objective of the French actions. 
Could this be the long awaited 'surprising initiative' indicated by Mitterrand 
in February of 1985 ? One thing is sure: had this French draft been accepted it 
certainly would have changed the institutional balance of the Community, though 
not in the direction favoured by the federally-inclined supporters of the EUT who 
had placed so much faith in the French President. Although styled an Act of 
European Union, its similarity to the EUT lies only in its grandiose title. I f 
anything it represents a step away from integration as it is understood by those in 
favour of increasing the role and jurisdictions of the 'supranational' institutions of 
the Community, and increases the jurisdiction of the Member States in those areas 
which were universally recognised, i f sometimes challenged, as being the province 
of the Community institutions. In short this document is intergovernmentalist in 
design and intent. Given the advance notice of Mitterrand's preferences found in 
his much (mis)quoted speech, to the European Parliament^^ the content of both the 
Franco-German and French drafts should really have come as no surprise to those in 
the maximalist camp. Indeed their expectations of Mitterrand must be regarded as 
little more than wishful thinking. 
Two possible explanations for French behaviour present themselves. Firstly 
was it as the Dutch Foreign Minister suggested inspired simply by 'presidentialism' 
on the part of Mitterrand?^^ Given Mitterrand's taste for the melodramatic last-
minute grand gesture, this cannot be discounted. But why risk one's reputation on a 
project almost certainly doomed to failure? 
Secondly the 'eleventh hour' circumstances of its submission and the content 
of the Act of European Union suggest that it would be possible to mount very 
similar arguments to those put forward with respect to the last- minute submission 
of the Franco-German draft to the Milan C o u n c i l . H o w e v e r , in the absence of 
substantive evidence to confirm or refute these explanations such an exercise would 
be purely speculative. 
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Whatever the motivation behind the French draft, its rapid rejection as a 
subject for serious consideration by the Political Committee clearly indicates the 
strength of opposition to the creation of an overarching Secretariat. However, 
notwithstanding the strength of opposition to the Franco-German Secretariat-
General, the joint November Draft submitted by the Political Committee retained 
both versions of the Secretariat, suggesting that the Political Committee had 
abdicated responsibility for the final decision in this matter to their political masters. 
The IGC had reached the home straight, and for the Political Committee at 
least, the race to the finishing line of the Luxembourg Council, scheduled for 2-3 
December 1985, had become a canter. Their work, with the exception of semantic 
detail and confirmation of French acceptance of the form of Permanent Secretariat 
preferred by the overwhelming majority of the Member States, was complete. The 
issues outstanding, alongside a number of difficulties encountered by the 
Dondelinger Group, were left to the European Council to untangle. In the course of 
an intense Luxembourg Council devoted almost entirely to the conclusions of the 
IGC, they were largely resolved. 
One issue to remain unresolved at the Luxembourg Council was the issue of 
the form in which the conclusions of the IGC would be presented. Although the 
IGC at the formal level of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States met as a 
single conference, at the level of Working Groups, the IGC was in many respects 
two conferences, working towards the realisation of two distinct goals, based on the 
Mandate agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of July 22-23 1985. 
For their part the Dondelinger Group were concerned with issues relating to a 
'revision of the Treaty'.^^ While the Political Committee worked and presented 
their conclusions based upon the instruction to prepare a 'Draft Treaty ... 
concerning political co-operation, with a view to a common foreign and security 
p o l i c y ' . T h u s although the Commission in particular had from the outset lobbied 
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very strongly for the results of the IGC to be enshrined within a single text,'^ and 
had successfully gained acceptance of the principle that a single Conference would 
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deal with both Community and EPC issues, there was no initial consensus on 
combining the results of the IGC in a single text. It was not until the meeting of 
Foreign Ministers on 16-17 December 1985 that textual 'unicite' was finally and 
unanimously accepted. 
Credit for the final unified structure of the Single European Act, can 
arguably be claimed by both the Commission and by France. The Commission 
prior to the first meeting of the IGC had tabled a paper outlining their view on the 
framework within which the results of the Conference could be contained. This 
proposed framework made up of a preamble, a section dealing with common goals, 
and two self-contained Titles, one dealing with revisions to the Community 
Treaties, the other with Political Co-operation. Understandably, agreement on a 
final framework, prior even to the first meeting of the IGC, let alone agreement on 
substantive content, was regarded by many participants as rather presumptuous and 
was set aside. 
Although rejected almost immediately on the basis of its content, the French 
Act of Union did attempt to unify Community and EPC matters within a single 
framework. When stripped of its contentious content it was identical in structure to 
that advocated by the Commission in their September paper, containing as it did a 
Preamble and three sections, the first, entitled 'The European Union' dealing with 
common provisions, a second section encompassing the Community Treaties and the 
third with EPC. Thus the paper presented by the Presidency and agreed upon at the 
Ministerial meeting on 16-17 December 1985 was based on the Commission 
framework and the basic structure of the French Act of European Union, stripped 
bare of the French insistence of a Secretariat at every turn. The Single European 
Act was born. 
The Single European Act 
The unified text is made up of a Preamble, four Titles and a Final Act. Of 
primary concern here are the provisions of Title 3, Provisions on European Co-
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operation in the spliere of foreign policy, though some aspects of Title 1 
Common Provisions do have a bearing on the status of EPC and will therefore be 
examined. 
Title 3 does in fact appear in the form of a single article; Article 30 to be 
precise, though this is subdivided into 12 paragraphs and numerous sub- paragraphs. 
The most immediate and striking difference between Title 3 and the other provisions 
of the SEA is the form of address used in reference to the participants in the 
Political Co-operation framework. Whereas Articles 1 and 2 refer to its participants 
as either the Member States or use the collective term of 'the Community', Title 3 
is distinguished in referring to its participants as the High Contracting Parties. 
The use of this phrase gives Title 3 the appearance of being a conventional free-
standing intergovernmental treaty, bearing no relationship to the other constituent 
parts of the SEA. To an extent this can be explained away as a consequence of the 
factor of deadlines and the instructions of the original mandate to the IGC. The 
Political Committee had been instructed to draw up a 'draft treaty on Political Co-
operation', and this is precisely what they produced. 
Although the issue of the 'unicite' of the texts had always been in the 
background, it was by no means a foregone conclusion. Thus the Political 
Committee worked on the assumption that their efforts would result in the 
conclusion of a specific Treaty on Political Co-operation. Indeed in terms of the 
Luxembourg Presidency and the timetable of the IGC, agreement on the unity of the 
texts was very much a last-minute decision. In this respect it may be argued that 
the time factor militated against the re-working of the agreed text of the Treaty on 
Political Co-operation. However while the pressure of deadlines can be taken 
account of in explaining the decision to paste, without alteration, a free-standing 
treaty document into a wider text, it would be naive to attribute this decision to the 
time factor alone. A simple re-phrasing of the text to give the appearance of a 
cohesive whole may well have been a time-consuming chore, but it was by no 
means an impossible task in the time available. 
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However to begin to do so risked the emergence of unnecessary, and 
potentially insurmountable difficulties. In particular, to replace the phrase 'High 
Contracting Parties' with a more Community-orientated phraseology risked the 
complete rejection of the Single European Act by some of the more reluctant 
Member States, in particular Denmark, who in agreeing to the principle of textual 
unity felt it had gone as far as it possibly could. Given the particular difficulties of 
the Danish Government in respect of foreign policy and defence and security 
issues,^ -^  it was therefore necessary to demonstrate a clear division between the 
rights and jurisdictions of the Community and those of EPC. Political Co-operation 
could not be seen to be falling under the spell of the Community institutions. 
Indeed the inclusion of the provisions on EPC in the SEA were a prominent factor 
in the decision to seek the approval of the population via a national referendum. 
Thus the decision to retain the phrase 'High Contracting Parties' within a textual 
unity can be regarded as a sensible compromise between those who wished to 
demonstrate a growing convergence between the two frameworks and those who 
required that a distance between the frameworks be maintained, and be clearly 
observable. 
This compromise between the two strands of opinion can also be seen in 
Article 1 of Title 1, the opening paragraph of which, while identifying two separate 
frameworks also offers the impression of a convergence between the two by 
claiming a common goal. 
"The European Communities and European Political Co-operation 
shall have as their objective to conn-ibute together to making concrete 
progress towards European unity." 
While the common objective of European Unity is a typically ambiguous 
term which has no agreed meaning, it does create the sense of a common link 
between the two areas. However paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 clarify any 
confusion of competences that may be implied by the opening paragraph, by clearly 
identifying the authority under which each framework operates. 
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"The European Communities shall be founded on the Treaties 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the European 
Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy Community and 
on the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing 
them. 
Political Co-operation shall be governed by Title 3. The provisions 
of the Title shall conform and supplement the procedures agreed in 
the reports of Luxembourg (1970), Copenhagen (1973), London 
(1981), the Solemn Declaration on European Union (1983) and the 
practices gradually established among the Member States."^ 
This clear separation of competences and jurisdictions is further reinforced 
in Article 3 of Title 1, which states ... 
"The institutions of the European Communities henceforth designated 
as referred to hereafter, shall exercise their powers and jurisdiction 
under the conditions and for the purpose provided for by the Treaties 
establishing the Communities and by the subsequent Treaties and 
Acts modifying or supplementing them and by the provisions of Title 
2. 
The institutions and bodies responsible for Political Co-operation 
shall exercise their powers and jurisdiction under the conditions and 
for the purposes laid down in Title 3, and in the documents referred to 
in the third paragraph of Article 1 . " ' " 
The sense of separate identities is however balanced by Article 2 which 
creates, or rather recognises, a common institutional link in the form of the 
European Council which brings 'together the Heads of State or of Government of 
the Member States and the President of the Commission of the European 
Communities...'.^^ 
Thus the European Council, a political fact since the European Summit of 
10th December 1974 when French President Giscard d' Estaing declared the 'death 
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of the European summit and the birth of the European Council', ° now enjoyed full 
institutional status within the framework of a Treaty document encompassing both 
the Communities and EPC. However, while recognising the existence and 
composition of the European Council, and the regularity of its meetings. Article 2 is 
a blank. There is no attempt whatsoever in Title 1, or indeed anywhere else in the 
Single European Act, to outline the powers, functions and jurisdictions of the 
European Council. 
It is indisputable that the European Council prior to the formulation of the 
Single European Act de facto sat at the apex of both the Community and the EPC 
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frameworks. Yet, anyone unfamiliar with the operation of the Community, 
presented with the text of the SEA, would be at a loss to explain the status and 
function of the European Council. As any detailed study of the negotiations 
surrounding the formulation of the SEA will show, detailed proposals for the future 
role of the European Council in the European process are conspicuous by their 
(almost) total absence.^^ In this respect the report of the Dooge Committee is a 
case in point. The Dooge Report expends little more than four lines in its 
recommendations for the future of the European Council. 
"The trend towards the European Council's becoming simply another 
body dealing with the day-to-day business of the Community must be 
reversed. Heads of State or Government should play a strategic role 
and give direction and political impetus to the Community. Fc^this 
purpose two European Council meetings a year should suffice. " ° ^ 
Given that the European Council, a body with no, or at least dubious, 
institutional status had emerged as the major decision-maker in the Community, the 
failure to clarify its status in the 'European' process must count as one of the 
surprising aspects of the SEA. Explaining the absence of such an extrapolation 
returns the debate to that which consumed much of the Fouchet negotiations, that of 
maintaining the rights and jurisdictions of the Community institutions in the face of 
the creation of a Council of the Union. In short, the absence of any significant 
text on the role of the European Council is a case of 'letting sleeping dogs lie'. 
Despite the political fact of the European Council's overarching status, it remained 
too sensitive an issue for many Member States to take further than simple 
recognition of its existence and entry to the Treaty framework. This is not to 
suggest that discussion of the role of the European Council was avoided, indeed the 
lack of text on the European Council in the Dooge Report reflects what may best be 
described as an agreement to disagree. This was an issue which, perhaps as much 
as the issue of a Permanent Secretariat, revived memories of the Fouchet episode. 
As Van Eekelen notes in describing the Dutch position on the role of the European 
Council in the Dooge Committee: 
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"There was a fair amount of discussion on the European Council. 
...Several countries, including my own, were not at all keen on the 
European Council, we accepted the European Council as a 'fire-side' 
chat, but not really as a new and leading organ of the Community. 
Our main concern was, and still is, that the European Council would 
become some kind of superstructure which has a Community part, an 
intergovernmental part and maybe an economic and monetary part... 
and in this the Fouchet experience played a part, did we want to have 
such a superstructure or not ? We and the Belgians and by and large 
Luxembourg held a negative view of this role for the European 
Council. We felt it would erode the role of the Treaties and of the 
Commission. . . . in this Faure was quite constructive, maybe because 
he had Fouchet in the back of his mind. He was not too imposing of 
his views, he did not push too far !. In so far as I had instructions 
from my Government, that was one of my main instructions; to 
maintain the present structure of the Community and build on that, as 
we think that is the best structure we can imagine. 
In the Netherlands we have never liked the European Council very 
much, I think by now we have realised that it is necessary sometimes 
to decide a thorny issue, but we were always were afraid that it 
would become a 'court of appeal' and that i f that were to develop, 
then nothing would be done any more in the normal Council 
meetings, all the difficult issues would be booted upstairs!..."" 
Although M . Faure was, it appears, sensitive enough not to press the point, 
the overarching superstructure for the European Council was very much on the 
French agenda and appeared in both the Franco-German Draft treaty on European 
Union and the French Act of European Union. Both of these were ultimately 
rejected in the text of the SEA in a formula which acknowledged the presence of the 
sleeping dogs, but did not attempt to wake them from their sleep nor to identify 
their breed! 
Given the reluctance of the formulators of the SEA to spell out the role and 
functions of the European Council, it is surprising to note that the 1983 Solenm 
Declaration on European Union has no such qualms, and presents a clear 
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Statement of the European Council's status vis-a-vis the Communities and EPC.°-^ 
The most striking aspect of this exposition was its similarity in form and style to the 
text of the various Fouchet proposals for a 'Council of the Union'. 
It would be stretching a point to suggest that the authors of the Single 
European Act avoided the formalisation of the Solemn Declaration's provisions on 
the European Council simply because of its similarity to the Fouchet texts. But it 
can be argued that the objections to such a detailed account of the European 
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Council's status were based on very similar arguments to those expressed during the 
Fouchet negotiations, that is to say, fears for the rights and jurisdictions of the 
Community institutions, in particular those of the European Commission. Indeed as 
indicated by Van E e k e l e n , t h e battle lines between the Member States on this 
issue mirrored those of the Fouchet negotiations. 
Despite the hard political reality of the European Council as the overarching 
body described by the 1983 Solemn Declaration, and advocated by the French Act 
of Union, the continuing sensitivity of a number of Member States on this issue 
necessitated a retreat into ambiguity. We are left therefore with nothing more than 
an acknowledgement of the European Council's existence within a formal Treaty 
framework; a tentative admission of parenthood. Indeed, Title 1 (Common 
Provisions) can in many respects be regarded as an acceptance of a family 
relationship between the European Council, the European Communities and EPC. 
In the case of European Political Co-operation it is a recognition of the 'illegitimate 
child' of European integration. 
However, to return to the text of Title 3: given the attention paid to the 
Treaty drafts considered by the IGC the content of Title 3 offers no surprises. It is 
in most respects a series of semantic compromises between the various drafts, 
reflecting the weight of opinion between the Member States on each issue, which, 
for the most part, had been ironed out in the joint November Draft of the Political 
Committee. Thus the differences between the November Draft and the finished 
product found in Title 3 are minimal, and largely confined to a reshuffling of the 
order of the text rather than textual change. There are however a small number of 
omissions and minor textual adjustments worthy of note. Article 3 of the November 
Draft, provided that... 
"The work of Political Co-operation shall become the general 
responsibility of the Council for European Union/The European 
Council. The Council for European Union/The European Council 
shall set out the general political guide-lines for Political Co-
operation. "^^ 
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The omission of this particular article can be attributed to the same reasoning 
as that lying behind the absence of a detailed account of the role and function of the 
European Council. Sleeping dogs, it seems, must be allowed to lie. In so far as the 
reshuffling of the order of the text is concerned, Article 4 of the November Draft, 
dealing with consistency between the external policies of the European Community 
and EPC, appears in Title 3 as 'Paragraph 5'. 
"The external policies of the European Community and the policies 
agreed in European Political Co-operation must be consistent. The 
Presidency and the Commission, each within its own sphere of 
competence, shall have special responsibility for ensuring that such 
consistency is sought and maintained."" 
The retention of this article granting 'special responsibility' to the 
Commission in the sphere of Political Co-operation, alongside the provision that the 
'Commission shall be fully associated with the proceedings of EPC',^^ is a quite 
significant breakthrough, particularly in light of the British Draft Agreement's 
attempt to reduce the status of the Commission in EPC. This attempt must of 
course be viewed in the context of the Prime Minister's instructions to resist any 
attempt to enhance the role of the Commission in both the Community and Political 
Co-operation frameworks. 
The Final Article of the November Draft becomes Paragraph 12 of Title 3, 
and is also subject to omission and change. The Final Article of the November 
Draft, in what it was imagined would be a separate, free-standing treaty, is a three-
paragraph Article. Paragraph 1 contains the usual formalities with respect to Treaty 
ratification by the 'High Contracting Parties'. As part of a unified text these 
ratification provisions were clearly unnecessary and therefore did not appear in Title 
3. Less understandably Paragraph 2 guaranteeing respect for the rights and 
jurisdictions of the existing Community Trea t ies ,was also omitted; given the 
concerns expressed by a number of Member States over the rights and jurisdictions 
of the Community Treaties, concerns which reflect those of the Fouchet 
negotiations,^^ it is surprising to find this element omitted. Particularly so when 
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the U.K. draft agreement, and the Dutch and Italian drafts contain similar 
provisions, thus providing the basis for its inclusion in the November Draft. 
Only paragraph 3 of the Final Act, providing for a review of the Treaty 
finds its way into Paragraph 12 of Title 3. This is also subject to a slight alteration. 
Where the November Draft provides for a review of the Treaty, 3 years after 
coming into force. Title 3 extends this to 5 years. 
Of the more sensitive issues, only Article 8, dealing with the provisions on 
the 'security' mandate of EPC, is subject to movement, and finds itself as 
Paragraph 6 of Title 3. In so far as textual change in this area is concerned there is 
little to report. The changes that do appear are minor, and amount to a tidying-up 
of the edges. The only notable, if not unexpected change, was the omission of the 
reference to the European Community, in sub paragraph 2, outlining the resolve of 
the High Contracting Parties to 'maintain the technological and industrial conditions 
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necessary for their security'. Thus the potential difficulties surrounding this 
highly sensitive issue had been headed-off well in advance of the final stages of the 
IGC. It was, for the moment at least, a dormant issue. 
Although the final form of Paragraph 1 of Title 3 bears a great similarity to 
that found in Article 1 of the November Draft, agreement on the precise form of 
words was one of the most difficult aspects of the negotiation. The difficulty in 
agreeing an acceptable form of words can largely be attributed to the reluctance of 
the British delegation to accept any formula or form of words which surrendered or 
implied the surrender of the U.K's right and capacity to undertake independent 
action in the international arena.^ -^ The consequence of this resistance, in which the 
U.K. was supported by Denmark and Greece, was the further dilution, of what was 
already an ambiguous and non-committal form of words. 
Whereas the November Draft had as the 'objective' of EPC the 'formulation 
and implementation of a European external/foreign p o l i c y ' , T i t l e 3 reduces this 
from an objective to an 'endeavour'. The High Contracting Parties would now 
'endeavour to jointly formulate and implement a European foreign policy'. 
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Prime Minister Thatcher in reluctantly accepting this form of words was 
persuaded that the substantive aspects of the commitments to EPC, did not in any 
sense undermine the U.K.'s capacity for independent action. Thus she was 
persuaded that acceptance of Paragraph 1 was a purely presentational issue which 
would allow the U.K. greater leverage in other areas of negotiation. Indeed the 
provisions of Paragraph 2, which are largely unchanged from those found in Article 
2 of the November Draft^^ clearly do not place binding and enforceable constraints 
on the actions of Member States. Indeed it would have been difficult for Prime 
Minister Thatcher to object to Paragraph 2 as it draws much of its content from the 
provisions of the U.K.'s Draft Agreement on Political Co-operation.^^ 
"(a) The High Contracting Parties undertake to inform and consult 
each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to 
ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as 
possible through co-ordination, the convergence of their positions and 
the implementation of joint action, (b) Consultation shall take place 
before the High Contracting Parties decide on their final position. 
(c) In adopting its positions and in its national measures each High 
Contracting Party shall take full account of the positions of other 
partners and shall give consideration to the desirability of adopting 
and implementing common European positions. 
In order to increase their capacity for joint action in the foreign 
policy field, the High Contracting Parties shall ensure common 
principles and objectives are gradually developed and defined. The 
determination of common positions shall constitute a high point of 
reference for the policies of the High Contracting Parties. 
(d) The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to avoid any action 
or position which impairs their effectiveness as a cohesivq^force in 
international relations or within international organisations."^" 
With regard to that most contentious of issues, the creation of a Permanent 
Secretariat, it will be recalled that the Political Committee's November Draft 
contained two versions of Articles 10 and 11, the first version being preferred and 
supported by the overwhelming majority of the Member States, whilst the second, 
specifically designated an 'alternative version' had the support of France and 
arguably the lukewarm support of ERG. Given the weight of opinion and the 
strength of feeling this issue was able to mobilise among the Member States, the 
majority view prevailed. Thus Paragraph 10:(g) establishing the Secretariat is 
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virtually identical to that proposed by the majority in the November Draft, as is 
Paragraph 11 dealing with the status of the Secretariat's members. 
"A Secretariat based in Brussels shall assist the Presidency in 
preparing and implementing the activities of European Political Co-
operation and in administrative mattery It shall carry out its duties 
under the authority of the Presidency. "^^ 
"As regards privileges and immunities, the members of the European 
Political Co-operation Secretariat shall be treated in the same way as 
members of the diplomatic missions of the High Contracting Parties 
based in the same place as the Secretariat."^^" 
Whilst the majority view with respect to the size, the subordinate role and 
administrative nature of the Secretariat could be assumed from the brevity and 
location of the text dealing with its creation, there remained an element of 
ambiguity about the Secretariat. The bare bones of the text specify neither the size, 
the internal structure, nor the exact role of the Secretariat, and could therefore be 
subject to differing interpretations. 
Indeed participants in the negotiations have confirmed that they were 
conscious of this ambiguity, but also concerned not to elevate the status of the 
Secretariat to something akin to a full institution of the Community, by oudining its 
precise structure and role in a Treaty document. The inclusion of precise technical 
detail was also regarded as unnecessarily cumbersome. In addition it would also be 
difficult to amend and add to, when the need arose, thus negating one of the great 
strengths of EPC, its flexibility. 
The solution to these difficulties was found in the decision to adopt the 
approach found in the U.K.'s Draft Agreement on Political Co-operation, that of 
an Annex. On 28th February at the Hague, at which time the final signatures were 
put to the Single Eiu-opean Act, the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC adopted 
what are in effect a series of Annexes to Title 3 of the SEA. Claiming one of the 
longest and most tortuous headings on record, it is styled as the Decision adopted 
by the Ministers, meeting in the framework of European Political Co-operation 
on the occasion of signing the Single European Act. 
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Relative to Title 3 the 'Decision' is a lengthy and detailed document which 
fills in the fine detail of the operation and structure of EPC, and covers much the 
same ground as the Annexes to the British 'Draft Agreement'. The 'Decision' is 
composed of a brief introductory preamble and five detailed and self-contained 
sections - 1. Relations between European Political Co-operation and the European 
Parliament. 2. Co-operation of Member States' Missions and Commission 
Delegations in Third Countries and International Organisations. 3. European 
Political Co-operation Secretariat: Responsibilities and Organisation. 4. Venues for 
European Political Co-operation Meetings. 5. Use of Languages in European 
Political Co-operation. 
Whilst each section holds interesting aspects, the primary concern here is 
with the detail of Section 3 covering the 'responsibilities and organisation' of the 
Secretariat. In format this section is made up of a short Preamble and four sub-
sections. 
The overall impression of this section, which in substance draws heavily on 
the content of the U.K's 'Draft Agreement', is one of a concerted effort to hammer 
home the message that the Secretariat is a subordinate and ancillary body with no 
independent function. One of the great fears, that the Secretariat would operate 
under the authority of the European Council and would thus develop into an 
overarching body with jurisdiction in the area of the Community Treaties, is dealt 
with immediately in the Preamble. The Secretariat would be the creature of 
Political Co- operation alone . 
"The Secretariat of European Political Co-operation shall act under 
the authority of the Presidency. It shall assist the Presidency in 
preparing and implementing European Political Co-operation 
activities and in administrative matters. "^^^ 
In outlining the functions of the Secretariat the initial message of 
subordination to the Presidency found in the Preamble is reinforced in the tone of 
the language employed in the detailed exposition of the functions of the Secretariat. 
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The Secretariat would 'assist' the Presidency and 'work with' the other subordinate 
areas of the Co-operation framework 
"The Secretariat shall: 
(a) assist the Presidency in the organisation of European Political Co-
operation meetings, including the preparation and circulation of 
documents and the drawing up of minutes; (b) work with the 
European Correspondents Group in the preparation of conclusions 
and guide-lines and in carrying out any other task entrusted to the 
group by the Political Committee; (c) assist the Chairmen of 
Working Groups as regards procedures and precedents and the 
drafting of oral reports and studies; (d) assist the Presidency in the 
preparation of texts to be published on behalf of the Member States, 
including replies to par iamentary questions and resolutions as 
defined in item 7 sub-paragraph 2, of Chapter 1 on relations between 
European Political Co-operation and the European Parliament; (e) 
maintain the European Political Co-operation archives and assist the 
Presidency in preparing the six monthly compilation of European 
Political Co-operation texts, (f) keep up to date the body of European 
Political Co-operation working practices; (g) assist Ihe Presidency, 
where appropriate, in contacts with third countries. " ^-^ 
In so far as the other great bone of contention in this debate is concerned, 
that of the size of any Permanent Secretariat and the status of its Head, the solution 
agreed by the Member States reflects the pragmatic and evolutionary pattern evident 
throughout the development of EPC. The Secretariat would, as the great majority 
of reports and Draft Treaties from the Dooge Report onwards have emphasised, be 
'small'. Indeed the text which in substance is taken from the Italian Draft, simply 
extends the current Troika arrangements to five, and gives it a permanent seat. 
"The Secretariat shall be composed of five officials. Following on 
from the support team arrangements, the Presidency-in-Office of 
European Political Co-operation together with the two preceding and 
the two following Presidencies shall each second an official for a 
period covering five Presidencies. The status of the officials of the 
Foreign Affairs Ministries on temporary secondment to the 
Secretariat shall be identical to that of members of the diplomatic 
missions in Brussels to which they shall be administratively 
attached. "1^4 
As for the headship of the Secretariat there would be no high-profile 
Secretary-General, though the text in providing for the appointment of a 'Head of 
the Secretariat' is rather ambiguous in so far as the role of the holder of this 
position is concerned. Limiting itself to the brief provision that the 'The Head of 
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the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Foreign Ministers under arrangements to be 
agreed between them'. 
Although the text does not spell out in fine detail the precise nature of the 
Head of the Secretariat's functions, majority opinion on this issue was strong 
enough to ensure that the Head of the Secretariat would not emerge as a high-profile 
figure. Indeed the absence of detail on the role of the Head of the Secretariat and 
the provision that the arrangements for position would be agreed by the Foreign 
Ministers, tends to emphasise the low profile sought by the great majority of 
Member States. In this respect one can observe a convergence of views between 
those concerned to preserve the rights and jurisdictions of the Commission, and 
those of Prime Minister Thatcher. 
"There were good reasons for resisting a large Secretariat, with a 
high profile Secretary-General. ...,we certainly did not want to be 
building up a parallel Commission, or even a parallel Council of 
Ministers Secretariat. This is one of the things that blended in very 
strongly with Margaret Thatcher's views. She would not have been 
content to see a major, non-governmental figure, a kinii^of 
Commission-role figure, capable of putting forward initiatives."^^" 
Thus when the Foreign Ministers, with the aid of the Political Committee, 
actually came to the point of choosing the first Head of the Secretariat this 
convergence of views meant they were able to ensure that the appointee would 
remain a marginal almost invisible figure. 
"We restricted very carefully the role of the Head of the 
Secretariat,... we limited his ability to talk to the press or to other 
diplomats. He was very much the handmaiden of the Presidency. In 
choosing the first Head of the Secretariat, Jannuzzi, we set his rank 
very carefully, and briefed him very carefully on what his 
responsibilities were. We wanted to keep him very low profile, so 
that he did not in any way compete with the Council Secretariat, or 
let alone with the Commission. "^^ ' 
Thus this contentious issue, which in one way or another had simmered for 
quarter of a century had, for the moment at least, reached a conclusion. The 
Member States now had a Permanent Secretariat to assist them in the co-ordination 
of their foreign policies, in pursuit of a 'European foreign policy'. With the 
exception of France, and possibly FRG, the body created was to the satisfaction of 
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all involved. The British in particular who, since the London Report of 1981, had 
pressed for a secretariat on the lines of the body created by the Single European 
Act, were particularly pleased with the result, and can be regarded as crucial to its 
creation in the form finally agreed by the Member States. 
"We were very happy with the Secretariat as it came out. We would 
not have been happy with the much bigger more^muscular secretariat 
that the French popped up with near the end."^^° 
The only other aspect of Section 3 worthy of note is found in the brief 
Preamble, and connects to the wish to avoid the perception of the Secretariat 
emerging as a competitor to the European Commission. The Preamble provides 
that the Secretariat 'shall assist the Presidency in ensuring the continuity of 
European Political Co-operation and its consistency with Community positions'.^^^ 
Given the 'handmaiden' status attributed to the Secretariat, it would appear 
entirely appropriate that they would 'assist' the Presidency in this pursuit of the 
long-standing aim of ensuring consistency between the actions of EPC and the 
Community, which in paragraph 5 of Tide 3 confers a joint responsibility on the 
EPC Presidency and the Commission. It seems however that this 'assistance' was a 
cause of concern among a number of Member States, due in the main, according to 
Nuttall^^^ to the U.K.'s preference for including this aspect in the body of Tide 3. 
Those opposed to this inclusion were of the view that a specific reference to the 
Secretariat in this role would undermine the role of the Commission. British 
preference for this was therefore successfully resisted and was relegated to the 'nuts 
and bolts' detail of the 'Decision'. 
With the final signing of the Single European Act on 28th February 1986 
European Political Co-operation in the form of Title 3 finally took its place in the 
formal Treaty structure that had its beginnings in the ECSC Treaty of 1951. 
Despite this however, it has been suggested that the inclusion of what started life as 
a free-standing conventional intergovernmental Treaty on Political Co-operation, is 
at best a limited, presentational development which adds nothing to the wider goals 
of European integration. 
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It would be difficult to dispute the criticisms levelled at Tide 3. Firstly, 
Title 3 is little more than a codification of existing practices, and therefore does 
nothing to advance the process of integration. Secondly, although contained within 
a 'unified' Treaty document the provisions of Tide 3, are hermetically sealed from 
'contamination' by the institutions of the Community. Thirdly, regardless of the 
objectives and rules established by EPC the absence of any means of enforcement 
renders their realisation wholly dependent on the goodwill of the Member States. 
Indeed the voluntary aspect of EPC can be seen to have been the major bone 
of contention for the critics of the Political Co-operation process, who in general 
would regard EPC as representing a backward step in the integration process. 
"In order to make progress towards the objective accepted by all the 
Member States (with varying degrees of enthusiasm and in many 
cases attached conditions), ie. that of European Union, the conclusion 
of an ad hoc treaty on 'intergovernmental co-operation' in the field of 
each State's foreign policy is completely superfluous. ... The 
possibility of a 'European foreign policy' remains a verbal 
whim. "1^1 
In raising this point we are returned to the sphere of the contentious 
theoretical debates surrounding the concept and measurement of post-War European 
integration, and with into the crucial stage of attempting to locate the Single 
European Act in a conceptual and theoretical framework. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION: THE DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN POLICY CO-
OPERATION 
The Single European Act marks out the beginning of one of the most active 
phases of development in the history of post-war European integration. It is said to 
have been responsible for the injection of a new dynamic into a virtually moribund 
Community.^ The evidence to support the contention of a new dynamic is largely 
beyond dispute and arguably most evident in the signing of a Treaty of European 
Union at Maastricht on 10 December 1991, the so-called Maastricht Treaty. 
This new-found institutional and policy dynamism brought with it a 
concomitant resurgence in attempts to explain the integration process from a 
theoretical perspective. In this respect a number of theorists have attempted to 
revise and resurrect neo-functionalism.^ Typical of these efforts is that of David 
Mutimer who argues that the neo-functionalist concept of 'spillover' is the most 
useful conceptual tool in examining and explaining the economic and political 
effects of the Single European Act.-^ 
Whilst the neo-functionalist revival has provided a number of useful and 
worthwhile insights, the overwhelming majority of these studies concentrate their 
fire on the economic, technical and technological aspects of the Single Act, while 
those which address institutional developments invariably concentrate on changes to 
the original institutions found in the Treaties of Paris and Rome. Notwithstanding a 
few isolated exceptions, none have made serious attempts to encompass the 
developments leading to the inclusion of EPC within the SEA. Indeed in this 
respect Mutimer performs the remarkable feat of discussing the 'political integration 
of Europe' without once mentioning EPC or any aspect of Title Three of the Single 
Act.4 
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One of the few attempts to apply aspects of neo-functionalism to the Single 
Act's EPC provisions is provided by Kirchner^ who in considering the prospects for 
an EC security policy argues that the SEA contributes to the creation of a 'common 
security policy' by promoting the 'necessary economic conditions' and through the 
strengthening of EPC. In particular Kirchner argues that the inclusion of the 
economic aspects of security alongside the political aspects in the text of Title 
Three, not only indicates a strengthening of EPC but 'reflects the functional logic of 
spillover'.^ 
In so-far as the promotion of the 'necessary economic conditions' is 
concerned, Kirchner's line of argument, although coherent, is highly speculative. It 
is based on the possibility of linkages between the goals contained in Title Two of 
the SEA and the commitment to 'maintain the technological and industrial 
conditions necessary for ... security' found in Tide Three the outcome of which is 
expressed in neo-functionalist terms: 
" . . . i f the internal market of 1992 is to become a reality, then 
common policies on arms, research, production and procurement will 
be greatly enhanced by virtue of the link with industrial policy. The 
functional logic of a gradual build-up from a common industrial 
policy to common economic, political and security policies seems to 
capture the evolution most appropriately." 
The assumption of an underlying functional logic in these projected 
developments is apparent, yet Kirchner's evidence to support the existence such 
clear linkages is almost entirely speculative. 'Common EC military production 
could have its starting point in a common industrial policy', while an 'EC entry 
point into the defence arena could be through the various industrial and information 
technologies programmes'.^ Thus although there may scope for the development of 
such linkages in the various provisions of the Single Act, it should be recognised 
that Kirchner is engaging in a prescriptive exercise with litUe empirical foundation. 
With regard to the strengthening of EPC found in the consideration of the 
economic aspects of security alongside the political aspects of security, Kirchner's 
identification of this as a significant incremental development in the remit of EPC is 
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highly questionable. Firstly, the formula employed in Tide Three is that found in 
the 1983 Solenm Declaration on European Union. Thus on purely 
chronological grounds the argument to support the presence of a 'logic of spillover' 
in the Co-operation mechanism is flawed. Insofar as the explicit boundaries of EPC 
consultation are concerned, the status quo prevails. Secondly, far from representing 
evidence of functional logic, this formula is indicative of the long-running resistance 
of the three 'footnote' countries to the extension of EPC's security m a n d a t e t h e 
consequence of which was the decision of the majority of member states to upgrade 
their contacts within a non-EC framework, that of WEU. Thus, rather than 
strengthening EPC, the decision to proceed via the lowest common denominator, 
that of the Stuttgart formula, and the concomitant decision to employ the reactivated 
WEU as a forum to discuss security-related issues, weakens rather than strengthens 
EPC. 
Given the combination of continuing emphasis on underlying economic and 
technical determinism and clearly mistaken assumptions of 'spillover', one may 
conclude that neo-functionalism as a means of explaining the developments leading 
to and including the SEA is of litde use. 
From a different perspective an interesting attempt to provide a theoretical 
19 
account of European integration is provided in the work of Andrew Moravcsik.^"^ 
Discounting the attempts to revive neo-functionalism, Moravcsik posits an approach 
to European integration described as a 'Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach'. 
This approach rejecting unicausal explanations combines theories of 'preferences, 
bargaining and regimes' to provide 'plausible accounts for many aspects of the 
major decisions in the history of the EC in a way that is sharply distinct from neo-
functionalism'. 
Moravcsik's argument stresses the development of European integration as 
the consequence of intermittent intergovernmental bargains in which domestically 
derived national preferences, modified or augmented by cost-benefit calculations, 
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and the relative bargaining power of Member States form the basis for 
agreement. 
In so far as the role of institutions is concerned, contrary to the neo-
functionalist emphasis on supra-national institutions and the agenda-setting role of 
their officials, Moravcsik's approach relegates these to a subsidiary position arguing 
that the supranational institutions of the Community enhance and strengthen the 
Member States control over their domestic agenda, 'permitting them to attain goals 
otherwise unachievable'.^^ 
Given Moravcsik's emphasis on integration as a series of intergovernmental 
bargains and the relegation of supranational actors to a subordinate role, liberal 
intergovernmental ism would at first sight appear to offer fertile ground for the 
development of a theoretical approach encompassing consideration of EPC and 
related developments. However, in this respect appearances are deceptive. Indeed, 
in his attempt to subject the integration process to a cost-benefit analysis Moravcsik 
admits to the inadequacy of this approach in analysing areas such as EPC which, in 
cost-benefit terms, is 'near impossible to calculate'. 
The root cause of this inadequacy is to be found in the underlying 
foundations of liberal intergovernmental ism which is heavily grounded in modern 
theories of international political economy. Thus while Moravcsik's combination 
of theories of preferences, intergovernmental bargaining and regimes does in many 
respects offer an appealing characterisation of the central developments of 
'Community-based' integration, it shares in the neo-functionalist inability to provide 
an adequate account for developments in certain elements of post-war European 
integration. In short liberal intergovernmentalism runs aground on the rocks of 
those areas traditionally identified as high politics. 
This is not to suggest that the traditional characterisation of low and high 
politics remains valid in an economically interdependent world, where many issues 
traditionally defined as low politics occupy central positions in both domestic and 
international politics. To maintain such a position would be to fly in the face of the 
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empirical evidence. Rather it is to suggest that regardless of the increased status 
and importance of economic and technological issues, there remains a small core of 
state functions which have proved extra-ordinarily resistant to the integrative 
tendency seemingly present in other areas of state activity. Correspondingly these 
areas have also proved to be highly problematic to the various attempts to build a 
satisfactory theory of European integration. In this respect foreign policy and in 
particular defence policy as the ultimate bastions of state sovereignty must be 
regarded as occupying a separate and distinct status. 
While it will be argued that integration has taken place in the foreign policy 
and defence fields both in a Community-related context and in extra-Community 
context, it is integration of a qualitatively different character to that which has taken 
place within the confines of the original Treaties of Paris and Rome. Herein lies the 
problem for those concerned to construct a theory of European integration. 
Notwithstanding the economic roots and the determinism found in the great majority 
of studies, it is essentially a problem related to the criteria of measurement. In this 
respect, and despite the methodological difficulties experienced, the measurement of 
European integration revolves around variations of neo-functionalist definitions. 
The classic definition was provided by Haas. 
"Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several 
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a 
new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing 
ones."^^ 
Although this definition has been subjected to a wide range of revisions and 
variations, the pivotal assumption of the granting of supranational jurisdiction to a 
central organ remains for many theorists the yardstick by which all European 
integration is measured. Judged by this criterion, one must conclude that the Co-
operation framework of EPC has exhibited little or no integrative tendencies! It 
remains in this respect an instrinsically intergovernmental body and by implication, 
does not advance the goal of creating an 'ever closer union'. Thus Co-operation 
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between governments or government departments, no matter how close, does not, in 
the absence of a supranational intermediary, amount to integration. 
While the necessity of a clear set of criteria by which to evaluate any given 
process is accepted, such judgements'^ indicate the persistence of an underlying 
normative bias against developments which do not proceed via the Community 
route. The net effect of this bias has been to close-off a fuller appreciation of the 
processes and potential contained in developments which have taken place outside 
the strict confines of the Community Treaties. This is particularly the case with the 
development of the EPC mechanism. Indeed using any one of the numerous 
variations of Haas' definition of integration, the evolution of EPC would barely 
register as integration. Yet despite the absence of the prevailing indicators, close 
inspection of the EPC mechanism reveals a deep level of integration among its 
participants. While this is not apparent in the restrained nature of the various EPC 
reports, nor has it issued in the adoption of de jure 'common policies' or in the 
emergence of supranationality in its institutional structure, it is nonetheless firmly 
embedded in the operation of EPC.^^ 
Integration between the various participants in the Co-operation process was 
perhaps best exemplified in the now abandoned Troika arrangements. This system 
emerged as a compromise between the pressing need to provide an efficient 
administrative back-up for the Presidency of EPC and the extremely sensitive issue 
of a permanent secretariat. In practice the Troika system led to officials seconded 
from the foreign ministries of Member States working on a daily basis within the 
physical confines of the Presidency's foreign ministry. The passing of the Troika 
system in favour of a permanent secretariat was much regretted by many 
participants in the EPC process^^ who, reflecting the functionalist tenet of faith, 
regarded the experience of 'living and working together' provided by the Troika 
system as a trust-building measure par-exellence, which served to strengthen the 
collegiate nature of EPC. 
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Based as it was on a voluntary non-binding agreement, the level of trust and 
co-operation required for the successful operation of the Troika system and other 
aspects of the EPC process would be extremely difficult to quantify using the 
standard measures of integration which require the hard evidence of legally 
grounded commitments to 'common policies' and elements of institutional 
supranational ity, none of which were present in the EPC framework during the 
period under discussion. However, to reject the deep levels of co-operation and 
trust developed between the participants within the EPC framework as 
unquantifiable or even counter-integrative is to ensure that attempts to develop a 
satisfactory theoretical account of post-war European integration remains beyond the 
reach of integration theorists. 
This is not to suggest that there is a ready-made answer to this extremely 
problematic issue. Indeed, writing in 1992 Christopher Hill commented that 'it is 
possible to argue that the experience of 'European foreign policy' over the last 20 
years or so has been so unique that the search for one theory to explain its evolution 
is doomed to fail and that we must fall back on history'.^^ 
Happily, Hill does not abandon all hope of developing a single explanatory 
theory, but suggests that there are 'certain ideas and arguments which might be 
useful in the construction of a wider theory'.^-^ Central to Hill's approach are the 
concepts of 'actorness' and 'presence'.^"^ 'Actorness' as a concept focuses on the 
degree to which the EC has become a 'genuine international actor'. The concept of 
'presence' concentrates on external perceptions of the EC, that is to say, the degree 
to which third parties view the EC as an independent international actor. 
While the central thrust of Hill's argument is, 'to look at the functions which 
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the Community might be fulfilling in the international system','^ ~' the concept of 
actorness presents itself as a potentially useful theoretical tool with which to assess 
the institutional evolution of EPC's objectives, the range of its activities and its 
relationship with Community institutions and external policies. Employing 
actorness as a tool to measure not simply the superficial evidence of the EPC 
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reports, but the actual day-to-day operation of the Political Co-operation 
framework, wil l reveal the emergence of an increasingly complex and 'integrated' 
policy-community, which would be difficult to explain using the usual and rather 
simplistic characterisation of the EPC framework as intergovernmental. Whilst it 
would be nonsense to suggest that EPC is in any sense supranational, the web of 
linkages between foreign ministries, the external relations elements of the European 
Commission, the Embassies of the Member States in third countries etc, from which 
a European position on foreign policy issues emerges, combine to make EPC far 
more than a purely intergovernmental organisation. Thus, in organisational and 
operational terms there may be grounds to argue that EPC is sui generis. 
However i f one is concerned to uncover the presence of an underlying 
incremental or integrative logic in the development of EPC, leading perhaps 
towards the emergence of an all-encompassing European foreign and defence policy 
under the control of a common agency, the concept of actorness will prove to be of 
little more than descriptive worth. Indeed, Hill is of the view that the evidence for 
the existence of an underlying automicity lies in the realms of 'wish fulfilment'. " 
Equally, in accounting for the factors leading to the inclusion of EPC in the 
framework of the SEA and related developments in the defence sphere. Hill's 
otherwise perceptive attempt to pre-theorise is of limited use. 
In this respect a more appropriate explanatory framework may be found in 
recourse to a more traditional theoretical model. As identified above^' the primary 
motivating factor in the initiation of the various European proposals in the foreign 
and defence sphere is found in the resurgence of the 'European' security debate in 
the early 1980's. This debate was rooted in the emergence and identification of 
genuinely felt national security c o n c e r n s . T h e s e concerns and the various 
institutional responses tend to suggest that a realist perspective may provide a more 
satisfactory account of this period than the attempts to make use of the models more 
usually associated with European integration. 
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In positing an explanation based on realist assumptions of national security 
and relative power, this is by no means to suggest that a realist paradigm can 
provide the elusive all-embracing single theory. Rather, a realist lens provides the 
essential clarity required to understand and explain the undei-lying impetus for the 
wish, on the part of the principal a c t o r s , t o upgrade the level and nature of co-
operation in the foreign policy and defence spheres. A bald realist framework 
cannot however, adequately encompass all aspects of the developments touched 
upon in this study. 
Nevertheless, while this study does not and cannot lay claim to hold the key 
to the development of a convincing and comprehensive explanatory framework, it 
has perhaps uncovered some of the difficulties and pre-conceptions that need to be 
overcome in the development of a satisfactory theoretical understanding of the place 
of foreign policy and defence/security co-operation in the wider context of post-war 
European integration. 
To this end one must concur with Moravcsik's observation that 'unicausal 
explanations of European integration,..., are at best incomplete and at worst 
misleading'.-^^ This indicates a need to develop a multi-layered theory, perhaps 
drawing upon elements of pre-existing models in much the same fashion as 
Moravcsik has amalgamated various theories of international political economy to 
come up with 'liberal intergovernmental ism'. In this respect the contributions of 
both Hi l l , with his concept of actorness, and Moravcsik's stress on theories of inter-
state bargaining combined with realist assumptions about national security may well 
provide a basis for further development. Secondly there is a pressing need for 
integration theorists to accept and accommodate the idea that integration may be 
possible within the confines of broadly 'intergovernmental' settings. Acceptance of 
this would of course require significant adjustments in the nature and criteria of 
measurement employed by integration theory. The failure, thus far, to do so to any 
significant degree can in many respects account for the paucity of theoretical 
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treatments of the most significant institutional developments since the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome - E.P.C and the European Council. 
Meanwhile, in the continued absence of an adequate single explanatory 
framework are we, as Hil l has suggested, to 'fall back on history'? While this may 
be an appropriate route to follow, it should be recognised that there is an intrinsic 
relationship between history and theory; how we choose to describe history will 
always have theoretical implications. Indeed this is apparent in the general 
conclusions to be drawn from the themes and trends to emerge in the course of this 
thesis. 
Understanding the Legacy of Fouchet 
The debate between intergovernmental ism and supranationalism has set the 
tone and parameters for the study of European integration for many years. Indeed 
the original motivation to embark upon this thesis was to examine the apparent 
struggle between two contrasting and contesting visions of Europe, a struggle which 
appeared to be at its fiercest over the issue of a 'European' foreign and defence 
identity. However, as this study has progressed it has become increasingly clear that 
the characterisation of the search for this identity in these terms is something of a 
blind alley which will not increase our understanding of the issues to any significant 
degree. In short, supranationalism in foreign policy and defence has never seriously 
been on the agenda of the Member States during the lifetime of the Treaty of Rome. 
Yet commentators and theorists alike continue to explain their observations 
in the terms of a struggle between intergovernmental and supranational goals. 
Casting the progress and development of the European foreign and defence debate 
in these terms does have an appealing logic and simplicity, but as this study has 
shown it has been something of a 'phoney war'; we have been receiving reports 
from the scenes of battles that were never actually fought. This is by no means to 
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suggest that the debate has no place in the study of European integration as a whole, 
rather that its place in the study of efforts to create a European foreign and defence 
identity is, by and large, a rhetorical irrelevance, which serves to obscure more than 
it clarifies. 
The prime example of this was seen in the negotiating position adopted by 
the Netherlands throughout the Fouchet negotiations.-^' Examination of these 
negotiations has shown that the supranational stand-point adopted by the Dutch in 
their opposition to the Fouchet proposals was a rhetorical device which formed the 
superficial front-line of a strategy designed to protect the 'cornerstone of Dutch 
p o l i c y ' t h e maintenance of the position of the Atlantic Alliance, and in particular 
the U.S., as the guarantor of European defence. Moreover it should also be re-
stated that while objecting to the absence of supranational ity in the Fouchet 
proposals the Dutch did not at any point during the negotiations propose 
supranational alternatives. The Dutch of course were not alone in this omission, 
none of the participants in the Fouchet negotiations were in any sense inclined to 
back proposals of a supranational character. Indeed in all subsequent developments 
in this policy area there is a marked absence of substantive supranationally inclined 
proposals. In creating the EPC mechanism in 1970, supranational ambition was 
largely confined to peripheral rhetoric and played no part in the actual negotiation 
of the Luxembourg Report'-^-^ while in the negotiations and reports leading to the 
inclusion of EPC in the Single European Act, even the rhetoric of supranational 
ambitions in foreign and defence policy had long been abandoned. 
In this respect we are brought to perhaps the clearest point to emerge in the 
course of this thesis; the sheer persistence of a basic core of ideas about the form of 
a European foreign and defence identity. From the Belgian and Italian proposals of 
1969,^ "^ the creation of the EPC mechanism in 1970, through to the reactivation of 
WEU in 1984 and Title 3 of the Single European Act, each of the proposals and 
reports examined in the course of this study bear the unmistakable imprint of 
F o u c h e t . O f particular importance is the Single European Act, which in bringing 
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both EPC and the European Council into the framework of the Community Treaties 
institutionalises the basic elements of the Fouchet proposals. 
Thus the Single European Act establishes the 'Europe of de Gaulle', but not 
a 'Gaullist Europe'. Whilst the relevant provisions of the Single Act mirror the 
basic institutional structure advocated by de Gaulle in the Fouchet proposals, it is a 
Europe in which the role of France as the predominant actor envisaged by de Gaulle 
is much diminished. Indeed the steady, though relative, decline of French influence 
among its Community partners has been one of the strongest themes running 
throughout this thesis. This decline has been charted from its beginnings in the 
Fouchet negotiations and the realisation that the agenda of the Committee was 
slipping from French g r a s p . I n marked contrast to the positive and flexible 
stance which had characterised the French position at the opening of the 
negotiations, the French response to this realisation issued in the adoption of an 
aggressively rigid negotiating position which contributed significantly to the 
breakdown of negotiations. Thus one may conclude that, unable to control the 
direction of the negotiations, French strategy was deliberately destructive in its 
intent. Indeed from this point onwards one can observe a definite negative and 
reactive trend in French European policy, reflecting their declining ability to take 
the lead in the promotion of European projects. Thus French influence has been 
seen to be exercised more successfully in either opposition, or in reaction to non-
French enterprises. 
The inability of the French to dominate the European foreign and defence 
debate is in many respects related to a further theme to emerge, that of British 
participation as the pre-requisite to the success and credibility of any European 
venture in the foreign policy and defence spheres. Throughout the post-war period, 
the success or failure of the many and varied attempts to make progress in the 
foreign policy and defence fields has hinged on the participation or non-participation 
of Britain. Britain's close relationship with the U.S.A. in defence matters and 
underlying fears of French, German or Franco-German domination of Western 
293 
Europe have all been contributory factors in the decision on the part of various 
Member States of the Community to insist on the guarantee of British participation 
as the price of their involvement. In this respect the successful establishment of 
EPC in 1970 was in no short measure a direct consequence of the acceptance of the 
principle of British entry to the Community on the part of France . Indeed EPC is 
an area of Community-related activity in which Britain has proved to be an 
extremely positive and influential force, contrasting markedly with its overall image 
as one of the more difficult and disruptive Community States. 
However, to return to the major theme of this thesis: this study has clearly 
shown that there exists among the overwhelming majority of Member States a broad 
consensus on the institutional character of a European foreign and defence identity. 
Whilst there are number of issue areas which have been, and in some respects 
remain, constant barriers to full agreement, it is nevertheless a consensus which has 
demonstrated a remarkable degree of persistence. This however is not to conclude 
that the line between the Fouchet proposals and the inclusion of the EPC mechanism 
in the Single European Act is evidence of an inexorable deterministic logic at work. 
Whilst EPC had emerged as the preferred vehicle for further progress in the 
development of a European foreign and defence identity, the use of the reactivated 
WEU as a means of advancing the collective security ambitions of the majority of 
Member States was a clear indication that they were not inextricably tied to a 
Community-related route. Indeed the pattern of progress and development in this 
sphere has been guided by the combination of pragmatic responses to situations of 
crisis, the political constraints and ambitions of various Member States, and the 
wider context of Western Europe's relationship with the U.S.A. Yet while the 
pattern of development has been subject to a number of differing and conflicting 
pressures the form of the response has remained fundamentally that proposed in the 
Fouchet Plans. (-
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